137 A. 260 | Pa. | 1927
Argued February 7, 1927.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of common pleas to which an issue, framed by the orphans' court, was referred for trial. The question to be determined was whether the name affixed to a will was forged. The jury found it had been forged, but the trial judge on motion for judgment n. o. v. set the verdict aside and entered judgment in favor of the proponents of the will, thus sustaining the validity of the signature. Under the rule in Cross's Est.,
The trial judge, who sits to determine an issue devisavit vel non, acts as a chancellor. He is not bound by a verdict when it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, which is addressed to him quite as much as to the jury. If his professional and official conscience is not satisfied that it is sufficient to sustain a verdict against the will, either because it lacks probative force or inadequacy, it becomes his duty to get the verdict aside: Kustus v. Hager,
The circumstances attending the execution of the will were these: Testatrix had been blind for some years and had been confined through illness to her room a few days *271 before the will was executed. When about to place her signature on the document she called in her brother William, the principal beneficiary, to assist. He placed his left arm about her wrist, raised her in bed and with his right hand placed over her right hand wrote her name. Thereafter the subscribing witnesses attested the will as above indicated.
It is insisted this method of affixing the signature did not comply with our Act of Assembly in that "the will was not signed at the end thereof." Whether a testator can write at all makes no difference in determining the validity of a will, nor does it matter whether he is so stricken that he cannot write, or can write only with difficulty. Where testator's mental conception is entirely clear and he desires to sign the will, but his physical powers unassisted will not permit it, and such assistance is called in, the incident of assistance becomes immaterial so long as there is a conscious wish of the testator that his hand should make the signature. His participation in the slightest degree, or acquiescence in or adoption of the signature is sufficient: McClure v. Redman,
The remaining question, as to whether there was evidence sufficient in quantity and quality to sustain the verdict, needs but little attention. The record has been examined with great care, and we are satisfied the trial judge was well within the rules laid down by this court in setting aside the verdict: Tetlow's Est.,
The will was a natural one; the property was given to her brother, her only close relative then living. The assignments have all been considered. They are overruled and the judgment of the court below is affirmed. *272