Brenner v. J. J. Brenner Oyster Co.Brenner v. J. J. Brenner Oyster Co.
Annie Brenner sold the timber upon á tract of land in Thurston county. After the timber was
In 1901, Charles Brenner, the late husband of respondent Annie Brenner, had an oyster business partnership with his brother J. J. Brenner, the predecessor of appellant J. J. Brenner Oyster Compаny. In that year, the partnership purchased from the state of Washington the second-class tidelands on Eld Inlеt lying in front of government lot 2, section 12, township 18 north, range 3, W.W.M., in Thurs-ton county.
The state’s conveyance contаined a metes and bounds reference to the government meander line, which was erroneously placed inland on government lot 2 a considerable distance from the line of ordinary high tide. The second-class tidelands neither touched the government meander line nor overlapped any part of governmеnt lot 2. The land here in question is that part of government lot 2 which lies between the erroneous government mеander line and the true line of ordinary high tide, which marks the limits of the second-class tidelands.
In 1902, the partnership was dissolved. The partners made an agreement for the division of the second-class tidelands and implemented it by the exchange of quitclaim deeds, in which their wives joined. In drawing the deeds, they copied the same mеtes and bounds description of the erroneous meander line that was used in the state’s con-, veyancе to them. It is not contended that the partnership had acquired any right or title to the land in question by reason оf the description used by the state in conveying the second-class tidelands. The deeds exchanged by the part
In 1924, respondent Annie Brenner acquired all of government lot 2, which, of course, included the land in question. Appellant contends that this after-acquired title to the land which was described in respondent’s quitclaim deed, inures to the benefit of aрpellant by reason of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 10571 [cf.
“Whenever any person . . . having . . . conveyed by deed any lands in this state, . . . who . . . had no title to such land, . . . and who . . . shall acquire a title to such lands . . . , such title shall inure to the benefit of the . . . сonveyee ...”
This section was enacted by the territorial Laws of 1871, § 1, p. 195. It made no reference to аny particular kind of deed, but applied the principle of after-acquired title to deeds in generаl. However, the application of the principle of after-acquired title was later limited as to quitclaim deeds by the Laws of 1886, § 5, p. 178, as amended by the Laws of 1929, chapter 33, § 11, p. 35, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 10554 [cf.
“Quitclaim deeds mаy be in substance in the following form: The grantor (here insert the name or names and place of residenсe), for and in consideration of (here insert consideration) conveys and quit claims to (here insert grantеe’s name or names) all' interest in the following described real estate (here insert description), situated in the county of............................................................, State of Washington.
“Dated this...................................................... day of.............................., 19............
“Every deed in substance in the above form, when otherwise duly еxecuted, shall be deemed and held a good and sufficient conveyance, release and quit claim to the grantee, his heirs and assigns in fee of all the then existing legal and equitable rights of the grantor in the premisеs therein described, but shall not extend to the after acquired title unless words are added expressing such intention.” (Italics ours.)
Under these statutes construed together, after-acquired title is conveyed by (1) warranty deeds, and (2) quitclaim deeds which express an intention so to do, but
The appellant relies upon
West Seattle Land & Imp.
Co.
v. Novelty Mill Co.,
This rule makes a distinction between the effect of quitclaim deeds which have habendum clauses and those which do not. Such a distinction is not sound. The addition of an habendum clause does nоt change the effect of a quitclaim deed in any way.
Every
quitclaim deed conveys to the grantee whatеver present interest the grantor has. In
McCoy v. Lowrie,
44 Wn. (2d) 483,
“It has been the law since statehood that a quitclaim deed is just as effectual to convey the title to real estate as any other deed, and a grantee of a quitсlaim deed has the same rights as the grantee of a warranty deed, with the exception that he is given no wаrranties. A quitclaim deed is just as good as any other deed, if the grantor has the title to convey. Ankeny v. Clark,1 Wash. 549 ,20 Pac. 583 ; McInerney v. Beck,10 Wash. 515 ,39 Pac. 130 .”
We overrule West Seattle Land & Imp. Co. v. Novelty Mill Co., supra, and Bradley V. Fackler, supra, to the extent that they conflict with this opinion.
We now hold thаt an habendum clause in a quitclaim deed does not convey after-acquired title because it doеs not (1) express an intention so to do, or (2) convert it into a warranty deed.
Annie Brenner’s acquisition of government lot 2 did not inure to the benefit of appellant.
The judgments are affirmed.
All Concur.
June 5, 1956. Petition for rehearing granted.