65 N.W. 701 | N.D. | 1895
Lead Opinion
Although the steamer Eclipse has for years lain at the bottom of the Missouri river, the litigation connected with her shows no signs of decadence. 4 Dak. 218, 30 N. W. 159; on appeal, 135 U. S. 599, 10 Sup. Ct. 873; 1 N. D. 455, 48 N. W. 354; 1 N. D. 475, 48 N. W. 361; 2 N. D. 57, 49 N. W. 419; 3 N. D. 365, 56 N. W. 133. In this case Capt. Braithwaite is seeking to recover damages for breach of an undertaking given by defendants
Preliminary to the consideration of the merits, we must settle the question of the jurisdiction of the state courts to take cognizance of this action. Counsel for defendants insists that the power to render judgment on the undertaking sued on is vested
But counsel for defendants earnestly urges that a strong array of authority supports his contention. We are unable to agree with him in the view which he takes of the decisions he cites. It is undoubtedly true that courts of admiralty have power summarily to render judgment against stipulators upon any stipulation given during the progress of an admiralty proceeding, and that such judgment may be rendered in the very proceeding in which the stipulation was given. No new suit is necessary. Nor does it matter whether the stipulation is for value or for costs, or is given to perfect an appeal, or stay execution during the pendency thereof. U. S. v. Ames, 99 U. S. 35; The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1; The Webb, 14 Wall. 406; The Wanata, 95 U. S. 600; The Lady Pike, 96 U. S. 461; Sawyer v. Oakman, 11 Blatchf. 65, Fed. Cas. No. 12,403; The Blanche Page, 16 Blatchf 1, Fed. Cas. No. 1,524; Id., 17 Blatchf. 221, Fed. Cas. No. 1,525; The Alligator, 1 Gall. 145, Fed. Cas. No. 248; McLellan v. U. S., 1 Gall. 227. Fed. Cas. No. 8,895; Nelson v. U. S., Pet. C. C. 235, Fed. Cas. No. 10,116; The Virgin, 8 Pet. 538; The Baltic, Fed. Cas. No. 826; The
Nor does the fact that a bond, instead of a stipulation, is taken, alter the rule that the admiralty court may, in the same proceeding, summarily enforce the obligation. Bonds are regarded in admiralty as stipulations to be enforced in the same manner. The Wanata, 95 U. S. 600; The Alligator, 1. Gall. 145, Fed. Cas. No. 248; McLellan v. U. S., 1 Gall. 227, Fed. Cas. No. 8,895; Nelson v. U. S., Pet. C. C. 235, Fed. Cas. No. 10,116; Conk. Adm. 434; The Sydney, 47 Fed. 260; Dunl. Adm. Prac. 164. Neither does.the power of the court to render in the same action judgment against the parties bound by the stipulation or bond depend upon their express consent recited in the obligation, or their submission to the jurisdiction of the court by the terms of the security. It was long customary to embody such submission and consent in stipulations, and this is still done in many cases. It is possible that this doctrine that an admiralty court may proceed in the same suit summarily against the stipulators may have had its origin in such submission and consent. But, however this may be, such doctrine no longer rests thereon. In several cases in which this practice was upheld and followed with respect to supersedeas bonds on appeal, such bonds contained no clause by which the obligors in terms submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, nor did they contain any consent that execution might issue against them in the same action in a summary manner. The Sydney, 47 Fed. 260; The Blanche Page, 16 Blatchf. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 1,524; Id., 17 Blatchf. 221, Fed. Cas. No. 1,525; The New Orleans, 17 Blatchf. 216, Fed. Cas. No. 10,181; The Wanata, 95 U. S. 600. See, also, The Alligator, 1 Gall. 145, Fed. Cas. No. 248; Sawyer v. Oakman, 11 Blatchf. 65
The courts in holding that stipulations may be enforced, against those that sign them, by summary proceedings in the oxfiginal case, do not adjudge such proceedings to be an essential pax't of the main suit. The title of the oxfiginal action is used. The px'oceedings are carried on with greater dispatch than a fox-mal action, and the procedure is much simpler. But, in its essence, it is an independent litigation against new parties, — the stipulators. They cannot, it is true, retxy the mexfits of the original action; but they have an absolute right to be heard, at some stage of the proceeding before their propeity is finally wx-ested from them under execution, on the questions whether they in
