41 Vt. 621 | Vt. | 1869
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The only question presented by the bill of exceptions is, whether what was said by the defendant to the plaintiff at their interviews in May, 1862, and in the spring of 1868, was sufficient to take the plaintiff’s claim out of the statute of limitations. This action is brought upon three promissory notes. The notes were all barred by the statute before the interview in May, 1862. On that occasion, the plaintiff asked the defendant to renew the notes by giving a new note, or by endorsing something on them. The defendant declined to renew the notes in either manner, but said: “ I will come up soon, and have a general settlement of accounts, and if all accounts are all right, other matters will be all right.” In the spring of 1863, the plaintiff again asked the defendant to take up these notes and give a new one, or to endorse something on them, so as to revive them. The defendant again refused, but said: “ We have a long string of accounts to look over. If I find that all right and satisfactory, the notes will bo all right.” The declarations made on the two occasions are substantially the same. These declarations may be regarded as a recognition of an original indebtedness by reason of the notes, but they do not contain an express promise to pay, either absolute or conditional. Will the law imply a promise therefrom? In Phelps v. Stewart, 12 Vt., 256, it was held that to prevent the operation of the statute, there must be an acknowledgment of the debt as still due, with an apparent willingness to remain liable for it, or at least without any avowed intention to the contrary. The acknowledgment of an original indebtedness is not sufficient. Brainerd v. Buck, 25 Vt., 573. The acknowledgment must be such that a promise to pay the debt can be implied'from it. The naked acknowledgment of an existing indebtedness is not sufficient, as that is consistent with a refusal to pay or a determination to take advantage of the statute. The acknowledgment must be of such a character, or made under such circumstances as to indicate, or to be consistent with, a willingness to remain or be held liable for the debt. This is substantially the rule as recognized in all the eases since that of Phelps v. Stewart, and especially in Moore v. Stearns, 33 Vt., 308, where Judge Kellogg fully collates all the cases in this state.
There is not sufficient in this case to show that the defendant acknowledged a then existing liability or indebtedness, or a willingness to remain liable, or from which' to imply a promise to pay the notes.
The judgment of the county court is affirmed.