120 Ga. 929 | Ga. | 1904
The Brenau Association, a corporation, filed its petition in the superior court of Hall county, to enjoin the sale of its property under an execution for taxes, claimed to be due tbe City of Gainesville for the year 1903, the ground on which the injunction was sought being “that under the constitution and laws of this State said property is exempt from taxation, and was exempt from taxation during and for said year 1903, and said tax execution is void and illegal, and said levy illegal and^a trespass.”' The petition alleges that in the year 1900 the plaintiff was incorporated by an order of the superior court of Hall county, under the provisions of the Civil Code, §2351, “for the purpose of' establishing and maintaining a college for the education of girls and young women, a conservatory of music and art, and an academy or college for the education of boys and young men, and a Chautauqua for the general educational interest of the community, and to run in connection with said proposed business a boarding department, and charge for and collect from those availing themselves of the benefit 'of said institutions such compensation as will be reasonable and just, with authority to enforce good order, receive donations, make purchases, sell and convey property, not for the purpose of trade and profit, but for promoting the general design of such institutions and advance the cause of education.” The petition for incorporation was filed by A. W.
The defendant, the marshal of the City of Gainesville, demurred to the petition, on the grounds, (1) that it shows on its face that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed, and sets forth no cause of action; (2) that the petition shows on its face that the Brenau Association is at most but an educational business enterprise; and (3) that while the plaintiff is incorporated, as the “ Brenau Association,” and is educational in its scheme and purpose, its property is not exempt from taxation, because used for private or corporate profit. The defendant also filed an answer, in which many of the allegations of the petition were admitted, but it was denied that the income of the property was devoted to the necessary expenses of the college, and it was averred that the plaintiff was a,private business corporation, organized and conducted for purposes, of private and corporate profit. A plea in bar was also filed, which set up that the case should not proceed, because the Supreme Court, in the case of Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 292, decided adversely and conclusively against the present contention of the plaintiff; “ that the issues and the parties were the same, and that it ought to be and is a final adjudication of the questions and issues involved in this proceeding.” On the hearing the plaintiff introduced in evidence a certified copy of its charter, the material portions of which have already been, in substance, set out;-the bond for title under which it held the property levied on; the execution against the property, with the levy by the marshal; and its duly verified amended petition. The defendant introduced its sworn answer to the petition, and an affidavit by Biley, one of the original incorporators of the plaintiff. Biley testified that the property levied on was put into the corporation at the price of $42,000 ; that he, Yan Hoose,Pearce, and
In the case of Linton v. Lucy Cobb Institute, cited supra, the property sought to be taxed belonged to a corporation which had no stock and which could not exist except for educational purposes ; and had the corporation earned ten times as much as it cost to conduct it, not one dollar could have legally gone to the trustees or to any of the parties whose gifts had made the institution possible. In the present case there is nothing whatever to prevent the incorporators, from applying all the earnings of the corporation to their own private benefit; and should the corporation be dissolved, as at any time might be the case, its property, greatly enhanced in value from the extensive improvements which have been put upon it from the proceeds of its enterprise, would pass absolutely to the individuals composing it. Thus a clear distinction is apparent between this case and the Lucy Cobb Institute case. A grant of exemption from taxation, being in the nature of a renunciation of sovereignty, must, as a general rule, be construed most strongly • against the grantee, and can never be permitted ,to extend, either in scope or duration, beyond what the terms of the concession clearly require. 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d ed.) 302. As before stated, exemption from taxation is exceptional, relieving one person, corporation, or class of property, and casting a corresponding burden upon all others; and however meritorious and deserving of encouragement the object thus attained may be, an inequality is created which is repugnant to common right and inconsistent with the principles of republican government. There is a line of cases from other jurisdictions holding that the rule of strict construction should be relaxed in dealing with exemptions of property of religious, charitable, and. edu
Affirmed.