There is another conclusive reason why the court in which the stipulation for value is given has sole cognizance of the proceedings to enforce it: Its jurisdiction over the original res is exclusive. Such jurisdiction includes the power to make the res produce, up to its value, in that very suit, the money to satisfy the libelant’s claim. This is accomplished by a sale after judgment. The stipulation takes the place of the ship. It, in turn, becomes the res, and over it the court exercises the same jurisdiction as over the vessel where it is not released. The court has, and must have, power, in the same suit, to make this new or substituted res produce, up to its value, money to satisfy the libelant’s claim. The procedure against the stipulation is different from the procedure against the vessel, because the former differs from the latter in its nature. In making the stipulation produce money to apply on libelant’s claim, the admiralty court proceeds as other courts proceed against-similar instruments. It does not sell the obligation at public auction, but renders judgment and awards execution against the obligors therein. This it has the exclusive power to do just as it possesses exclusive jurisdiction to sell the original res in case it is not released from the control of the court. But
It is true that cases can be found in which it has been asserted that admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce all bonds and stipulations given .in admiralty proceedings. But these cases will be found, on examination, to be prize cases, and not actions on the instance side of the court. Such were the cases of Smart v. Wolff, 3 Term R. 336; Brymer v. Atkins, 1 H. Bl. 164. It is on this ground that these cases are distinguished by Chief Justice Chew in Lacaze v. Pennsylvania, 1 Add. 65, 66. The cases of Penhallow v. Doane's Adm’rs, 3 Dall. 54, and Jennings v. Carson, 4 Cranch, 5, cited by counsel for defendants, were both cases of prize. So are the cases of Sasportas v. Jennings, 1 Bay, 470; LeCaux v. Eden, Doug. 594; Doane’s Adm’rs v. Penhallow, 1 Dall. 218; Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 Dall. 160, 1 Yeates, 443; Simpson v. Nadeau, Cam. and N. 115; Cheriot v. Foussat, 3 Bin. 220; and Novion v. Hallett, 16 Johns.
The Federal Supreme Court appeal's to have settled the question involved, under facts precisely the same as in the case at bar, so far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned. An admiralty action in personam was instituted in the United States District Court, sitting as an admiralty court. The case having been decided in favor of the libelant in the District Court, and thereafter on appeal in the Circuit Court, it was carried by appeal to the Federal Supreme Court. On that appeal a supersedeas bond was given. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. New Jersey Steam. Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, 6 How. 344. Instead of securing judgment against the sureties on the appeal bond in the very case in which the bond was given, the libelant sued them in the United States Circuit Court in an action of debt. This was a suit in a common-law court, and not in an admiralty court. The United States Circuit Court had common-law jurisdiction, but no original jurisdiction in admiralty cases. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. no. It could take cognizance of such cases only on appeal. The action to enforce the appeal bond was, like this action, a common-law action brought in a court possessing original jurisdiction of common-law and not of admiralty cases. Ives v. Bank, 12 How. 159. No one connected with the case, from the time the United States Supreme Court affirmed the original judgment on appeal (6 How. 344,) seems to have had any thought that the only remedy on the appeal bond was in admiralty. If such had been the law, the court in the Ives case would have declared the judgment appealed from a nullity, for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter. If counsel for defendants be correct in his contention, then both the judgments of both the Circuit and the Supreme Court were void, and always have been. With this case before us, we feel constrained to hold that the District Court of this state has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action, and the case is therefore properly before us on appeal. We are of opinion that sound
A large number of cases have been cited by defendants’ counsel, holding that an action may be maintained in the Federal Court, irrespective of diverse citizenship, if such action is an offshoot from another suit of which such Federal Court had jurisdiction. Among them are Bobyshall v. Oppenheimer, Fed. Cas. No. 1,592; Arnold v. Frost, Fed. Cas. No. 558; Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U. S. 119, 12 Sup. Ct. 659; Campbell v. Hadley, 1 Spr. 470, Fed. Cas. No. 2,358; Seymour v. Construction Co., 7 Biss. 460, Fed. Cas. No.
