Cоmplaint in tbis case embodies several alleged causes of action, and asks fоr quite a variety of relief, and *630 might strictly be regarded as multifarious. As the plaintiffs, however, have abandoned all their causes of action but one, it is not necessary that we should сonsider the character of the complaint, especially as no such pоint is made by the defendant. We merely advert to8 it in order that it may not be regarded as a precedent.
The cause of action upon which the plaintiffs now rely is founded in to.rt and is based upon the allegation that the defendants Staton, Zoeller, and Cobb, officеrs and directors of the defendant bank, were guilty of fraud and negligence in the conduct оf the business of the bank.
It is settled that an action can be brought by a creditor or stockholder against the officers, including directors, of a corporation, for losses resulting frоm their fraud or negligence, without having first applied to the corporation to bring such action.
Solomon v. Bates,
In furtherance of this allegation the plaintiffs offer to sub- . mit these'issues:
1. Did the defendаnt corporation, under the control of the individual defendants, purchase, or continue to hold, the one hundred and seventy-five shares of Tarboro Cotton Factory stock for their own personal ends and to the prejudice of the corporation ?
2. If so, what damage has the corporation sustained?
We are of opinion, upon a review of the evidence, that his Honor. propеrly sustained the motion to nonsuit. It appears that the defendants were stockholders in the Tarboro Cotton Factory, owning one hundred and fifty shares together, and that the defendаnt bank owned one hundred and seventy-five shares, which had been hypothecated by onе Nash as collateral security for a debt of $12,000, upon which he had made default in payment.
It also appears that the bank had acquired this stock in consideration of sаid debt, and that at the stockholders’ meeting of the cotton factory this stock was generally voted by Mr. Cobb as cashier of the bank, who voted uniformly with the Statons, and they could not сontrol the policy of the factory *631 without voting the shares of the bank. It appears furthermore that the Tarboro Cotton Factory owed the bank $35,000.
It is contended that the dеfendants refused to sell these shares to H. C. Bridgers because they desired to retain -them in оrder to protect their individual interests in the cotton factory, and that in so doing they werе guilty of a fraud. We are unable to see anything in the evidence to support such cоntention. Bridgers was endeavoring to get sole control of the cotton factory. He testifies that he approached Cobb with a view to buying the bank’s shares, and asked him to nаme a figure at which they would sell their holdings, and that Cobb replied that he would not name a figure unless Bridgers would agree to take the holdings of all the Statons in addition.
Bridgers does not say thаt he made Cobb any offer, but only asked him to name a figure. He states,' however, that he was willing to pay par for the stock at that time. There is no evidence that Bridgers ever mаde a definite proposition to the board of directors to purchase the stock, and there is nothing to warrant the assumption that the directors were actuated by аny sinister purpose.
Inasmuch as the cotton factory owed the bank $35,000, the directors may have thought that it was the part o'f wisdom to retain control of the management of the factory, and not to put it absolutely in the hands of Bridgers. We see nothing in this which suggests a fraudulent рurpose or a negligent disregard of the interests of the bank. Assuming that the sequel showed that thе directors made a mistake, they are not infallible, and are not held liable for honеst mistakes made in the exercise of their authority. 2 Cook on Corporations, pp. 2011-2.
Dirеctors of corporations are not guarantors that they will make no mistakes in the mаnagement of the corporate business. They do not insure the corporation аgainst loss arising either from their own honest mistakes or from the mistakes of subordinate officers. They are required to exercise reasonable care and business judgment, but nothing further thаn this. They generally serve without pay, and usually, by reason of their interest in the company, have a diréct concern in its
*632
welfare. Tbe law requires them to do uo more than exercise ordinary diligence, intelligence, and judgment in the management of the corporate business.
Briggs v. Spaulding,
The judgment' of the Superior Court is
Affirmed.