88 Mo. App. 148 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1901
There are rights and privileges incident to membership in an organization like the respondent club, independent of any property Interests which, if not valuable, are prized as desirable, and the esteem in which they are held is likely to wax instead of wane, because the trend of social forces bids fair to continue towards association in habits and efforts. The growth of urban populations, enlarged means of intercourse, wide diffusion of knowledge with an attendant broadening of popular interests, extension of political power among the masses and other tendencies of the age, have rapidly multiplied societies formed for the prosecution of various purposes, religious, ethical, political, commercial and social. The law has not lingered; along with the phase of contemporary life has gone a development of the rules needed to appropriately regulate these corporations, which have characteristics of their own and call for an application of legal principles unlike that made to companies created for gainful purposes. The store set by the privileges of membership is proven by the number of cases in which their protection by the courts has been invoked,' resulting in the status of such societies and in the sphere in which they are self-governing and beyond which their acts are reviewable, being well defined. Regarded from a legal standpoint, they resemble more the old English proprietary clubs or voluntary societies than anything else. Many of the eases liken them to benefit companies, but it is believed there is a growing disposition in the courts to distinguish between the two. This would be more logical, for
It may be said, generally, that the disciplinary power of a corporation of the class to which the Jefferson Olub belongs, over its members, and its' rights to try, suspend and expel them for alleged delinquencies, is not interfered with by the courts except when abused. If a fair mode of trial is provided, with due notice to the accused, an opportunity to defend himself
,, Do the offenses with which the relator was charged fall within the statute or the by-law? In other words, did they affect “the interests and good government of the corporation,” or “tend unqualifiedly to lower the reputation of the association, retard its progress or defeat its ends ?” We may leave out of view, in answering this question, the threat of the appellant that he would not support the nominations made by the
But it appears that the relator, at a meeting of a rivals political club, organized with reference to the coming municb. pal election, had declared he was a member of the Jefferson Club and had been on its board of directors for more than three years, and its treasurer. He used these remarks prefatory to the further statements that nothing could be hoped for from men high up in political parties; that it was laughable to hear them talk — he had sat in their councils and ought to know. It further appears that when called to account by the directory for his conduct and talk, the appellant declared he would resign from the hoard of directors if he did not fear his resignation would injure another political organization. His resignation was desired, because, it was thought his position was inconsistent by reason of his connection with the Bowman Hall club. The appellant, however, said he could not consistently resign, for it might he construed so that it would injrrre the movement he had undertaken with, the rest at Bowman Hall. All these utterances may have been patriotically made by the relator and for that matter, may have been wise. On account of the consideration with which he was treated during his trial by the directors, we must believe they esteemed him a sincere man. But it is palpable his remarks might effect detrimentally the interests or good government of the Jefferson Club, tend to retard its progress and defeat its ends. We can not hold one is a good member of an association whose purpose in remaining in it or in exercising official duty is to aid a rival organization — a group with which he is more in accord. Such behavior
While one purpose of this organization was strictly political, it had others — recreation, amusement, reading and agreeable social intercourse. Assertions calculated to provoke ill-will and engender animosity, as were some of those made by the relator, might very seriously mar the influence of the institution. In Littleton v. Blackburn, 45 L. J. (N. S.), 19, the court refused to interfere where the member had written a discourteous letter criticising the management, and was expelled under a power to expel “for conduct injurious to the character and interests of 'the club.” So where the complainant had written an article reflecting on a fellow member. Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 L. R. Chd. 615. So where a member had said a committee was a packed borough and could pass such by-laws as it pleased. Lambert v. Addison, 46 L. T. (N. S.), 20. And where one who belonged to a conservative club had pledged himself to vote for three liberal candidates. Hopkinson v. Marquis of Exeter, L. R. 5 Eq. 63. And where a member had been expelled for using insulting language to another member in the clubhouse. Commonwealth ex rel. v. Union League, 135 Pa. St. 301. The case last cited is a valuable authority, for the organization was in all material respects similar to the Jefferson Club, being partly political and partly
A careful reading of the record has convinced us that the directors of the Jefferson Club, far from being moved by malice or sinister purposes in their treatment of the appellant, cherished kindly feelings toward him and were anxious for him to offer any evidence or explanation that would exculpate him. He was importuned, over and over again, to make a statement in his own behalf, but steadily and obstinately refused to utter a word in addition to his protest against the jurisdiction of either the board or the club itself. Neither during his trial in the order nor in the circuit court was any proof adduced tending to support the allegations of the petition and alternative writ, of malice and unworthy motives on the part of the respondents. We can not take statements in pleadings for facts nor does it indicate a proper spirit to make such harsh charges without at least attempting to prove them.