It is urged that the state courts ought not to take jurisdiction of this case, for the reason that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy by proceeding in the original admiralty case. While it is true that courts of equity will refuse to entertain a bill to set aside a judgment, where there is an adequate remedy by motion in the action in which the judgment was rendered, we have been unable to discover any decision making that general doctrine of equity jurisprudence applicable to suits at law. The fact that the suitor has another remedy, which may be more speedy, and even more efficacious, does not debar him from bringing his action at
It is next urged that comity x-equires us to refuse to take juxdsdiction of this case. The cases to which we ax'e cited on this point hold that where in an action in a Federal Court, px'opex'ty has been seized, the state courts must not interfere with the control of the px-operty by the Federal Court, but that, if any person nota party to the suit desix'es to litigate his right to the px-operty, he must intexwene in the action, and there txy his case. We have cax-efully examined these decisions, but the great length of this opinion prevents a review of them. It is sufficient to say that we are clear that they do not lay down any nxle inimical to the juxdsdiction of the state courts over this action. The rule which they lay down is thus stated in Cohen v. Solomon, 66 Fed. 411, at page 413: “No principle is more firmly intrenched in the law than that doctrine that, when one court acquires jurisdiction and power over the res, no other coui't can intei'fere with its possession and control.’’ Many of the cases cited by counsel for defendants are there referred to. In Meyers v. Block, 120 U. S. 206, 7 Sup. Ct. 525, the court affirmed a judgment of the state court in an action on an injunction bond given in an action in equity in the Fedex-al Coux-t. This case is hostile to this contention of defendant’s counsel. It furnishes, also, a complete answer to his contention that the suit on the appeal bond is ancillary to the px'oceedings in the admiralty court, -within the scope of the rule that such proceedings must be carried on in the state or Federal Coux-t -in which the main action was litigated. The cases cited by counsel for defendants in this connection are cases in which the coux-ts have held that the px-oceedings were insepax-ably connected with the enforcement of the judgment in the main action, and wex-e thex-efox-e only additional steps in that action, looking to the enforcement of such judgment. The gx-eat length of this opinion prevents a more particular x-eference to
We now come to the merits of the case. The defendants’ counsel contends that the undetaking sued . on is void. The plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the alleged breach of the condition of the undertaking that the obligors would obey any order the appellate court might make in the premises. The defendants’ counsel asserts that, so far as this provision of the undertaking is concerned, the undertaking is void as a statutory undertaking. A consideration of this branch of the case necessitates a more particular reference to the facts. The action in which the undertaking was given was an action in admiralty in a cause of possession, civil and maritime, instituted in the District Court of the Territory of Dakota, for the Third Judicial District thereof, sitting as a court of admiralty under the laws of the United States. The power of such court .to take jurisdiction of such an action was derived, as we have before said, from section 1910 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. This section provided that the District Courts of' the several territories referred to therein (Dakota being one of them) should have and exercise the same jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, as was vested in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States. That such a statute is valid, and that its effect was to vest in the Territorial
It is claimed by the plaintiff that the judgment appealed from directed the delivery of personal property, and that, therefore, the execution of a mere- cost bond would not have been sufficient to stay the execution of such judgment. Section 416 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as revised in 1877 (the statute in force when the appeal in question was taken,) provides that: “If the judgment appealed from direct the assignment or delivery of documents or personal property, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed by appeal, unless the things required to be assigned or delivered be brought into court, or placed in the custody of such officer or receiver as the court shall appoint, or unless an undertaking be entered into on the part of the appellant, by at least two sureties, and in such amount as the court, or judge thereof, shall direct, to the effect that the appellant will obey the order of the appellate court upon the- appeal.” The judgment that was appealed from did not, in terms, direct the delivery by the appellants, on such appeal, of the steamboat Eclipse, her tackle, apparel, and furniture. . It merely adjudged that the
In determining whether the judgment appealed from is of such character that a stay of proceedings under, it will entitle the appellant to hold possession of the property which the judgment declares shall be delivered to the adverse party, we are never to
