Opinion by
This is a replevin case in which a wife seeks to recover one-half of a crop of corn (or its value) harvested by her estranged husband from a farm owned by the entireties.
In her complaints the plaintiff alleged only that the husband-defendant and certain other defendants harvested the corn contrary to her orders and directions and caused it to be delivered to the defendant, Mark Hershey, at his place of business, the Hy-Line Hatchery, and that they have refused to deliver any or all of it to her or to pay over the proceeds of the crop to her. In her prayers for relief she did not ask judgment for possession of the entire crop or damages for its value, but only for possession of her “share” of the crop or for one-half its value.
The defendants filed demurrers alleging that the complaints failed to state causes of action (1) because the plaintiff sought to recover only a share or the value of a share of a crop to which she did not have title, and (2) because title to crops growing on land owned by the entireties is exclusively in the husband.
*541 The court below sustained the demurrers on the ground that replevin does not lie against a spouse to recover entireties property because neither spouse has sole title or the right to exclusive possession of such property. Holding that this disability or defect could not be cured by amendment, the court dismissed the complaints without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to pursue other remedies, including assumpsit, or an action in equity for an accounting.
Even if this were a suit against Hershey alone to preserve the entireties property, Mrs. Brandt could not succeed without the joinder of her husband as a plaintiff. “Persons having only a joint interest in the subject matter of an action must be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants.” Pa. B. C. P. No. 2227-(a). In these appeals the plaintiff does not seek an order authorizing an amendment of the pleadings enabling her to discontinue the actions against her husband, join him as an involuntary plaintiff, and proceed in replevin against the defendant, Mark Hershey, for the entire crop, or its value. Compare:
Sielecki v. Sielecki,
The plaintiff here does not seek an order permitting her to comply with the compulsory joinder provisions of Pa. B. C. P. No. 2227 which codifies the substan *542 tive rule expressed in the Sielecki, Pastore and Magee cases, supra, requiring both spouses to join as plaintiffs in actions to preserve or recover entireties property. See: Note of the Procedural Rules Committee to Rule 2227. On the contrary, in her brief she insists upon her right to maintain replevin actions against her husband and to obtain in such actions what amounts, in effect, either to an involuntary division or partition of the entireties property, or an order directing the defendant-husband to account for one-half of its value or one-half of the proceeds of its sale. She goes so far as to argue that a suit in equity would not lie because she has an adequate remedy at law in replevin.
The action of replevin is not appropriate or available for the relief sought by the plaintiff. It is a legal form of action ordinarily employed only to recover possession or the value of specific personal property unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff plus damages for its detention. 10 Standard Penna. Practice, chap. 43, §1 et seq. It is primarily a possessory action in which the issues ordinarily are limited to the plaintiff’s title or right to possession of the goods. Ibid. Thus, no counterclaim may be asserted in replevin. Pa. R. C. P. No. 1082(a).
Even if a wife may bring replevin against her husband to recover her separate property under the provisions of the Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, §3, as amended, 48 PS §111 (authorizing suit by a married woman against her husband “in a proceeding to protect and recover her separate property”) , 1 this act gives her no right to recover an undivided interest in personal property owned by the entireties.
In
Notes v. Snyder,
55 App. D. C. 233,
The decisions of our common pleas courts are in accord with
Notes v. Snyder,
supra. Replevin to recover the wife’s separate property was allowed in
Berger v. Berger,
19 Pa. Dist. 427, 3 Leh. L. J. 183 (1910), and
McDonald v. McDonald,
38 Pa. C. C. 268 (1911), but in
Cinardo v. Cinardo,
2 Pa. D. & C. 2d 219 (1954) , where a divorced husband brought replevin against his former wife and others, Judge Sloane held that he could recover only items of property owned solely by him and not items owned jointly or in common with any of the defendants. Replevin does not lie by one tenant in common against another.
Rockwood and Company v. Pusey,
*544
Since the statutory remedies for compulsory division or partition of jointly owned property by their terms are not available to married persons,
3
it is doubtful that a wife may compel a division of tangible entire-ties property in any proceeding prior to divorce. See:
Tioga No. 2 B. & L. Association v. North Philadelphia Trust Co.,
The defendant contends that title to crops grown on entireties real estate vests exclusively in the husband. We do not have to determine whether the current law of Pennsylvania includes this common law doctrine, dating from the days when all of a woman’s personal property became the property of her husband upon marriage. Pennsylvania decisions compelling a husband to account to his spouse for rents received from entireties real estate are evidence to the contrary.
Brobst v. Brobst,
Since an action of replevin is neither available nor appropriate for tbe relief sought by tbe plaintiff under tbe circumstances set forth in her complaints, they were properly dismissed by tbe court below.
Orders affirmed.