*1 regarding the Telford was not aircraft.
subject E’s when air- to J & control being
craft used in interstate com-
merce, very required the stat- management
utory exemption.
agreement relationship did create E and J & Telford that entitles J
& E to the it seeks. is:
Judgment affirmed. Remand the Su-
perior pay E Air to order J &
assessment. 90ME CO.,
BRENT LEASING INC.
STATE TAX ASSESSOR
Docket No. Ken-00-324.
Supreme Judicial Court Maine.
Argued Feb. 2001.
Decided June *2 Pierce, Roy T. Esq., (orally), irig Harbor, Michael L. from returning and to Bar Sheehan, Preti, Esq., Beliveau, Flaherty, any stops. without intermediate theOn LLC, Haley, Portland, Pachios & plain- for all, cruises, majority, if not of the tiff. Friendship IV crossed into international waters. Rowe, General,
G. Attorney Steven Garrett, Attorney Crombie J.D. Asst. Gen- [¶ 3] The Assessor issued an assessment eral, (orally), Olson, Clifford B. Asst. At- taxes, against Leasing Brent for use inter- General, torney Augusta, for defendant. est, penalties. and Leasing Brent filed a timely petition for pursu- reconsideration WATHEN, C.J., Panel: and § (Supp.2000). ant to 36 M.R.S.A. CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, The upheld Assessor the assessment and SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and added additional interest. Brent Leasing CALKINS, JJ. sought Superior pur- review Court CALKINS, J. § suant to 36 M.R.S.A. 151 and 5 M.R.S.A. Brent Leasing appeals § parties The filed cross- (Kennebec judgment Superior of the motions summary judgment on the J.) Marden, County, affirming a decision stipulated Court, facts. Superior in a of the Tax State Assessor which denied it thorough decision, and well-reasoned an exemption from the Maine Sales and motion, granted the Assessor’s affirming Law, §§ Use Tax 1751-2113 the decision of the Assessor. (1990 Supp.2000). & Leasing Brent ar- gues vessel, TV, that its Friendship II. INSTRUMENTALITY OF instrumentality INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN pursuant the use tax COMMERCE § (Supp.2000). M.R.S.A. We
agree that
Leasing
Brent
is not entitled to
[¶ 4] Submission of this matter on
an exemption, and
affirm
portion
summary judgment
appropriate
be
judgment.1
of the
disputes
cause there are no
of material
fact. Estate
DiMillo v. State Tax As
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
sessor,
154, ¶ 2,
ME
parties stipulated
[¶ 2] to the facts.
386. We
de
Superior
review
novo the
In May
Brent Leasing purchased a Court’s determinations of law. Fairchild
Friendship
vessel called the
IV Massa-
Corp.
Semiconductor
v. State Tax Asses
paid
chusetts.
It
no
sales
use tax to
¶
sor,
1999 ME
any state.
thirty days
Within
chase,
Leasing’s
[¶ 5] Brent
entitlement
to a
Friendship
IV sailed to Bar
tax exemption
Harbor.
for the
Leasing
Brent
used the Friend-
IV de-
pends upon
IV to
passengers on whale
whether the vessel is a “water-
watching
depart-
and other nature cruises
purchaser
craft that is
in use
Leasing
Superior
1. Brent
also claims that the
instead
date utilized
the Asses-
affirming
agrees
Court erred in
the Assessor’s deci-
sor. Because the Assessor
with Brent
interest,
penalties
affirming
Leasing’s position
penalties
sion to assess
and in
on
portions
judgment concerning
Assessor's calculation of interest. The Asses-
objection
penalties
sor has no
to the waiver of the
and interest will be vacated and
penalty
against
assessed
remanded for calculation of the correct
agrees
July
interest accrues from
amount of interest.
instrumentality
instrumentality
qualifies
or for-
cruises
as an
as an
1760(41).2
Leasing argues
commerce.” M.R.S.A.
commerce. Brent
meaning that
Our
is to determine the
is a
phrase “foreign
task
Legislature intended when
precedent
defin-
of art with extensive
term
*3
chose these words.
in
of the Com-
phrase
the
the context
ing
Consti-
of the
States
merce Clause
United
statute,
a
When we construe
that because the
tution.3 It contends
plain meaning of the
we first look to the
art,
a term of
the
phrase is
intent.
language
legislative
to determine
“foreign
commerce”
Corp., 1999 ME
Fairchild Semiconductor
by
meaning given to it
decisions
same
¶
170, 7,
Only
A.2d at
if the
740
587.
phrase
interpreting the
in the Commerce
ambiguous
resort
language
do we
Assessor,
hand,
on the other
Clause.
glean
statutory
extrinsic aids to
intent.
not
argues that the
did
intend
Raceway,
Lewiston
Inc. v. Maine State
phrase to be coextensive with the
663,
Comm’n,
Racing
Harness
Commerce Clause.
(Me.1991). “In
legis
of a
absence
definition,
given
the term must
a
lative
be
Thus,
the issue comes down to
8]
[¶
meaning consistent with the overall statu
intended the
whether
in
tory context and must
construed
Clause definition of
Commerce
matter,
light
subject
of
purpose
of the
to be
to section
applicable
commerce”
consequences
partic
the statute and the
of
1760(41) whether it intended a
or
narrow-
interpretation.” Reagan
ular
v. Racal
If the
in-
meaning.
er
¶
Inc.,
8,
A.2d
Mortgage,
ME
phrase
to have the same
tended
(citation
omitted).
and quotation
meaning and to be coextensive with the
statutory
avoid
constructions that
“‘[W]e
Clause,
likely
then we would
Commerce
absurd, illogical,
create
or inconsistent re
interpret
have to
”
Corp.,
Fairchild
sults.’