If we were to be governed by the territorial statutes referred to, we would be of opinion that the undertaking was void, for the reason that under such statutes the libelants were entitled to a stay of execution on giving the mere cost bond specified in section 422. But, despite the agreement of counsel, we cannot accede to their view that these statutes in any manner controlled the appeal in the admiralty case to the Territorial Supreme Court. There are only two theories on which it can be held that the territorial statutes regulated the procedure on appeal in the admiralty case. One is that by the terms of section 1910, Rev. St. U. S., the procedure applicable to actions at law in the territorial courts was made applicable to actions in admiralty; and the other is that the territorial legislature had in fact regulated the procedure in'admiralty cases on appeal. That section 1910 did not assume to regulate the practice on appeal to the Territorial Supreme Court of Dakota Territory in admiralty cases, at all, is apparent from its language. It merely declared that in such cases, among others, writs of error and appeals might be taken as in other cases. It gave the light to appeal, but did not attempt to establish the procedure on such appeal. On this point the decisions of the Supreme Court of Washington Territory and of the Supreme Court of the United States are express authorities in support of our view. Section 19x1 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which was applicable to the Territory of Washington, contains precisely the same provisions as section tgio. The Supreme Court of that territory held in the case of The City of Panama, 1 Wash. T. 615, that the territorial statutes did not govern the procedure on appeal to that court from a judgment of the Territorial District Court in an admiralty case, but that on such an appeal the case must be tried de 7iovo in the Supreme Court, and that on such trial new evidence in that court might be received. On appeal to the Federal Supreme Court the judgment, of the Territorial Supreme
Certainly, there was no settled rule of practice which would have entitled the appellants in The Eclipse case to a stay of proceedings, and even to appeal at all, without giving such a bond as the court might direct. There being no inflexible rule on the subject, the District Court of the territory in which The Eclipse
It is ui'ged that the respondent could not have been compelled to refrain from enforcing his judgment pending the appeal, but we are decidedly of the opinion that he would have been promptly restrained, upon motion, it being shown that this bond had been given to secure him. But it would not be decisive of the question, if we should hold that he need not have abstained from proceeding under the judgment pending the appeal. The fact is that he did so abstain. This is sufficient. Said the court in Wing v. Rogers, 138 N. Y. 361, 34 N. E. 194: “When an action is brought against sureties on a bond or undertaking given in an action or upon appeal, the validity and force of the instrument depend upon its efficacy in performing the office or accomplishing the end or result contemplated by the parties at the time it was given.” To same effect, Carter v. Hodge, (Super. Buff.) 27 N. Y. Supp. 219; Hathaway v. Davis, 33 Cal. 161; Gardner v. Don
Counsel for defendants now takes up his stand at the last barrier, save one, against his clients’ liability, left him, and asserts that the District Court did not in fact render a judgment against the libelants and interveners for the delivery by them of this property to the claimant, that when this judgment was affirmed its character was not changed in the least, and that, therefore, there has been no breach of the undertaking on appeal, as this refers to only such a judgment as the appellants must perform. It is on his construction of the undertaking that we differ from him. His two other propositions are clearly sound. The language of the undertaking is that the obligors undertake to obey any order made in. the case by the appellate court. This does not mean merely any order requiring something to be done by the promisors, for no order of that kind could be made, as against such of the promisors as were sureties. The language is broad enough to cover any order which might be made in the case,
This brings us to the question whether the failure of the court to fix the amount of this bond as a supersedeas bond renders it void. Having held that the territorial statutes do not apply, but that the bond is good as a common-law bond, this question is not
The plaintiff successfully vindicated his right to the possession of the steamer Eclipse through the entire course of the action in admiralty; obtaining a judgment in the District Court, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the territory, and finally by the Supreme Court of the United States. The justice of the case is palpably with him. All parties have regarded this bond as taking the place of the vess'el, — as his security in lieu of his obtaining possession of her under the judgment appealed from. It is a source of great satisfaction to the court that we are able, under the law to recognize and uphold the justice of his claim. The order of the District Court is reversed, and the trial court is directed to enter an order overruling the demurrer.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring.) I concur in the foregoing opinion, but also deem it proper to go one step further than my Brother Corliss has gone. Assuming that the territorial statutes were controlling in the matter of giving the undertaking on appeal from the original judgment in admiralty, I then think that the undertaking sued upon should be sustained as a statutory
Rehearing
ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING.
