*1 Billiter circumstances, undisputed here is In contrast to those sentencing entry, notice, hearing and sentencing at the received both after Authority up years for to three by the Adult Parole supervised he would be complied that he undisputed And it is prison. his release from under detention. believing himself to be years, for almost three supervision subject of law and to correction is insufficient as matter Although the sanction sentence, actually imposed the trial court nonetheless of the completion before control, had the Authority the Adult Parole postrelease term of three-year it, escape the crime of when and Billiter therefore committed authority to execute he broke his detention. void, not his escape conviction for is Accordingly, because Billiter’s I judicata, of res and would by to it is barred the doctrine challenge
belated judgment appeals. affirm the J., foregoing concurs opinion.
Lundberg Stratton, Ferrero, Attorney, and Richard Mark County Prosecuting John D. Stark Caldwell, Attorney, appellee. Prosecuting Assistant Defender, Hardwick, P. Assistant
Timothy Young, Stephen Ohio Public Defender, appellant. Public Appellant.
Branch, Appellee,
Foundation,
v. Cleveland Clinic
Found.,
as Branch v. Cleveland Clinic
[Cite
114,
lee, Margaret suffered stroke during surgery performed brain *2 appellant, result, clinic, the Cleveland Clinic. As a Branch sued the claiming that ventricle, its had struck a causing the stroke. trial, a Following jury a verdict was entered for the clinic. Branch
{¶ 2}
appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals found abuses of
discretion
three
rulings
Found.,
the trial court. Branch v. Cleveland Clinic
8th Dist. No.
95475,
{¶ 3} in each of respects, these “legally and factually flawed” and inconsistent with our precedent. We agree. us, Based on the record before court did not abuse its in any Therefore, at issue. we reverse the judgment District Court of Appeals and reinstate the jury verdict for the clinic.
Background Evidence at trial that demonstrated Branch is a highly accomplished attorney with a long history of advocating injured for plaintiffs. Prior to the surgery, husband, Branch and her Turner managed a law firm with approximately 30 staff members and 8 attorneys Albuquerque, New Mexico. testified, however, Branch that in 2003 she noticed of a symptoms neurological disorder known as cervical dystonia. The condition irresistibly drew her head downwards and to the right, causing spasms severe and It pain. led to career, serious struggles life, Branch’s personal and mental health. toll, As the condition took its Branch learned that the clinic offered a new
procedure dystonia, (“DBS”). known as deep-brain stimulation DBS, surgeons implant electrodes within the brain to defeat destructive impulses brain such as those causing dystonia. After consulting with clinic physicians, Branch elected to undergo surgery. During surgery, Branch suffered a stroke that caused significant damage
to her physical
cognitive
and
clinic,
abilities. Branch then sued the
contending
the clinic committed medical negligence that
permanent
caused
brain
her
ability
pursue
and
lost
speech,
vision
impaired
paralysis,
damage, partial
suffering.
pain
and severe
occupation,
chosen
informed
of lack of
included counts
time,
complaint also
At one
claim for
well as
loss-of-consortium
credentialing, as
negligent
consent
however,
all these
trial,
dropped
Branch
husband, Turner. Before
Branch’s
relating to the
claim
lack-of-informed-consent
except
portion
claims
performing
identity of the doctors
knowledge,
experience,
Branch
for the clinic.
trial,
unanimous
found
After a two-week
of discretion
identified three abuses
and the
appealed,
Branch,
and was well aware of the issue’s importance. Indeed, exercising before his discretion to demonstration, allow the judge the explained that it a “tough” decision. The result was not an abuse of discretion. Branch permitted to an use exhibit the trial to deemed be comparable to the clinic’s exhibit. Branch’s counsel had access to the same notes that in used preparing aid, its demonstrative and we defer to the trial court’s judgment that counsel for adequate had to opportunity cross-examine clinic doctors with respect to the despite exhibit the minimal notice. its discretion exercised reasonably trial court that the conclude We far from unreason- decision was That court’s the clinic’s demonstration.
allowing contrary to the ruling District’s Eighth The unconscionable. able, arbitrary, or was in error.
