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Brave v. Brave
432 S.W.3d 42
Ark. Ct. App.
2013
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*1 because the Springs Road loans her home.

were secured about a constructive bring

To

trust, promise falsely giv oral must be an

en, performance, with no intention of misrepresentation

that it amounts to a Robertson,

fact. 229 Ark. Robertson A 317 S.W.2d 272 construc if it imposed

tive trust is shown convincing

clear and evidence that

grantee’s promise intentionally fraud grantor grantee

ulent or that the and the

were in a confidential relation. Walker

Biddle, 225 Ark. review, give

In our we due defer superior position

ence to the circuit court’s credibility

to determine the of the wit weight to be

nesses and accorded to Hall, Hall v. 429 S.W.3d 219. the testimony Myra promised

as to whether Charles to his name on the

place property was con

flicting. The circuit court resolved that Therefore, Myra’s

conflict in favor. we

can find no error in the circuit court’s not impose

decision constructive trust.

Affirmed; appeals’ opinion court of va-

cated. Ark. BRAVE, Appellant BRAVE, Appellee.

No. CV-12-479. Appeals

Court of of Arkansas.

2,Oct. 2013.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 2013.

ing to find that the restaurant’s personal and thus non-mari- 2) tal property, and the trial court erred dipping” “double into his future earn- ings when both divided the alimony. agree awarded We Peter’s point, first and therefore reverse and 12remand.1 met, parties At the time the Peter working Hotel, Capital as a chef at the employed and Marie was as a waitress and, there. parties married in August 1991, opened BNR. Peter testified that he creates and executes the menu at BNR job and that his is to know what the cus that, tomers want. parties agreed kitchen, while Peter worked in the handled the “front end” of the including scheduling ordering staff and li quor According for the restaurant. to Pe ter, although very helpful Marie was Firm, Short, by: James Law Lee D. for beginning, she became less involved after appellant. their two children were born. Peter testi longer fied that Marie was no involved in Firm, Rock, by: Lueken Law Little Pat- operating the once it restaurant moved to Lueken; James, House, ty W. Fink & its current location in 2000. Rock, P.A., House, by: Little Matthew R. appellee. for expert Both and Marie offered appraisers gave opin- real-estate who WALMSLEY, BILL Judge. H. to the value ions as restaurant |! space. Peter Brave and Marie Brave own a Peter also introduced very successful restaurant in Little Rock from Gus a business consultant Brave Incorporated called Braves to handle account- employed d/b/a BNR). (hereafter, ing payroll New Restaurant When for BNR. Dobbs asserted $819,057; parties twenty-two divorced after that BNR’s amounted to years marriage, Peter was ordered to Dobbs also testified that $420,000 pay separated for Marie’s interest BNR. business itself could not be from because, sense, In a “In subsequent following order Peter’s Peter real request findings, for additional the trial business is Peter Brave. The whole busi- good- personality.” court found that the restaurant held ness is his Dobbs described and, consequently, unique operation will that was BNR as a a hard-to- property. points simply Peter raises two find location and stated that Peter 1) appeal: replaced. the trial court erred in fail- could not be Dobbs further tes- merit, appeal; 1. Marie filed a and it is therefore denied. motion dismiss however, we the motion be without find say Any value that attaches to tified that he would not whether ness asset. Id. entity solely personal as a result of goodwill of the business (non-marital). (marital) nothing more than goodwill represents which, capacity, probable earning future decree, In the trial court the divorce although determining alimony, relevant in of the real estate for found that the value *3 dividing nót a in proper is consideration | $495,000 the and that Sbusiness proceeding. marital in a property divorce BNR, furniture, including the value of the Tortorich, Ark.App. Tortorich v. 50 fixtures, goodwill, equipment, (1995). 247 “The 902 S.W.2d Tortorich $895,000. The trial court then deducted and Wilson cases confirm that the burden $550,000 debt of and concluded that the is on the who seeks business, including net value of the todisestablish goodwill produce as a marital asset to con- real The trial property, vincing proof delineating profes- between $420,000 in- court awarded Marie for her goodwill sional the one hand terest in the restaurant and later ruled goodwill sonal on the other.” Williams v. goodwill that the in BNR was Williams, 294, 314, 82 108 goodwill and therefore marital property (2003). 629, 642 and that Marie was entitled to one-half. recognized personal Arkansas has not respect With to the division of business; goodwill non-professional in a case, property in a divorce we review the unique under the facts of this judge’s findings trial of fact and affirm case, particular extending we are the con- clearly them unless are erroneous. to BNR cept presence because Peter’s is Cole, v. 89 Ark.App. Cole 201 S.W.3d essential to the success of the restaurant.2 (2005). finding clearly A erroneous trial judge credited Dobbs’s court, when the reviewing on the entire appeared recognize that there was evidence, is left firm definite and goodwill what amounts to conviction that a mistake has been made. commented, BNR. “I judge The trial think Id. has some [Peter] “[Peter] up goodwill.” judge The Arkansas has built stated that, has held goodwill for to be marital that the loss of Peter to the restaurant property, “very, very damaging” it must be a business asset with would be that, restaurant, independent presence value repu or if Peter left the “it tation of a v. judge individual. Wilson would not be the same.” The trial Wilson, recognized 741 S.W.2d 640 also that Marie contributed had words, In other it must be an previ- little to the restaurant over the sold, transferred, asset that years con ous ten and that the success of the veyed, pledged. or Id. Whether restaurant was due to Peter’s hard work. Further, question is marital is a fact and a trial judge stated that she party, establish as marital had no basis on which to allocate how such, property and divisible as must much of pro personal good- the restaurant was will, duce evidence establishing salability opposed corporate goodwill. We marketability of that as a clearly busi- hold that the trial court erred Bertholet, jurisdictions recognized person Civ.App.2009); 2. Other Bertholet v. goodwill in al connection with commercial or (Ind.Ct.App.2000); Hough N.E.2d 487 See, non-professional enterprises. business Hough, (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001). 793 So.2d 57 (Okla. e.g., McQuay McQuay, 217 P.3d 162 her burden of finding Taylor Taylor, that Marie sustained 31, 41, in BNR was Ark. proving 250 S.W.3d entirely property, given the We do not reverse the findings court’s that the restaurant held evidence showed clearly fact unless are erroneous or to Peter. personal goodwill attributable against preponderance of the evidence. | fifmding A clearly erroneous if we are not reach the merits of Peter’s We do left with a definite and firm conviction that we and di- point second remand a mistake has been made. See id. |fitrial rect court to determine what portion personal good- of BNR’s value was Because the majority properly does not will, separate property, which is Peter’s apply our standard review this ap- remaining and to divide the marital assets peal, respectfully dissent. estate, including the real Consider selective reliance on Gus *4 furniture, fixtures, equipment. and majority Dobbs’s *5 very, very that restaurant would dam- go

