73 Pa. Super. 9 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1919
Opinion by
The ground upon which the appellant in his libel avers his right to a divorce from the bonds of matrimony is that the respondent “hath offered such indignities to the person of libellant as to render his condition intolerable and life a burden, thereby compelling him to withdraw from her home and family.” The court below referred the proceeding to a master who filed a report recommending that the prayer of the petitioner be granted and a divorce be decreed as prayed for. The court below, after consideration of the evidence, refused to enter a decree of divorce and dismissed the libel, from which decree the libellant appeals.
The able counsel representing the appellant argues that the recommendation of the master should have the same effect as a special finding of fact by a jury, and the court should not be permitted to avoid it or set it aside except for error. This is not the rule in actions for divorce. The report of the master is merely advisory, and does not relieve the court of common pleas nor this court from the duty of conscientiously considering the evidence and determining whether it establishes the facts which entitled libellant to a divorce for the very cause alleged in the libel. While the master in the present case recommended a decree of divorce he thus states the grounds upon which he founds his recommendation: “The case is not strong in the opinion of the master; but as respondent has entered no appearance, it shows that she does not intend to deny the allegations. Also when we consider that mere desertion for two years will give sure cause for divorce, and the master believing that when parties have become so estranged as to get into the divorce court, they seldom come together again in the spirit of love and affection that should be inseparable from the marriage relation, therefore in the interests of good order and morality, the master resolves a doubtful question in favor of the libellant’s position.” Divorces are not to be granted upon any such grounds. There is
The parties to this proceeding were married on May 23, 1917, and lived together at the house of the libellant’s father and mother, in Meadville, until September 25, 1917, when they removed to Pittsburgh, where the libellant was pursuing the study of dentistry at the university. They lived in an apartment in Pittsburgh, doing light housekeeping, until January 25, 1918. The libellant testified that he had then arranged to have his wife go to Meadville and stay with libellant’s father and mother, until he could complete his studies. She went to his father’s where she remained about three weeks, and then went to live with her mother, in the same City of Meadville. The libellant visited Meadville at Easter time for a few days, during which he stayed at his father’s residence, while his wife was with her mother, but there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that their relations were at that time other than entirely amicable. On June 17, 1918, the libellant returned to his father’s house at Meadville and invited his wife to join him there, while she insisted upon his going and living with her at the house of her mother. They settled the matter by renting an apartment in Meadville and going to housekeeping upon their own account, some time in the latter part of June, and continued keeping house there until July 13, 1918, when the appellant left his wife and has not lived with her since. He filed this libel on July 15, 1918. It is important here to observe that these parties only lived together from the 23d of May, 1917, to January 25, 1918, from the latter date, in pursuance of an arrangement which the libellant testified he had made, the respondent lived in Meadville while the libellant was pursuing his studies in Pittsburgh, until the latter part of June, 1918, when they again went to housekeeping and lived together
The decree is affirmed and the appeal dismissed at cost of the appellant.