Adverse Inference finding District erred Eighth that the argues clinic next The after the negligence an adverse inference argue unable to Branch was closing during BP oil to the disaster her to refer to allow court refused arguments. determination District’s words, challenges Eighth clinic other the clinic’s arising from an adverse inference argue to
that Branch was entitled
stated that
Eighth
The
developed
the plan
failure to retain
to the party
unfavorable
evidence would be
missing
that the
an adverse inference
“ ‘
under
is relevant evidence
it arises
“where there
to produce
who failed
’ ”
satisfactory explanation.”
it without
produce
who fails to
party
control of a
3505286,
62,
Cherovsky v. St.
arguing until closing argument. Up of Branch’s the end just occurred moments before The trial court missing repeatedly. records Branch referred point, in this respect. considering argument from not forbid the to determine bound- well within its discretion The trial court was Minch, 53 Ohio Pang an abuse of discretion. absent closing argument aries of (1990). contrary ruling to the District’s St.3d inwas error. Methods
Jury Regarding Instruction Different “disallowing District erred argues that the Finally, *5 jury agree. instruction.” We the different methods methods” the role of “different reviewed previously We have Assoc., Neurologists cases. Pesek Univ. medical-malpractice in instruction (2000). Pesek, that explained In we Inc, 495, 498, with their limited juries, principle ‘on the “grounded is the instruction knowledge, acceptable medical should not be forced to decide which of two ” Id., treatments performed by physician.’ quoting should have been defendant Dailey, The Two Schools Thought and Consent Doctrines in Penn- Informed (1994). A sylvania: Integration, Model 98 Dickinson L.Rev. We held in charge only Peselc the different-methods is appropriate if “there is evidence that more than diagnosis one method of or treatment is acceptable particular medical condition.” at syllabus. Regardless, Id. we found that trial court erred in in giving the instruction that case because no acceptable instead, alternative methods of treatment were presented; Pesek turned on a misdiagnosis. classic Id. at 499. The Eighth District found that give was error to the different-
methods in instruction this case Branch because claimed that the clinic’s surgeon negligent striking the denied, ventricle wall. Id. at 51. The surgeon however, that words, he had struck the ventricle wall. In other the dispute facts, However, turned on not legal theories. this analysis oversimplifies what fact, In transpired trial. the parties’ experts raised a number of questions regarding how different planning procedures could prevented have stroke, all of which required to determine whether another medical approach preferable. would have been For example, parties disputed planned trajecto- whether the clinic’s
ry into Branch’s brain dangerously close to vascular structures the middle brain; of her Branch’s experts proposed an alternative trajectory they claim would have been safer. Similarly, Branch’s experts challenged the clinic’s approach creating map Branch’s brain for surgery and testified to an alternative mapping strategy that Likewise, could have employed. Branch’s experts questioned whether the clinic’s surgeon many conducted too “tracks” into Branch’s brain while searching for the best site for electrode placement. respect issues, With to each of professionals these medical in the disagreed case about the best method of performing short, raised number of questions about whether the clinic adopted the correct medical approach her surgery despite the existence of alternative methods. These fall questions outside the limited knowledge medical juries. Therefore, that we expect court did not err in allowing different-methods instruction.
Conclusion Based on foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its in any the three at issue. Accordingly, we reverse the *6 and we reinstate Appeals, District Court of the decision for the clinic. verdict
Judgment reversed. Lundberg and Cupp, C.J., Lanzinger, Stratton, O’Donnell, and O’Connor, JJ., concur. J., dissents.
Pfeifer, J., dissenting.
Pfeifer, a trial court’s review of case, appeals’ a court of In this we review “the trial court is that holding decisions. Our jury-instruction evidentiary Undoubtedly, three at issue.” any not abuse its discretion and a matter of for the Branches personal interest great case is matter this Foundation, but it does not meet Clinic interest for the Cleveland corporate great great general “of or public of a case jurisdictional requirement this court’s 2(B)(2)(e). Constitution, IV, I would hold Article Section interest.” Ohio allowed in this case. improvidently jurisdiction Flowers; Firm and Co., L.P.A., Paul and Becker Law Paul W. Flowers Becker, for appellee. Michael Leak, Carulas, L.P.A., Ingrid Anna Moore Andress, G. Douglas
Roetzel & appellant. Kinkopf-Zajac, Anderson, Appellant, ex rel.
The State
Appellee.
City
v.
Vermilion,
Vermilion,
ex rel. Anderson
[Cite as State
120,