never said that the restaurant could not aging. you But long as could still call it aspect on without Peter. A main Restaurant, Brave New as it long as was sonal associated with a there, long still as had still the is that the menu, people would come for a while.” not saleable and the business cannot sur- The court did not come unmoored from the key person vive if the so-called is cleaved finding record in that the restaurant could from it. Dobbs’s own therefore continue without Peter. There was testi- directly undermined Peter’s personal— mony that Peter vacationed for weeks at a goodwill argument so the circuit court —or time, having employees trained other to concluded, reasonably could have and in manage the restaurant in his absence. Pe- fact did. ter told the court that “delegate he could denying There’s no that the circuit court daily the operational stuff.” And he had up looked to Dobbs. has built “[Peter] everything trained his sous chef to “mimic goodwill. Whether someone could come in wonderfully.” Peter’s staff in general can step into his shoes is a little bit hard said, recreate his food creations. He also say, to I’m taking your witness “I myself do need to kind of wean from [Dobbs],” said the court from the bench. guess by doing also and I [the restaurant] precisely by What the court meant go working can ahead and start statement is unclear. So we return to the making anonymous.” it a little bit more order, written which tells us that whatever notes, parties’ merit of witnesses’ and There is more. As the testimony, the circuit court as fact-finder the Braves were married when start- ultimately rejected personal-goodwill early ed the business in the 1990s. Marie argument. it And did rec- was then and has remained a 50% share- contained, in judgment, closely-held corporation. ord its insufficient holder in the Ac- proof that the goodwill cording equal legal rath- Marie had decisions, checks, corporate; conversely, power er than or the rec- to make cut

