62 Fla. 442 | Fla. | 1911
— On the 28th day of February, 1910, the appellee filed her bill in chancery against the appellant, wherein she sought a divorce, alimony and counsel fees. The only ground alleged therein for divorce was desertion. The cause was referred to a special master to take testimony as to the necessities of the complainant ’and the faculties of the defendant. Arendall v. Arendall, 61 Fla. 496, 54 South. Rep. 957. Such special master re
From this decree the defendant has entered his appeal to this court, assigning five errors, all of which question the propriety of the decree, but we do not set forth such assignments, as we do not deem it advisable to discuss them in detail. We also refrain from setting out the pleadings or discussing the evidence at length, for the reason that we see no useful purpose to be accomplished by so doing. The desertion of the complainant by the defendant for the requisite statutory period is clearly and positively alleged, therefore the demurrer, which was to the whole bill, was properly overruled. “Grounds of demurrer to a bill in equity which seek to have the court hold the whole -bill bad for objections applicable only to parts thereof,
We observe that most of the specific instances of the alleged cruelty occurred after the filing of the original bill, in which, as we have previously said, the sole ground upon which the divorce was sought was desertion. The proofs show that the complainant inherited property from her father of the value of something like $25,000.00, and ¿11 the marital troubles wpuld seem to have arisen subsequent to such inheritance. This inheritance would seem to have furnished the bone of contention and been the basis for all the dissentions between the complainant and defendant. Their marriage took place on or about the 3rd day of December, 1867, and at the time the suit was instituted the defendant, according to the testimony of the complainant, was about' 62 years of age and she was fifteen months his senior. It is a most regrettable controversy. A careful reading of the pleadings and the testimony constrains us to the conclusion that the decree was not warranted. Applying the principles laid down in Hancock v. Hancock supra, and in the other cases cited, we are clear that the charge of extreme cruelty has not been sustained. It follows that the final decree appealed from must be reversed, and it is so ordered and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complainant’s bill.