OPINION
{1} This is a consolidated appeal from orders of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) denying Workers’ applications for supplementary compensation orders. In it, we consider whether provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), NMSA 1978, §§ 52 — 1—41 (1999) and -42 (1990), that limit the duration of benefit payments for those workers disabled due to mental impairment, violate the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution. We also consider whether the same provisions violate the mandate of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 through -12213 (2000). We hold that there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory violation.
I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
{2} In August 1999, the WCJ entered compensation orders awarding temporary total disability benefits to Workers Breen and Carrasco (Workers) for injuries that resulted in temporary total disability due to a conditioned psychological response to odors and dust. Employer Carlsbad Municipal Schools and Insurer New Mexico Public School Insurance Authority (Employer/Insurer) appealed these compensation orders to this Court, which upheld the orders in a memorandum opinion filed on May 29, 2001. Following the mandate from this Court to the district court, Employer/Insurer submitted payment to Workers that totaled 100 weeks of compensation pursuant to the WCA. See §§ 52-l-41(B); -42(A)(3).
{3} Workers then moved for supplementary compensation orders, arguing that since this Court upheld the award of temporary total disability benefits and did not limit them, Workers were due more than the 100 weeks of benefits because the WCJ’s original order was “ongoing.” After a hearing, the WCJ found that Workers suffered from a primary mental impairment and were due only 100 weeks of compensation under the WCA. See id. Workers now appeal the WCJ’s order of 100 weeks of compensation. They raise three issues on appeal: (1) the WCJ erred in refusing to enforce his original compensation orders that were upheld on appeal, (2) the provisions in the WCA that limit benefits of workers disabled due to mental impairments violate the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution, and (3) the provisions in the WCA that limit benefits of workers disabled due to mental impairments violate the ADA. We affirm the orders of the WCJ.
II. DISCUSSION
A. ENFORCEMENT OF ORIGINAL ORDER
{4} Workers argue that the WCJ erred in awarding only 100 weeks of benefits after this Court affirmed the WCJ’s original findings of compensability and temporary total disability. They claim that because the WCJ’s compensation orders provided for benefits that were “ongoing” and because those orders were upheld by this Court on appeal, the WCJ’s subsequent denial of benefits beyond 100 weeks pursuant to Section 52-l-41(B) contravenes this Court’s order on remand.
{5} In a memorandum decision filed on May 29, 2001, this Court concluded that Workers suffered from a primary mental impairment and affirmed the WCJ’s award of temporary total disability benefits to them. There is nothing in the opinion discussing the level or duration of benefits to be awarded. The subsequent mandate from this Court to the district court remanded the case “for any further proceedings consistent with said decision.” Accordingly, the Employer/Insurer paid Workers for 100 weeks of disability, and the WCJ upheld this amount after a subsequent hearing.
{6} The award of 100 weeks of benefits is consistent with Section 52-l-41(B), which limits the period of compensation for total disability resulting from primary mental impairment to 100 weeks. Therefore, the trial court’s award of 100 weeks of disability is entirely consistent with this Court’s conclusion that Workers suffered from a primary mental impairment. We see no reason to disturb the WCJ’s award of 100 weeks of benefits pursuant to this Court’s mandate and to Section 52-l-41(B).
{7} Workers rely on a decision from a Missouri Court of Appeals for the general rule that “after affirmance of a lower court judgment any subsequent orders or adjudications in the cause must be confined to those necessary to execute the judgment.” McPherson Redevelopment Corp. v. Shelton,
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
{8} Workers argue that Sections 52-1-41(B) and 52-l-42(A)(3) treat similarly situated individuals differently: those who are temporarily totally disabled due to physical impairment and those who are temporarily totally disabled due to primary mental impairment. Because workers with physical impairments can receive up to 500 or 700 weeks of benefits and workers with primary mental impairments are capped at 100 weeks of benefits, Workers assert that Section 52-1-41(B), capping their benefits at 100 weeks, violates the equal protection rights guaranteed by the United States and New Mexico Constitutions.
1. Standard of Review
{9} The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The New Mexico Constitution also provides that no person shall be “denied equal protection of the laws.” N.M. Const, art. II, § 18. The equal protection clauses in the United States and New Mexico Constitutions provide the same protections. See Valdez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
2. Analysis
{10} The threshold inquiry of an equal protection analysis is whether the statute in question, in this ease Sections 52-1-41(B) and -42(A)(3), results in dissimilar treatment of similarly situated workers. Valdez,
{11} Having determined that similarly situated workers are treated dissimilarly, our next inquiry is whether this disparity is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. We hold that it is. “Legislative acts are presumptively valid[.]” Valdez,
{12} Courts traditionally have been reluctant to allow recovery for any mental suffering due to “fear of fraudulent claims and the lack of judicial expertise for evaluating injury unaccompanied by observable physical manifestations.” Candelaria v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
{13} Furthermore, the wording of the WCA indicates that “the legislature clearly intended to restrict coverage for mental injuries” because of the restrictive circumstances under which mental injuries are compensated and by the limitations in the duration of benefits for mental injuries. Fitzgerald v. Open Hands,
{14} Accordingly, we hold that Sections 52-1-41(B) and 52-1-42(A)(3), which result in dissimilar treatment of similarly situated workers, do not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution or the New Mexico Constitution because they are rationally related to legitimate government purposes.
C. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
{15} Workers claim that Sections 52-1-41(B) and 52-1-42(A)(3) establish disparate treatment that violates the ADA. They essentially make a Title I claim, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) of the ADA. They argue that Workers’ Compensation is a privilege of employment, and as such, New Mexico’s scheme that treats persons temporarily totally disabled due to a mental impairment differently from persons temporarily totally disabled due to a physical impairment is discriminatory in regard to a privilege of employment and violative of the ADA. See id.; see also Harding v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,
{16} Employer/Insurer essentially argues that Workers do not have standing to bring an ADA claim. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that she is qualified-with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) that she was discriminated against because of her disability. Aldrich v. Boeing Co.,
{17} We understand Workers’ argument to be that they are not bringing a claim under the ADA per se, but are seeking to have its provisions enforced so as to preempt Sections 52-1—41 and —42 of New Mexico’s Workers’ Compensation statute. Under the preemption doctrine, rooted in the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution, states “may not frustrate either through legislation or judicial interpretation” federal law. Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
1. Purposes of WCA and ADA
{18} The purpose of the WCA is “to provide a workers’ benefit system ... to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled workers at a reasonable cost to the employers.” NMSA 1978, § 52-5-1 (1990). “The workers’ benefit system in New Mexico is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.” Id. In short, the act is a legislative balance of an employer’s assumption of liability without fault and a worker’s exclusive but efficient remedy. See id.; Sanchez,
{19} The purpose of the ADA is to ehminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. It provides that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual with a disability” is an “individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Thus, the ADA provides a remedy for disabled workers who can work but have somehow been discriminated against because of a disability.
{20} The ADA does not abrogate or invalidate or limit remedies, rights, and procedures of any other federal or state laws that provide “greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b). New Mexico’s WCA and the ADA do not conflict with each other, but rather they have different purposes and provide remedies for different grievances. See e.g., Harding,
2. Analysis of Workers’ Claim
{21} Workers do not provide, nor can we find, any authority that directly addresses their argument that in a workers’ compensation scheme, persons with disabilities due to mental impairment cannot be treated differently under the ADA than persons with disabilities due to physical impairments. However, many courts have found, in similar contexts, that the ADA does not require equal benefits be given to all disabled persons equally. As a starting point, we look to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which standards are applied to ADA provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a); McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc.,
a. Decisions Regarding Distinctions in Workers’ Compensation Schemes
{22} Several federal and state courts have relied on the Unites States Supreme Court’s guidance in Alexander and Traynor to find that the ADA does not require that all disabled persons, regardless of the differences in each person’s disabilities, receive equal eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits. Workers in Florida challenged the Florida’s workers’ compensation scheme that awards benefits based on levels of physical impairment as violative of the ADA, arguing that persons with lesser impairment ratings and lesser benefits may be more disabled than persons with higher impairment ratings. Cramer v. State of Fla.,
{23} Florida state courts have reached a similar conclusion. See Barry v. Burdines,
The Oregon Court of Appeals also has found that its workers’ compensation scheme that treats injured workers with preexisting conditions differently from injured workers with no preexisting condition is not in conflict with the ADA because the ADA does not require that all disabled persons have identical access to benefits of employment. Bailey,
b. Decisions Regarding Distinctions in Health and Human Services
{24} The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has determined that the purpose of the ADA is to provide equal opportunity for disabled citizens rather than to eliminate all differences in levels or proportions of resources allocated to individuals with differing types of disabilities. Williams v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Human Servs.,
c. Decisions Regarding Distinctions Between Mental and Physical Disabilities in Insurance and Disability Policies
{25} In an issue that is analogous to Workers’ claims, seven United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have found that employer-offered health and disability insurance policies that offer different levels of benefits for mental or nervous disorders than for physical disorders do not violate the ADA as long as the same distinctions apply equally to all employees. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Staten Island Sav. Bank,
{26} The only court that has concluded differently from the courts noted above, and the only case Workers rely on, is the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in its decision in Johnson v. K Mart Corp.,
3. New Mexico’s WCA Does Not Violate ADA
{27} We come to the inescapable conclusion, as have the many federal and state courts discussed above, that the ADA does not require that the state or an employer confer the same benefits to people with different disabilities. New Mexico’s WCA applies equally to all workers employed by employers who come within the Act. See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-2 (1987). It provides meaningful access to benefits for all workers, whether they are disabled due to mental or physical impairments. See §§ 52-1-41 and - 42; Alexander,
III. CONCLUSION
{28} We affirm the order of the Workers’ Compensation Judge.
{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.