159 Ga. 288 | Ga. | 1924
Plaintiffs in the lower court, defendants in error here, filed a petition for mandamus in the superior court of McIntosh County, against W. A. Branson, county superintendent of schools of said county, seeking to compel said Branson as superintendent to call an election in the “Townsend Consolidated School District, for the purpose of electing trustees for the consolidated schools in said district.” Upon this petition the trial judge granted a rule nisi, which was served upon the respondent. The petitioners alleged, that McIntosh County had been laid off into school districts in accordance with the school laws of Georgia; that in accordance with such law the Townsend school and Pine Grove school, both in said county, had been consolidated; that petitioners as residents and citizens of the affected territory had requested said superintendent to call an election in said district for the purpose of electing trustees for said-consolidated school; and that said superintendent had failed and refused to call such election, although it was his duty to do so even without request or demand. The respondent demurred to this petition, qn the grounds, (1) that’ the same fails to allege sufficient facts to authorize the relief prayed; (2) that it does not appear that the consolidation of said schools was made in accordance with law; (3) that if the last sentence of section 90 of said school law be construed as requiring respondent to call an election as sought, then the provisions of said section are at variance with and in conflict with other provisions of said law; and (4) that the provision contained in the last sentence of said section is unconstitutional, in that it contains matter different from what is expressed in the. title of the act. In his answer the respondent admitted that in June, 1922, the board of education of McIntosh County decided to use the school building in Townsend, Georgia, in said Townsend district, to serve not only the children in and around Townsend but also the children that lived in the territory served by the Pine Grove school in the same district, and the children that lived in the territory served
Upon the hearing it was agreed-that the facts stated in the respondent’s answer, excluding conclusions of law and of fact, were true; and that the minutes of a meeting of the board of education of McIntosh County, held on June 6, 1922, showed the following: “The board was informed that Eulonia and Pine Grove schools desired to be consolidated with Townsend school, instead of continuing their one-teacher schools. The superintendent of schools was instructed to advertise for bids to transport these schools to Townsend.” The minutes of a meeting of said board, held on July 11, 1922, showed that bids were received from three persons for transporting the Pine Grove school children to Townsend school, and that three bids were received for transporting the Eulonia school children to Townsend school. At a meeting held on July 18, 1922, a report was received from the superintendent on the matter of transporting the Pine Grove children to Townsend, and the committee agreed to award the contract to the low bidder upon the condition that he satisfy the patrons as to a driver. Prior to the filing of the .petition in this case, a State school supervisor had agreed to recommend to the State board of education to award the board of education of said county the sum of $500 under section 92(b) of the school code, for the Townsend school as a consolidated school for the year 1922-23. Heretofore the said board of education of McIntosh County has been awarded this amount for the Darien consolidated school. This award will be made for only one
After the case was submitted upon the agreed facts, the trial judgS took the case under advisement on both the law and the facts, and, on December 15, 1923, entered final judgment granting a rule absolute commanding the respondent to call an election in the Townsend school district for the purpose of electing trustees for the Townsend consolidated school, as provided by law and as prayed for in plaintiffs’ petition. The respondent assigns this judgment as error upon the grounds that his demurrer should have been sustained upon each and every ground thereof; because the judgment was contrary to the evidence, and without evidence to support it; and because under the agreed facts the judge was unauthorized, as a matter of law, to grant the mandamus against the respondent. A large portion of the brief and argument of counsel for both parties in this case is directed to a comparison of sections 90 and 92 of the general school act of 1919 (Acts 1919, p. 288), counsel for the school superintendent insisting that one section is repugnant to the other, and counsel for the petitioners denying such repugnancy. We are not permitted to deal with this portion of the argument or consider the merits of the contention, for the reason that the demurrer which was before the lower court makes no reference whatever to section 92 of the act, and is predicated upon the alleged conflict between section 90 and section 120 of the school act, supra. This court will not undertake to deal with any question except under review of some ruling made by the lower court, and failure to present to the lower court the point now insisted upon before us for the first time precludes any consideration of its merits.
Plaintiff in error contends that one of the reasons why the trial judge erred in making the mandamus absolute is that it does not appear that the consolidation of the schools mentioned in the petition was made in accordance with law. In our opinion this ground of objection is not meritorious. It is true that it does not appear from the minutes of the board of education of McIntosh County that any motion was made and carried to consolidate the school at Townsend with Pine Grove and Eulonia schools, but it does appear that upon the application for the consolidation of
It is further insisted that there is a conflict between section 90 of the school code, as contained in the act of 1919 (Acts 1919, p-t 288), and section 120 of this act. It does not appear to us that there is any conflict between the two sections. In section 90 provision is made for the consolidation of schools. Section 120 of the act provides for the consolidation of school districts,, change of district lines, etc., which have no bearing on the question now before us. By the terms of section 90 it is very plain that the provisions of section 120 refer to altogether different matters. Section 90 is as follows: “The board of education of any county shall have the right, if in their opinion the welfare of the schools of the county and the best interests of the pupils require, to consolidate two or more schools located in the same or different districts into one school, to be located by said board at a place convenient to the pupils attending the same, said sehoolhouse to be located as near the center of the district or districts as practicable. Whenever two or more -schools aré consolidated as hereinafter provided, the county superintendent shall call an election of trus-r tees for said consolidated schools from the district or districts con
It is further insisted that the provisions contained in section 90 are unconstitutional, in that this section contains matter different from what is expressed in the title of the act. The title of the act is as follows: . “An act to codify the school laws of the State of Georgia, in compliance with the provisions of the act entitled 'an act to empower the State Superintendent of Schools, the Attorney-General, the Chairman of the Senate and House Committees on Education to codify the school laws, and for other purposes/ approved July 20, 1918; to revise the school laws of the State; to; provide for a State Superintendent of Schools, State Board of Education, a State Board for Vocational Education, County Superintendent of Schools, County Board of Education, Supervisors of Schools and Institutes, an Auditor, a Secretary and Executive Agent of the State Board of Education, and other officers; to provide the method of their selection, their duties, powers, and compensation; and for other purposes.'” It will be noted that the scope of the caption is extremely broad in so far as reference to a number of specific matters is concerned. First it expresses a purpose to codify all of the school laws of the State. It then descends into particularization as to the creation of certain officers, included among which are county superintendents of schools, and finally concludes with the customary phrase, “and for other purposes.” It has several times been held that even the use of the last-quoted phrase will prevent an act from being subject to the objection that the act contains matter not included in the caption, where such words will naturally include and render constitutional incidental provisions germane to and bearing a generic relation to the general subject-matter expressed in the title. Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21 (50 Am. D. 306); Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga. 621; Butner v. Boifeuillet, 100 Ga. 743, 753 (28 S. E. 646). From the well-settled rule that an act will not be declared unconstitutional if there is any doubt with respect to its unconstitutionality there has grown another ruling that where certain specified proposed amendments are indicated in the title and the words “and for other purposes” are also included therein, this is sufficient to have directed the at
Judgment affirmed.