82 N.Y.S. 860 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1903
The action is upon a membership certificate or insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff, whose occupation was stated to be that of a physician, insuring him against “. bodily injuries sustained during Ms membership through involuntary, external, violent
On the afternoon of the 18th of February, 1902, the plaintiff was a passenger on a Lexington avenue car. The car was crowded and he was obliged to stand. The car started suddenly to go around the curve from Twenty-third street to Broadway. The plaintiff was holding on to a strap and was swung violently around, his weight resting on his left foot which was held in place by the feet of other people, and his knee was twisted and strained. He felt quite a little pain at the time, and when the car reached Eighteenth street he transferred to another car and went to his home at 213 West Twelfth street. The knee continued to be quite painful and commenced to swell that evening. He put on cold applications and remained home. In the morning the pain and swelling continued, but he made a necessary visit to a patient nearby and then returned home and there remained. The next day the knee was still more swollen and painful and he could scarcely move it at all. On the twenty-first its condition was such that he was obliged to go to bed and have it treated. A physician was called and the knee was' put in splints and kept immovable and bandaged. He remained in bed for nearly three weeks.
The principal question presented is whether the accident “ immediately, continuously and wholly ” disabled the plaintiff from performing any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation. We are of opinion that it did within the fair intent and meaning of the policy. The only act that he performed as a physician was to
In the proof of claim filed by the plaintiff he stated the time and circumstances of the injury, but he only claimed total disability from the third day when he was obliged to take to his bed. It is claimed that this prevents a recovery on the theory that it shows that total disability was not immediate. This contention cannot be sustained. He claimed for a total disability from the twenty-first of February to the fourteenth of March, a period of three weeks, and the recovery was for that period. His failure to make the claim for the first three days may have been a waiver of the insuiv anee for that time and it was some evidence to be considered by the jury on the question of whether his disability was immediate; but he was not estopped thereby from claiming immediate,, continuous and total disability in order to recover the insurance for the period for which he had presented a claim, which was more favorable to the' insurance company than the facts warranted.
The plaintiff’s recovery was less than one hundred dollars, and under section 332 of the Municipal Court Act (Laws of 1902, chap. 580) he was only entitled to recover an allowance of ten dollars as costs upon the recovery. He was, however, allowed twelve dollars.
It follows, therefore, that the determination of the Appellate
O’Brien, Ingraham, McLaughlin and Hatch, JJ., concurred.
■ Determination of Appellate Term reversed, and judgment of Municipal Court modified by reducing the statutory allowance of costs to ten dollars,, and -as modified affirmed, with costs.