On the application for rehearing, the opinion of the court has been attacked with such ability and earnestness by the counsel for defendants, who has laid under tribute, to strengthen his argument, so wide a field of juridical learning, that, despite the length of the original opinion, we feel constrained to state our reasons for not agreeing with him with respect to the new points he has presented. He seems to concede that we are correct in our view that the territorial statutes did not govern the appeal in the admiralty case. But he contends that such appeal was in all respects regulated by the statutes of the United States and the rules of the Federal Supreme Court relating to appeals from the Federal District to the Federal Circuit Court in that class of cases. The decision in The City of Panama, 101 U. S. 453, is cited as conclusive on this point. We do not so construe it. The court was not called on in that case to decide whether such statutes and rules governed the appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington .from the Territorial District Court, for the practice which was in fact adopted on such appeal was sanctioned by the usuages of courts of admiralty on appeal in such cases, and did not require any support from legislation or formulated rules of court. The Federal Supreme Court nowhere asserts that the acts of congress, and the rules promulgated by that court, governed the appeal to the Territorial Supreme Court, nor is there to be found in the opinion any reasoning leading up to this conclusion. There is only a faint inference that such was the decision of the court, from the language of the assignment of error which is overruled.
But, even if we should agree with counsel that the appeal to the Territorial Supreme Court in the admiralty case was governed by the statutes of the United States, so far as applicable, we could not assent to his view that at the time such appeal was taken' there was any federal legislation relating to appeals from Federal District to Federal Circuit Courts in admiralty cases, aside from the statute giving the right to appeal. Rev. St. § 641. As this section originally stood, it provided that such appeals should be governed by the rules, regulations, and restrictions relating to proceedings on writs of error. While the statute remained in this form, there could be little doubt about appeals to the Federal Circuit Court, in admiralty proceedings on the instance side of the court, being governed by the statutes of the United States relating to proceedings on writs of error. See The Lottawanna, 20 Wall. 201; Hayford v. Griffith, Fed. Cas. No. 6,263. Mr. Conkling bases his criticism of Justice Story’s ruling to the contrary on that language of the statute which had been dropped therefrom before the appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Dakota was taken in The Eclipse case. 2 Conk. Adm. 385 et seq. Under the statute as it then stood, th'e authorities cited, which construed the statute as it originally was framed, are not in point. There is, however, a single decision in favor of the
But conceding all this to be true, counsel for defendants still contends that, on the assumption that general rules of admiralty practice regulated the appeal in question, the instrument sued on is void so far as it provides that the obligors shall obey any order which the court might make in the premises. We fully agree with him that if the appellants in that appeal had an absolute legal right to secure a stay of proceedings by appealing, without incorporating in the bond that condition, then that portion of the bond is without consideration and void, unless other circumstances, to be referred to later, take the case out of the general rule laid down and applied. Kountze v. Hotel Co., 107 U. S. 378, 2 Sup. Ct. 911. In this connection we must express our dissent from the proposition that writs of error and appeals operated of themselves, at common-law, absolutely to stay execution. Counsel for defendants insists that no authority to require security as a condition of allowing a stay is ever'vested in any court without a statute to that effect, and that, as we hold that there is no statute relating to this matter in admiralty cases, the bond was a nullity. This is not a correct statement of the law. There has always inhered in courts of law, courts of equity, and courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, power to require security to be given as a condition of staying execution. It is