47 business, just purpose run the as Peter did. Peter of a dissolution proceeding^]” supreme also that Marie was the one who The court then recognized that kept up largely company’s professional practices has were a special class has given particular “difficulty finances. She also held cases |flrestaurant’s license, liquor received a sal- arise in valuing professional [that] a practice, |inbecause ary during from the restaurant the mar- likely riage, bookkeeping, depend professional did some and worked on the reputation and Yet, sporadically. majori- continuing presence there under the of a particular individ- ty’s monetary view she receives no direct ual in that practice.” Id. So the Nebraska upon benefit from the restaurant the disso- opinion that started Arkansas down its marriage. lution of her professional-goodwill path acknowledged enterprises, that most commercial includ- began recogniz In 1987 Arkansas courts ing their goodwill, typically related would ing personal/professional goodwill di fall within Nebraska’s marital-property vorce cases where the business statute. professional association and the claiming “personal” “professional” good majority provides legal no rea- why husband who was licensed son Arkansas’s marital-property stat- heavy referral-type with a apply ute should not in the usual sense Williams, narrow, practice. except rely See generis Williams one sui (2003) Ark.App. (gas professional-practice class of cases—which troenterology-surgery practice); today Tortorich expands significantly, while re- Tortorich, versing 902 S.W.2d a circuit court’s fact-intensive de- (1995) (oral-surgery practice); a disputed evidentiary Wilson termination on rec- Wilson, ord, using and when one of this court’s (1987) (orthopedic-surgery practice). In most deferential standards of review. cases, each of these the husbands owned a Finally, utility wonder about the association, *6 part professional or all of the fairness of the decision to this remand case lawfully and the wives could not have to the circuit it court so determine owned an interest portion personal “what of BNR’s value was they were not themselves licensed profes goodwill.” How is the circuit court to do (now 155, § sionals. Ark. See 1963 Acts now what it could not do before? At the § codified at Ann. Ark.Code 4-29-208 hearing on Peter’s motion the posttrial (Repl.2001)). said, testimony court ... valu- “[T]he [on] point. helpful, my opinion, One more historical doctrinal ation is not in to the professional-goodwill [personal goodwill] argument.” Our short line of The cir- directly explained eases stems from one Nebraska cuit court then that the valuation opinion, Taylor v. Taylor, Court consisted of assessments of 729, 851, 222 Neb. 386 N.W.2d what restaurant would sell for on the importance open “[H]onestly, put This has some be- market. since it was cause, Brave, mean, Taylor, by before the Su- Nebraska on Mr. assumed that it Now, preme recognized goodwill the was more or less to. I un- (a professional practice argument context doctor’s derstand the that some of all the there), supreme goodwill might personal, was at issue court I don’t intangible any any way noted that the value businesses to allocate it.” business— patronage “may My concluding point have due to be considered is this: Peter had his part as a of the marital estate for the chance to establish and (or else) hand, majority through anyone Dobbs On the other is cor- its worth go the first around. He failed to do so. rect in that if the marital property includes prove even if Marie had the burden to And goodwill unique to a licensed | restaurant’s value good- professional, then the value of that nthe personal goodwill, than she goodwill rather property of is sole 112retained when our degree did so to a sufficient professional, the licensed unless the non- properly review is appellate standard professional spouse prove can otherwise. applied. That exception is found Wilson Wil- (1987) son, Ark. S.W.2d 640 HIXON, Judge, KENNETH S. the li- progeny, indicating its dissenting. merely is professional’s goodwill censed dissenting The and the other representation person’s of that future opinion partially are both correct. Each earning capacity. problem is that the opinion appro- bases its conclusion on the “professional license ex- Wilson priate proof. Ordinarily burden of all ception has never in Arkan- been extended property acquired through marriage is beyond professional practice, sas a licensed property, marital and the who is specifically practice. a medical or dental seeking to exclude the has the Here, Brave, Inc., profes- is not a licensed § proof. burden of See Ann. 9- Ark.Code Indeed, practice. only sional license at 12-315; Carroll, Carroll v. license, liquor issue here is the attained in Here, Brave, Inc., 384 S.W.3d 50. Therefore, Marie’s name. we have com- acquired during marriage, owned peting proof depending burdens of fifty percent each Inc., Brave, whether is Brave, undoubtedly it rendering marital subject general statutory to the rule of property. pre- Inc.’s assets are it property, subject or whether sumptively marital. Goodwillof a business to the Wilson license subject is a valuable to purchase asset exception. sale, property. is divisible as marital Nicholson, Nicholson v. 11 Ark.App. job simple: going Our are we to ex- parties pre- pand scope “professional license support sented evidence to the value of goodwill” exception companies to include “ongoing through this business” that “are unique the facts bookkeeper, unique who described it as “a suggested case” as operation in a hard-to-find location” with a majority? unique What does “under the *7 “goodwill” value of Our court of In- facts case” mean? upheld a division of in a tavern in of having only professional stead license Nicholson, that “there holding ample goodwill exception, do we now have a proof generated that the business substan- “unique operation in a hard-to-find loca- income, concern, going tial was a and that exception? tion” That sounds a lot like an provided the services it had a substantial “every key small man” business with following community.” ArkApp. exception. at 514. The same is true The Arkansas created a Supreme Court Brave, Inc. Brave New Restau- d/b/a/ “professional narrow license If rant. Mr. Brave wants to exclude the exception expansion in Wilson. If an is to value of Inc.’s from marital made, property, he have the burden of would defer to Arkansas would proof support excluding sweeping it. to make that Furthermore, law. change in our state’s

