86 Pa. Super. 414 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1925
Argued October 8, 1925. This was an action in assumpsit to recover the balance of the purchase price of a motor truck sold by plaintiff to defendant. The sole defense raised by the affidavit of defense and supported by defendant's evidence at the trial was that plaintiff had represented that the truck had a capacity of one and one-half tons, while, as a matter of fact, its capacity was only *416 three-quarters of a ton. At the trial plaintiff admitted, under cross-examination, that the truck was a used motor truck, and that he had not complied with any of the requirements of the Act of June 30, 1919, P.L. 702, relating to the sale of used or second-hand motor vehicles. At the conclusion of the testimony defendant's point for binding instructions was refused and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for the amount of his claim. Motions for a new trial and for judgment n.o.v. were overruled and from the judgment entered on the verdict comes this appeal.
The principal contention of appellant is that the contract between the parties is illegal and unenforceable, because it developed upon the cross-examination of plaintiff that the motor truck in question was a second-hand motor vehicle and that plaintiff failed and neglected to comply with the provisions of the Act of June 30, 1919, P.L. 702. The learned judge of the court below indicated in his opinion discharging the motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial that, if this question had been raised by the affidavit of defense, plaintiff probably could not recover. He held, however, that as that defense was not raised by the pleadings or at the trial, it was unavailable to defendant, because Section 16 of the Practice Act of May 14, 1915, P.L. 483, provides that "neither party shall be permitted at the trial to make any defense which is not set forth in the affidavit of defense, or plaintiff's reply, as the case may be, except as provided in Sections 7 and 13." All that that provision of the statute means is that a party may not, at the trial, make a defense not pleaded by him. It did not affect the rule that a plaintiff who fails to make out a case cannot recover. This Court said in Stein and Samson v. Slomkowski,
The main question raised here is whether our courts will lend their aid to the enforcement of a contract made in violation of the Act of 1919, P.L. 702. At the time the statute was enacted, the stealing of motor vehicles in the Commonwealth had become notorious. That is the mischief the legislature designed to prevent by it. A form of procedure was prescribed to be followed in transferring the title to used motor vehicles in the state. Failure to follow it is made a crime. A contract and transfer in violation of the provisions of the act is not innocent but criminal. The act was intended for the general protection of the public, rather than the individual parties to a transaction. The public policy of the state as to the subject was declared. It is clear, therefore, that a contract made in violation of such a statute is unlawful, unenforceable and void, and our courts will not, by enforcing it, declare it lawful. It is argued that defendant has possession of the motor vehicle and that it is inequitable to permit him to escape payment of the balance of the purchase price. This argument would have weight if the only parties concerned were plaintiff and defendant; but, "in enforcing a policy in the interests of the whole public, the law takes but little note of the conduct of the immediate parties to the contract; the rule is, that courts, having in view public interests, will not lend their aid to the enforcement of an unlawful contract." (Swing v. Munson,
The first and second assignments of error are sustained, and the judgment is reversed and here entered for defendant. *419