Defendant contends that she is entitled to an accounting for improvements she made to the property after execution of the separation agreement which granted her the exclusive right of occupancy. She argues that the separation agreement was a contract which altered the interest in the property that she and plaintiff owned as tenants by the entirety; that she had a legal right to present her claim for an accounting in the form of a counterclaim to the divorce action; and that even if the contract did not alter the character of the tenancy by the entireties property, she was entitled to an accounting under the doctrine of resulting trusts. We find no merit in defendant’s contentions.
With respect to the contract argument, defendant states that the separation agreement contractually altered the character of the ownership of the tenancy by the entireties and that such an alteratiоn was permissible under G.S. 3943.3(c) and
Council v. Pitt,
The tenancy by the entirety may be terminated by a voluntary partition between the husband and the wife whereby they execute a joint instrument conveying the land *535 to themselves as tenants in common or in severalty. But nеither party is entitled to a compulsory partition to sever the tenancy.
A divorce a vinculo, an absolute divorce which destroys the unity of husband and wife that is essential to the existence of the tenancy, will convert an estate by the entirety into a tenancy in common. The divorced spouses become equal co-tenants.
A divorce a mensa et thoro, on the other hand, a divorce from bed and board which dоes not dissolve the marriage relation, does not sever the “unity of persons,” and does not terminate or change the tenancy by the entirety in any way. In this connеction, it should be observed that an estate by the entirety is not terminated or dissolved by the acts of the parties which constitute mere grounds for an absolute divorсe; there must be a final decree of absolute divorce for this effect to occur.
The separation agreement provides that “. . . nothing in this Agreement shаll affect the rights, title or interest that the respective parties have in and to all of the real estate held as an estate by the entireties.” This statement сlearly indicates that neither party intended to alter by contract the manner in which they held title to the property, but that they should hold the real estate as tenants by the entirety until an absolute divorce terminated the tenancy.
Since the property was held by the parties as tenants by the entirety, they are entitled to an equal division of the property upon termination of the estate by absolute divorce and neither party is entitled to an accounting for expenditures mаde on the property while the tenancy by the entirety existed.
In the case of
Wall v. Wall,
The general rule is that upon divorce the two former spouses become equal cotenants even though one of the former spouses paid the entire purchase price. Each spouse is entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the property and is entitled to partition the property. However, expenditures for the property after the final decree of absolute divorce are treated as they normally would be in a tenancy in common. 2 Lee, North Carolina Family Law § 120 (1963); 4A Powell, Law of Real Property § 624 (1974); 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 180 (1959).
In the present case, defendant’s counterclaim for reimbursement includes sums allegedly paid by her on the indebtedness while she and the plaintiff owned the property as tenants by the entirety and while they owned the property as tenants in common. The stipulation between the parties supports the deсree that the defendant must be given credit for all sums paid by her on the indebtedness after the judgment of absolute divorce. An estate by the entirety is a form of co-оwnership of real property by a husband and wife in which each is deemed to be seized of the entire estate, with neither spouse having a separate оr undivided interest therein. Davis v. Bass,188 N.C. 200 ,124 S.E. 566 (1924); 2 Lee, North Carolina Family Law § 112 (1963). Thus, because of the nature of the estate by the entirety, we are of the opinion that the trial court cоrrectly concluded that the defendant was not entitled to be reimbursed for sums paid on the indebtedness encumbering such an estate during her marriage to the plaintiff.
Aрplying this reasoning to the instant case, we conclude that summary judgment for plaintiff was properly granted and defendant was not entitled to reimbursement for the imprоvements which she made to the property while the parties owned the property as tenants by the entirety.
*537 We find no merit in defendant’s second argument, namely, that the court may have refused to apportion shares of the property because it felt that it had to wait until the tenancy in common was officially crеated by the absolute divorce. Based on the cases and the principles cited above, it is clear that no tenancy in common was created until аfter the absolute divorce, therefore, there was no basis for apportioning the shares of the property based on expenditures made prior to the termination of the tenancy by the entirety. Since there was not an actual conveyance between the parties, and the separation agreement clearly states that the tenancy by the entirety property was not to be affected by the contract, the Wall rule governing the division of tenancy by the entirety property governs rather than the rules governing reimbursements on tenancy in common property.
Finally, defendant argues that even if the separation аgreement contract did not operate to change the tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common and create a right in defendant to recover for improvements on the property, the doctrine of purchase money resulting trusts would allow a recovery for such improvements. We find no merit in this cоntention.
“P]f the wife furnishes the purchase price, the law makes no presumption that a tenancy by the entirety was created, but instead presumes that the wife intended to place title in the husband and herself on a resulting trust for the wife.” J. Webster, Real Estate Law in North Carolina, § 162, p. 112 (1971). “The trust must result, if at all, at the time of the transmission of the legal estate and as part of the same transaction. The trust claimant must either pay or obligate himself to pay the purchase price before the execution of the deed and its delivery to the grantee.” R. Lee, North Carolina Law of Trust § 2b, p. 13 (6th Ed. 1977).
In this case, the improvements to the property were made sеveral years after the conveyance of the property, therefore, the doctrine of purchase money resulting trusts is inapplicable.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the trial court correctly allowed the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.