With respect to appeals in admiralty cases, counsel contends that’there is, in the absence of some statutory change in the practice, no such thing as a stay of proceedings, for the reason that the^appeal, of itself, annuls the decree appealed from, thus leaving nothing to be enforced pending the appeal. Undoubtedly, it has been many times asserted by the courts that the case is to be heard de novo on the appeal, — as though no decree had been rendered. And in some of the cases even stronger language is used. Yeaton v. U. S., 5 Cranch, 281; The Collector, 6 Wheat. 194; U. S. v. Preston, 3 Pet. 57; The Lucille, 19 Wall. 73; Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54. But as was said by Judge Benedict in Dutcher v. Woodhull, Fed. Cas. No. 4,204, there was no question before the court as to the right of the respondent to enforce a decree after appeal, no security having been’given. In this case Judge Benedict intimates it to be his opinion that, despite an appeal, the decree would stand unaffected for the purpose of enforcing it pending the appeal, should no security be given. “In determining this case, it is not necessary to say whether, under some circumstances, a decree in admii’alty, made by the Distinct Court, cannot remain of effect after an appeal is taken to the Circuit Coui’t. It would seem that such may be the case where an appeal is taken, but no bond for damages on appeal is given. Under such circumstances, the failux'e of the appellant to give a bond for damages would seem to change the aspect of the case, and render it thereafter a pi-oceeding to obtain a decree of restitution, and the numex-ous cases heretofore determined, both in the Circuit Court and the Supx'eme Court of the United States, do not appear to me to furnish authority for determining that, after an appeal without security for damages on the appeal, no effect whatever can be given to the decision of the District Court. The general language of these decisions can only be understood by referring to the position of the cases then under consideration, which were not cases of appeal without security.” That an
We agree with counsel for defendants that the 'plaintiff or
Finally, it is said that there has been no breach of the condition of the bond to obey any order the appellate court might make, for the reason that no order requiring anything to be done has in fact ever been made by that court. It is urged that a judgment of affirmance is not; either in terms or in legal effect, an order requiring the delivery of the vessel to the claimant. In this connection the case of The Lucille, 19 Wall. 73, is cited. This merely holds that a judgment of affirmance in the Circuit Court is not a final judgment from which an appeal will lie to the Federal Supreme Court. The ground of this decision is that the Circuit Court should render an entirely new judgment, for the reason that the amount of the judgment should not be left to be ascertained by an examination of the records of another court. But in The Eclipse case it was not necessary to examine the records of the District Court to ascertain just what the judgment of the
The application for a rehearing is denied.
Note by G. W. Newton — The foregoing decision records only one turn in the litigation that has arisen from the ownership and doings of the steamboat “Eclipse.” It is the aim of this note to epitomize briefly, the many points of law that have been mooted and decided in such litigation.
1. The jurisdiction of admiralty does not extend to the execution of a trust. The title of a steamboat being in trustees, the beneficiaries may terminate the trust, and obtain a decree of sale upon a proper proceeding in a court of equity. Rea, et al v. Steamboat “Eclipse," 4 Dak. 218, S. C. 30, N. W. 159. Creditors and interveners, in order to wind up a trust, and enforce a contract of sale of a vessel, can not resort to a court of admiralty. A court of admiralty has not the characteristic powers of a court of equity in such case. Rea, et al v. The Steamer “Eclipse," Wm. Braith-
2. When a part owner is master, and in possession of a boat, under an agreement in writing, he is not subject to removal by his co-owners. Rea, et. al. v. Steamboat “Eclipse," 4 Dak. 218, S. C. 30 N. W. 159. The owner of one-half of the legal title of a steamboat, who is the master in possession, and who is by written agreement entitled to such possession at master, is not liable to removal from his position as master. Rea, et al v. The Steamer “Eclipse," Wm. Braithwaite, claimant, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. L. Ed. B. 34, p. 269; S. C. The Eclipse, Rep. Ed. p. 599.
3. The Supreme Court of the United States is limited, in reviewing judgments and decrees in admiralty cases, to a determination of the questions of law arising upon the record, and to such rulings of the court, excepted to at the time, as are presented by the bill of exceptions. Id.
4. Where the title to a boat is placed in two persons, as trustees, to be held by them as part owners, and for co-owners, until payment to the co-owners, of certain sums, representing the amount of their interests, and upon such payments the trust to terminate, and title absolute to vest in such trustees, the transaction is at most, a creation of a lien in the nature of a mortgage, and the trustees are the legal owners of the boat. Under such circumstances, a bill of sale executed by a part of the co-owners, would pass to the purchaser no title beyond the equitable interests of such co-owners, as beneficiaries of the trust. Rea, et al v. Steamboat “Eclipse," 4 Dak. 218, S. C. 30, N. W. 159.