Much is said in the petition about the intentions of certain officers of the Jefferson Club to convert it into a political machine; nothing of the kind was proven. Much is also said about its spirit and tendency being subversive of the teaching of Thomas Jefferson. No court would assume ex cathedra to pronounce what the teachings of Jefferson or any other sage really were, or whether any society was upholding them or not. In a general way, it would perhaps be conceded by every one, that Jefferson’s doctrines look towards popular instead of class rule, and political equality instead of prerogative or privilege. Many secular organizations doubtless lay claim to faith in those doctrines, although they are opposed to each other, as many religious sects lay claim to sacred oracles. There may be truth in all such claims. It suffices to say, that as long as the majortiy of an organization, like the respondent club,
We come next to inquire whether there wás jurisdiction by the board of directors, and whether the proceedings were regular. The power to try and expel is vested either in such associations at large, or in some committee to which it has been delegated. The by-laws of the Jefferson Club committed that unpleasant duty to the board of directors. Such provisions are valid. This precise point was determined in a case where the legality of expulsion was challenged solely on the ground that jurisdiction must be exercised by the entire membership to whom the statute had confided it, it being in the nature of a trust and not to be delegated to a minority. The trial there, as here, was by the board of directors. Pitcher v. Board of Trade, 22 Ill. App. 319; see also People v. Board of Trade, 80 Ill. 104; Black & White Smith Co. v. Vandyke, 2 Whart. 309; Commonwealth v. Union League, 35 Pa. St. 301; Husey v. Gallagher, 61 Ga. 86; People v. Commercial Ass’n, 18 Abb. Pr. 271; White v. Brunnell, 2 Daly, 329; People v. Board of Trade, 45 Ill. 112; Green v. A. M. E. Soc., 1 S. & R. 254. The relator contends, however, that inasmuch as he was treasurer of the club and ex officio member of the board, and as such was only removable from the office at a meeting of the association by a two-thirds vote, he was not amenable to the hoard of directors. The provision for removing officers was simply a by-law adopted by the same anthority, to-wit, by the association itself, which adopted the by-law providing how members might be tried and expelled. One of these by-laws has no higher sanction nor dignity than the other. They relate to entirely distinct matters. 'We can not say one is valid and the other void. It is apparent that nobody could properly remove
Proceedings in cases of this kind need not be technically regular. Albers v. Merchants Ex., 39 Mo. App. 583; Commonwealth v. Union League, 135 Pa. St. loc. cit. 131; Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 L. R. Ch. D., supra. But so far as we can discover they were, in the trial of the relator. The courts simply inquire whether the corporate authorities have acted' within their powers, after giving the accused reasonable notice, and whether they have exercised their powers fairly and in good faith. Beyond these limits they do not take cognizance. Albers v. Merchants Ex., supra; State ex rel. v. Grand Lodge, 8 Mo. App. 148; State ex rel. v. Farris, 45 Mo. 147; Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. 773; Dawkins v. Antrobus, supra; Commonwealth v. Ben. Soc., 8 Watts. & S. 247; Hopkinson v. Marquis of Exeter, L. R. 5 Eq. 63. Corporate judicatures are not permitted to stigmatize a citizen, bring him into disrepute, or
But there is another reason why the writ must fail. The section of the by-laws of the respondent club which provides for the trial of an offending member by the board of directors, provides also for an appeal from their decision. The convicted defendant may request the president of the association to refer the charges against him to the whole association and if three or
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the circuit court did not err in refusing the peremptory writ of mandamus as prayed by-the relator. The judgment is affirmed.