Christian Brenneman, as parent and personal representative of Samantha Bren-neman and Amanda Brenneman, deceased, appeals from an adverse summary judgment in his action seeking damages for the children’s death in an automobile collision. The defendants, Jay Stuelke and Lori Stuelke, are alleged to have been social hosts of the deceased childrеn and one Todd Graham sometime prior to the collision that killed Samantha and Amanda. That collision occurred off the premises of the defendants. Plaintiff asserted that the defendants were negligent in serving liquor to Todd Graham and then allowing him to drive away from their premises with Samantha and Amanda in his motor vehicle.
The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the social-host immunity crеated by Iowa Code section 123.49 (1999). Plaintiff sought to avoid that defense by urging that his claims were based on defendants’ duty to control the conduct of Graham while he was on their premises. The district court sustained the motion for summary judgment. After reviewing the record and considering the arguments presented, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Plaintiffs petition alleges the following facts. Prior to the cоllision that killed Samantha and Amanda, they were present with Graham on defendants’ premises. Defendant Jay Stuelke was Graham’s employer. Defendants were giving a party to which Samantha, Amanda, and Todd Graham had been invited. Defendants provided intoxicating liquor to Todd Graham while he was on their premises. In addition it is alleged that, when Todd Graham drove away from defendants’ home wherе the party took place with Samantha and Amanda in his motor vehicle, defendants were aware that he was in an intoxicated condition.
In making the record on the motion for summary judgment, thе foregoing facts were assumed to be true. Defendants urged that they were immune from liability based on those facts by reason of Iowa Code section 123.49(l)(a), which provides:
A person other thаn a person required to hold a license or permit under this chapter who dispenses or gives an alcoholic beverage, wine, or beer in violation of this subsection [prohibiting the dispеnsing of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person] is not civilly liable to an injured person or the estate of a person for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of the alcoholic beverage, wine, or beer.
By its terms, section 123.49 ends the “social host” liability that was previously recognized in
Clark v. Mincks,
Plaintiffs specify four particulars in which they allege defendants were negligent: (1) in serving Graham alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication; (2) in serving Graham alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication when they knew he had a drinking problem; (3) in allowing Graham to leave the party as a driver with children in the vehicle; and (4) in failing to take any action to protect the children, knowing they werе passengers in a vehicle driven by an intoxicated person.
In reviewing the allegations of the petition, it is clear that the alleged
We are aware of a trilogy of cases recognizing social-host liability for the furnishing of liquor to persons not of legal age to consume alcoholic beverages.
See Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity,
Plaintiff seeks to avert the defendants’ statutory immunity from social-host liability relying on the principle set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 318 (1965). That section of the Restatement provides:
If the actor permits a third person to use land or chattels in his possession otherwise than as a servant, he is, if present, under a duty to exerсise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasоnable risk of bodily harm to them, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the third person, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
The duty described in section 318 is viewed narrowly and guided by the principle that “the scope of the duty turns on the foreseeability of harm to the injured person.”
Morgan v. Perlowski,
In Morgan a claim was brought by a social guest against a host for injuries received from a third person while attending a party at the host’s residence. Id. at 725. Adopting section 318, the court concluded,
[a]s a matter of public policy, it is reasonable to impose a limitеd duty upon a possessor of land, who is present on the land, to control the conduct of social guests.
Id. at 728.
We have recognized some limits on the duty of a possessor of land to control the conduct of third parties. For example, in
Davis v. Kwik-Shop, Inc.,
The duty mandated by section 318 is “to control conduct of a
licensee
to prevent harm to others.”
Morgan,
Kansas has adopted a requirement that the injury occur on the land in order for section 318 to be applicable. In
Beckner v. Jensen,
Ohio similarly adopted the requirement that the injury occur on the premises in
Gelbman v. Second National Bank of Warren,
for extending a duty to control third parties to a prоperty owner for the acts of unrelated individuals ... who have left the owner’s premises, have negligently entered a public thoroughfare outside the purview of the owner’s control, and thereby negligently injure a third party.
Gelbman,
Plaintiff urges that there were acts on defendants’ premises that triggered liability under section 318 by reason of the language “duty to exercise reasonable cаre so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from ... conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm.” He urges that such a risk was created from actions that took place on the premises. In resolving this issue we focus on (1) the language of the Restatement rule, and (2) the acts that occurred on defendant’s premises. The language of the rule is aimed at acts that “intentionally” harm others. No acts of this nature on Graham’s part have been alleged. In addition, to the extent that the Restatement rule establishes liability for acts that “create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm,” the only acts by Graham that are alleged to create such risk are acts for which defendants are immune from liability under section 123.49. When the legislature has immunized specific acts from civil liability, an injured party may not avoid that immunity by alleging that the act violated a broad general duty. We reject the effort to do that in the present case. Summary judgment was properly granted.
AFFIRMED.