52 Iowa 623 | Iowa | 1879
The defendant avers in his answer “ that as to whether the notes sued on in this action and referred to in the petition were ever signed by Cole & Hedges the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief;” that tlje giving of tlie notes was no part of tbe firm business of Cole &
II. The defendant was permitted to introduce, against plaintiff’s objection, testimony tending to prove that neither he nor any member of the firm of Cole & Hedges- signed the note sued on. This ruling is complained of, counsel insisting that, as the genuineness of the signature was not sufficiently denied under oath, the pleadings did not put in issue the execution of the instrument, and defendant, therefore, was not entitled to introduce the evidence in question. It is insisted that under-the pleadings defendant could not show that the note was not executed by the firm of which he was a member. Counsel rely upon Code, section 2730, to support their position. This statute provides that, unless the genuineness of the signature of an instrument referred to in the pleadings be denied under oath, it shall be deemed genuine and admitted. The purpose of the provision is to throw the burden of proof upon the defendant in the absence of the denial required, and not to deprive him of the right, upon proper pleading, to assume the burden of proving that he did not execute the instrument in suit. In the absence of a denial of the genuineness of a signature under oath the law regards it as admitted, and the plaintiff is required to introduce no evidence to prove the signature. If the signature be denied by an answer not sworn to, the defendant may support his allegation by proper evi-' dence, the genuineness of the signature being thus put in issue and the burden of proof cast upon defendant. Sankey v. Trump, 35 Iowa, 267; Farmers' & Merchants' Banhv. Young, 36 Id., 45; Sully v. Goldsmith, 49 Id., 690; Robinson v. Lair, 31 Id., 10; Ashworth v. Grubbs, 47 Id., 353.
Counsel for plaintiff insists that these decisions were made under a statute differing in its provisions from Code, section 2730. Upon a careful comparison of the statutes in question
We conclude that under the issues raised by defendant’s answer the court correctly permitted the introduction of evidence tending to prove that the firm of which defendant was a member did not execute the notes.
In the settlement of this difference, and in compliance with the requirement' of the agent, Cole & Hedges returned the notes signed by them as they now appear. They were afterward sent back by the agent, and part of the amount due was received and accounted for by Cole & Hedges.
The contract required Cole & Hedges “ to guarantee all notes good when taken.” Defendants theory of the case is that the signing of the notes was no part of .the business of the firm, and by their contract they were not required so to do. They were bound to do nothing more than “ to guarantee all notes good when taken.” This theory of the defense was presented in instructions asked by defendant. , The law was correctly announced, to the effect that the contract did not bind the firm to sign the notes, and, therefore, none of the co-partners were authorized to do so. The obligation of the firm to guarantee the notes surely did not give the co-partners authority to bind it by signing the notes as makers.
Plaintiff’s theory of the case is this: Cole & Hedge's accepted the note in violation of their contract, and thereby became liable to plaintiff Upon plaintiff’s agent claiming to hold them liable, and insisting upon security upon the notes,
Reversed.