Semiconductor
a
watercraft
granting
¶
170, 7,
(quoting
1999 ME
ly
it is
in
as
read when used
the Com-
necessity
of a
tax
It
use
is obvious.
Clause,
Leasing may
merce
not be
personal
is
that much
prop-
well known
to
exemption.
entitled
the tax
erty
purchased
outside the borders
Supreme
recently
brought
Court has
the state and
into the
state
Congress
reminded us that when
uses the
This
here.
State without authori-
phrase
in
ty
beyond
“interstate or
to tax sales
its territorial lim-
statute,
necessarily carry
a
complement
does
its.
some tax to
Without
tax,
same
in
supplement
only
the Commerce Clause.
the sales
—
Stores,
Adams,
City
In
advantage
enjoyed by
Circuit
Inc. v.
would a tax
-,
buyer
purchases
S.Ct.
who
outside of the state
(2001),
here,
L.Ed.2d 234
that
the Court held
and uses that
but also
phrase
in
“workers
local merchants would be at a disadvan-
commerce,”
in
tage against competition by
interstate
as used
the Fed-
out of state
n
Act,
by
may
eral Arbitration
was not intended
merchants who
be able
offer
to
Lines,
(Mo.
Greyhound
Streckfus,
4. See also Cent.
Inc. v. Mea
Louis v.
505 S.W.2d
73-74
653, 655-56,
ley,
1974).
334 U.S.
68 S.Ct.
(1948) (holding
going
L.Ed. 1633
that a bus
to
points
crossing
and from
in the same state but
Congress’
stated that
use of the
during
journey
into another state
is en
phrases "affecting
"involving
commerce” or
gaged in
commerce within the
regulate
commerce” evidences its intent "to
Clause).
meaning of the Commerce
The Mis
authority
to the outer limits of its
under the
souri
Court has likewise held that
Clause,”
phrases,
but
"en
transportation
on a
boat
commerce,”
gaged
"used
in commerce” or
in
boundary
jour
nonstop
river in a continuous
meaning.
City,
have a more limited
Circuit
ney
point
from and to the same
in Missouri
-U.S. -,
at
L.Ed.2d
121 S.Ct.
during which the boat crosses into the waters
City
of Illinois is interstate commerce.
St.
1760(41) exemption to
tax bur-
the section
by reason of lower
enacted
prices
lower
doubtful,
highly
typical
A
is the
that limitation.
It is
dens.
illustration
meet
tax,
in
non-taxable
purpose
chase of an automobile
the use
given the
for use
state
a citizen
this state
to
intended
to col-
obliged
A Maine dealer
here.
instrumentalities
more
lect
tax on such a transaction
a sizeable
than the
constitution re-
commerce
federal
a use
when made
this state. Without
suggested to us
It has not been
quires.
aggregate purchases
tax
of this
any
public
Legislature had
other
that the
result in a severe
character would
for which it
or rationale in mind
policy
State,
loss
a serious
present
expand
intended
handicap to Maine dealers.
beyond
confines of
con-
Johnson,
Hanbro,
legisla-
is no
158 Me.
stitutional restraint. There
public
history indicating
policy or
tive
such
Legislature may
for which the
rationale
of the use
purpose
Because
reading
expansive
have intended
tax,
apparent
it is
Thus,
phrase
commerce.”
any exemptions
from the tax
1760(41)exemption
the section
construe
required
be limited to those otherwise
*5
the
apply
only
to vessels
when
Commerce
the
constitution
laws or
federal
or other
an
from the use
requires
exemption
by public
those
Clause
policy
demanded
concerns.
the
Clause does
Extending
exemption beyond
the
that re-
tax. Because
statutes, or
an
to the Friend-
quired by public policy,
exemption
other
not mandate
concedes,
IV,
the
constitution
not advance
Leasing
federal
does
as Brent
we
1760(41)
the purpose of the use tax.
that
does not
conclude
exemption
grant an
to it.
Legislature
[¶
aware that the
13]
is
ability
Commerce Clause restricts a state’s
Furthermore,
have said on
sev
[¶ 15]
to tax instrumentalities
exemptions
that
are
eral occasions
tax
con
commerce,
foreign
but it
that
is also aware
narrowly.
v. Town
strued
Silverman
prohibited
in-
taxing
states are not
from
(Me.1982)
Alton,
103, 105
(stating
strumentalities of interstate and
uncertainty
meaning of
that
as to the
the
long
so
tax meets the
the
requires resolving the uncer
exemption
requirements
established
against
exemption);
tainty
Harold
challenged
Court.6 Brent
has not
(stating
MacQuinn, 415
at 820
that
A.2d
the imposition of the
tax on constitu-
in
exemptions are entitled to reasonable
grounds,
taxing
tional
and it
that
concedes
not
to situations
terpretation but
extended
Friendship
IV does not violate
coming
purposes);
clearly
within their
not
Commerce Clause.
Assessor,
Inc. v.
Tax
675
SST & S.
State
(Me.1996)
518,
(stating that taxa
A.2d
521
Because the
limitation,
excep-
it
the rule
is
aware of the constitutional
tion is
(1977). A tax on
6. A
com-
affirmed all other
DANA, J., CLIFFORD, J., with whom
joins, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Attorney represents General's office after the 1980 effective date of section 1760(41). eight days promulgated rule was this