188 A. 160 | Pa. | 1936
Argued October 8, 1936. John Brennan died December 23, 1913, survived by his wife, Alice Brennan, but leaving no issue. The parties were married in 1873 and lived together for forty years. Decedent executed his last will a few hours before his death. It is dated December 22, 1913, and was probated January 8th, 1914.
By the first item of his will he gave to his wife $10,000 and all of his household goods absolutely. He then made seven cash bequests to clergymen for masses, totaling $2,350. Then followed the ninth and tenth paragraphs of the will, the interpretation of which is here before us. They read as follows:
"Ninth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, Alice Brennan, with the right to sell and dispose of any of my real estate, with authority to make any and all deeds, conveyances and assurances, and execute the same, according to law, and holding the purchaser thereof free from any liability as to the application of the purchase money.
"Tenth: After the death of my wife, I give the remainder of my estate in equal shares to my sister-in-law, Bridget Sweeney, to my brothers, Richard Brennan and William P. Brennan, and my niece, Mary Ellen Griffen, to them and their heirs and assigns forever."
By the eleventh paragraph testator appointed his wife executrix and stipulated that "she be not required to file any bond, inventory or account whatsoever."
Following her husband's death, the widow took possession of all the assets of his estate, which included both real and personal property worth approximately $37,220.58. There was in addition one parcel of real estate *413 appraised at $6,000. She possessed no property other than this principal amount received from her husband at the time of his death. She died on September 9, 1932, without having filed any inventory or accounting of the estate. Her own estate at the time of her death consisted wholly of the residue of the estate of the husband, and was composed of approximately $28,000 of personalty and $6,000 of realty. She left a will wherein she appointed William P. Brennan as her executor and devised all the property in her hands to certain legatees, treating the residue of her husband's estate as though it were her own absolutely.
The Potter Title and Trust Company obtained letters of administration d. b. n. c. t. a. upon the estate of John Brennan and cited the executor of the widow's estate to file an account of the estate of John Brennan in his hands. Her executor claimed that the widow received an absolute estate from her husband and was therefore under no duty to account. The Orphans' Court, however, ordered an accounting which the executor of the widow subsequently filed, showing a balance for distribution of $26,027.59. Following the audit of this account, the court decreed distribution of the entire balance to the Potter Title and Trust Company as administrator, holding that the widow had only a life estate under her husband's will, with power to consume, and the provision in the husband's will for a remainder over to named relatives after his wife's death became effective. From the dismissal of his exceptions to this decree of the court below, the executor of the widow's estate has appealed to this court.
The question raised by this appeal is whether under the will the widow took the remainder of her husband's estate absolutely, or whether she acquired a life estate only with power to consume.
In attempting to reconcile the apparently conflicting provisions of this will, our primary aim must be to ascertain and give full effect to the intention of testator as it *414
appears from the four corners of the will. "In construing wills the courts are always searching for the testator's true intent": Swentzell's Est.,
However, the situation which confronts us here was given careful consideration recently by this Court in Byrne's Est.,
Turning to the will before us, we are of opinion that it falls within the second group of cases described in Byrne'sEstate, supra, as it appears that testator intended to give his wife a life interest only in his estate, with power to consume the principal while she lived, and upon her death the remainder or unconsumed residue of his estate was then to be paid over in equal shares to the designated beneficiaries.
It is to be observed that in creating the interest of his wife in the remainder, testator did not use words of inheritance or absolute ownership. In this respect the present will more strongly points to an intention to create a life estate than does the one in Byrne's Estate, where the gift to the sister of testatrix contained the word "absolutely." No such word was used by this testator in designating the estate which he gave to his wife. It is evident that testator knew how to make a gift of an absolute estate, for in the first paragraph he gave $10,000 and all his household goods to his wife "absolutely and forever," and likewise in the tenth paragraph he gave the remainder to relatives and added, "to them and their heirs and assigns forever." The first, ninth and tenth paragraphs considered together, show definitely, therefore, that testator meant to give his wife an estate for life only in his property.
The construction urged by the appellant would render inoperative the entire tenth paragraph of the will. As was pointed out in Byrne's Estate, supra, (p. 519), this is counter to the established rule that a construction is to be sought which will, if possible, render every word of a will operative, rather than have some words become *416
idle and nugatory. "It is a well understood rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every part of the will and to all the words used by testatrix":Clark v. Dennison,
It is apparent from the will that testator desired to make full provision for his wife during her lifetime and intended to give her the right to use such portion of the principal of his estate as might be necessary for her comfort and maintenance. Under such circumstances a power to consume the principal is primarily a matter of the testator's intention, and although not expressly given, will be implied where necessary to carry out that intention: Hege v. Ickes,
It follows that as the widow took only a life interest she had no power to dispose of the residue of the estate of her husband at her death, and the court below properly awarded the balance of the estate to the administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. of the estate of John Brennan.
The order of the court below is affirmed, costs to be paid out of the estate.