do not believe it is reversible error for the correctly apply existing

circuit court

law, way knowing majori- that a with no

ty judges on our divided court would change.

make such a Because Peter error, I to demonstrate reversible

1^failed

would affirm. ADAMS, Appellant

Danielle Kira ADAMS, Appellee.

Rebecca Roseanne

No. CV-13-275. Appeals

Court of of Arkansas.

Jan. 2014. notes alimony trial court then reassess ac- favorably that Dobbs testified for Peter’s cordingly. personal-goodwill argument in some re- and remanded. Reversed spects. who admittedly was not a expert business-evaluation but a tax advis- GLADWIN, C.J., and WHITEAKER or, used an approach” “income to value the VAUGHT, JJ., agree. goodwill associated with Marie’s and Pe- HIXSON, JJ., HARRISON and dissent. ter’s business. The number he deduced was He said the business has no HARRISON, Judge, BRANDON J. equity goodwill. without dissenting. But Dobbs also testified that his calcula- corporate-goodwill The circuit court’s were tions based the restaurant’s value determination is the crux of this case. We ongoing as an business with—of all previously recognized goodwill that a things replacement for Peter. chef —a a inquiry. determination is fact-intensive majority And as the notes but does not Cummings Cummings, credit, permit the circuit court to Dobbs 315, 323, say testified that he could not whether the the circuit court heard goodwill restaurant’s corporate argument goodwill on the issue and Moreover, sonal. when lawyer Marie’s persuaded concluded that it was not that asked Dobbs about his statement that “the goodwill argued Peter for was personal personality” whole business is [Peter’s] rather That corporate. than decision was Dobbs that the restaurant would proof based on the and the court’s credibil- stepped away not suffer if Peter for two determinations; ity we should not disturb said, “Well, might weeks. He then disturbed, part, it. But it has been make it two months.” Next came this believe, majority because the did not view exchange between Dobbs and Marie’s law- light all the evidence in a most favorable to yer: Marie, requires. as our standard of review If he [Peter] Marie’s Counsel: Here’s the standard that should drive away years, hap- for two what would decision-making process this divorce pen to the of this business? review anew: case. We the entire record Well, superior position We defer to the something Dobbs: that credibility circuit court to assess the intangible depreci- is an asset and it time, weight give witnesses and the it should why buyers ates over and that’s buy proof they provided when come business ord sufficient number, corporate, personal. not look at the know that can’t maintain only Dobbs was testi- not one who time, necessarily period over fied about the restaurant’s worth. Two standpoint. at it from that they look nationally-certified, business-appraiser ex- |7When questioned by attorney, Peter’s perts using valued restaurant several 18methods, Dobbs said: including different the same approach” “income Dobbs used. That the That has one of the most restaurant experts court did not mention these other in it unique operators I’ve ever seen.... in its order or divorce decree does not unique operation It is a that’s been built necessarily ignored mean it them. But nobody in a location that can find real experts ignored, even if all other were easy. yes, he So would be difficult not, Dobbs himself could as the replace, my and that was most diffi- acknowledges, delineate between make, cult what number do decision assign each a you plug replace in there to value; sup- how then was the circuit court Brave. posed to do so? point The material is not that the location too, Consider, what the court stated at nothing of the restaurant has little or to do the trial’s end: “the loss of Mr. Brave to personal goodwill, that Dobbs

Case Details

Case Name: Brave v. Brave
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Date Published: Oct 2, 2013
Citation: 432 S.W.3d 42
Docket Number: CV-12-479
Court Abbreviation: Ark. Ct. App.
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