119 Iowa 211 | Iowa | 1903
-The appellant was in the employ of appellee as a section hand at the time of his accident and injury, and had been so for ffve years previous to such time. His employment, during all the time thereof, had been on a section constituting a part of a branch line of defendant’s railway extending north from Cherokee, this-state. It appears tliat a work train, consisting of thirteen box cars loaded with ties, having reached the southern limit of the section on which appellant was employed, the section gang, consisting of four men, appellant being one, was directed by the section foreman to enter one of the cars, and, as the train passed north over the section, to throw out a portion of the ties from the car at each place where the train slacked its speed for that purpose. After a portion of the ties had been thrown out, appellant was injured by some one or more of the ties remaining in the car slipping from their places and coming down upon and against his leg. It is charged in the petition that the track was in a rough and uneven condition, and that said train was being run at a high rate of speed, and in a jerking and bumping manner, whereby the ties in the car, being piled up in tiers therein, were jolted, jarred, and dislodged and caused to fall and tumble down upon plaintiff, resulting in his injury.
Such are the allegations of fact upon which the charge of negligence on the part of defendant is predicated.
Now, that it may be said a case of actionable negligence has been made out, it must appear that the conditions and circumstances were such that the defendant ought to have foreseen that such an accident might happen, or, if such an accident could reasonably have been anticipated, that there was an omission to provide against' it. McKee v. Railway Co., 83 Iowa, 616. The record before us is barren of any evidence that would justify such a conclusion. Whatever danger there was incident to the work in which appellant was engaged was not only obvious to him, but as we have said, he had personal knowledge of the character thereof from previous experience. Indeed, we think there is much room for saying that he assisted in creating the dangerous condition out of which his accident grew; that such accident was the direct result of an improper’method employed in unloading the car. It seems to be reasonably certain that, had the piles of ties been lowered with some degree of uniformity, the accident could not have happened, and this appellant must be held to have known.
Taking the facts to be as we find them, and we think that the risk of accident from the sliding of ties in the car was of such character that it must be held to have been assumed by appellant, and therefore no recovery can be had. The principle is that, where the servant has as good an opportunity as the master to ascertain and avoid the danger for himself, he will have no recourse against the master in case he is injured thereby. Buswell, Personal Injuries, section 204; Haley v. Case, 142 Mass. 316 (7 N.E. Rep. 877) Powers v. Railroad Co., 98 N. Y. 274; Banking Co. v. Dickinson, 82 Gra. 629 (10 S. E. Rep. 203); McGlynn v. Brodie, 31 Cal. 376; Beckman v. Coal Co., 90 Iowa, 352. — Affirmed.