Thе only question piosented by the report is whether it was the duty of the officer to have the attached property examined and appraised, and to deliver it to the plaintiffs upоn their furnishing a sufficient bond, under the Gen. Sts. e. 123, §§ 87, 88.
The statute provides that, “when рersonal property belonging to two or more persons is attached in a suit against one or more of the part-owners thereof, it shall, upon the request of any others of the part-owners,” be examined and appraised, and delivered to the part-owner at whose request it was appraisеd, upon his giving a sufficient bond “conditioned to restore the same in like good order, or to pay the officer the appraised value of the defendant’s share or interest therein, or satisfy all such judgments as may be recovered in the suit in which it is attaсhed, if demanded within the time during which the property would have been held by the respective attachments.”
If we assume, as is stated in Pierce v. Jackson,
Its language does not aptly describe partners. It speaks only of “part-owners,” a term of common use in the law to denote a clаss of persons distinct from partners, who own property jointly, but in а different manner and by a different tenure.
The mode of proceeding which it provides is adapted to the case of рart-owners, but not to that of partners. The attached prоperty is to be appraised, and then the part-owner at whose request it is appraised is to give a bond, conditioned in one alternative “to pay the officer the appraised value of the defendant’s share or interest therein.” This рrovision is practicable in the case where the defеndant is a part-owner of the attached property оwning a specific share or interest in it, like one half or one quarter. But it is impracticable in the case where he is a partner. Such partner does not own any specific share in the attached property. His interest is a share of the surplus which may remain after discharging all partnership demands upon it. The appraisal of the attached goods (and
The provision of § 89, that, if such apрraised value is paid, the defendant’s share of the property shall thereby become pledged to the party to whom it was delivered and he may sell it, tends to show that the Legislature understood it was dealing with the fixed share of a part-owner in the sрecific property, which might be the subject of a pledgе and sale, and not with the indeterminate interest of a partner, which could not properly be pledged.
The statute does not in its terms apply to partners, and we find nothing in its provisions which indicates that the Legislature intended to use the word “ part-owners ” in a sense different from its ordinary meaning so as to include partners. The ruling of the Superior Court was therefore correct.
Judgment on the verdict.