5. Where the transcript of record upon an appeal from the District to the Supreme Court of the Terriiory of Dakota, in an admiralty case, contains evidence and extraneous matter, not made a part of the bill of exceptions, such evidence and extraneous matter should, by motion, be stricken from the record. Appeals in admiralty cases, from the District to the Supreme Court, are governed by the same statutes and rules that obtain in other civil actions tried to the court. Rea, et al v. Steamboat “Eclipse," 4 Dak. 218, S. C. 30 N. W. 159.
7. The District Court, of the State of North Dakota, is the successor of the Territorial District Court, and has jurisdiction to render judgments in actions pending in such territorial court, at the time of the admission of the state into the Federal Union; although the verdict was rendered before such admission. Braithwaite v. Power, et al, 1 N. D. 455, S. C. 48 N. W. 354.
8. Where the master of a vessel, who had agreed for a stipulated price, to transport goods upon the Missouri river, was interrupted by the closing of navigation, and the consignees forcibly took the goods from him, the master being able and willing to complete the transportation, to earn his freight, can recover full freight. No tiine for delivery being specified in the contract of affreightment, the master could rightfully have held the goods until the opening of navigation, that he might earn his freight by completing the transportation. Braithwaite v. Power, et al, 1 N. D. 455, S. C. 48 N. W. 354.
9. The master of a vessel who has entered into a contract of affreightment, in his own name as master, may maintain an action upon such contract as the trustee of an express trust, under § 4872, Comp. Laws of Dakota Territory. Braithwaite v. Power, et al, 1 N. D. 455, S. C. 48 N. W. 354.
10. Where the owners of three steamboats operated them jointly for their own benefit, under the name “Benton Line,” they are all liable as partners, Or joint traders on a contract of affreightment, made by their authorized agent in such name,
11. Where one of three defendants dies, pendente lite, and his administrator is substituted, and voluntarily appears and defends the action, and no objection is raised by any of the defendants to such course until after trial and verdict, the Supreme Court will not, on an appeal by the surviving defendants, reverse the j udgment against all of them when it provides that the judgment against the administrator shall be paid only in due course of administration. , Nor can defendants raise the point that a judgment against them should have been in favor of the plaintiff alone, and not in favor of plaintiff and interveners, as that is a matter exclusively between the plaintiff and intervenors. Braithwaite v. Power, et al, 1 N. D. 455, S. C. 48 N. W. 354.
12. Where the complaint in intervention is framed on the theory only, of co-operation by the interveners with the plaintiff, in the effort to secure judgment against defendants, and the prayer for relief merely requests payment of the money into the hands of a person to be designated by the court, no claim in the complaint, or on the trial being made that the rights of the plantiff and the interveners, as between themselves, are to be adjusted in the action; and the verdict is a joint verdict in favor of the plaintiff and interveners, for the amount of the recovery, it is error to award to interveners any specific portion of the money, without first having adjusted the equities between the plaintiff and the intervenors. Braithwaite v. Aikin, et al, 1 N. D. 475, S. C. 48 N. W. 361.
13. To warrant the granting of a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the affidavits must show such new facts as will probably lead to a different result on a new trial. Applications for a new trial on this ground, are looked upon without disfavor and distrust. Such facts must be established by the affidavits of persons who are personally familiar with them, and it is not sufficient to set forth that another will testify to these facts, or some of them. The affidavit of such person, showing what he personally knows about them, must be produced; unless some strong reason is shown why this requirement should be dispensed with. Although the trial court has a large discretion in awarding or refusing new trials, which will not be interfered with except in case of abuse, yet, when a new trial is granted, upon a particular ground, there must be some legal evidence that such cause for a new trial exists; and the ground must be a legal ground for granting a new trial. Braithwaite v. Aikin, et al, 2 N. D. 57, S. C. 49 N. W. 419.
14. The plaintiff and interveners recovered judgment against the defendants, for certain earnings of the steamboat “Eclipse,” while the plaintiff was operating her under the agreement for her purchase, set out in Braithwaite v. Aikin, 1 N. D. 475, S. C. 48 N. W. 361; and the interveners, by their complaint in intervention, claimed the money due under the judgment, as money to which they were entitled under the agreement. Held, that the plaintiff (defendant in intervention) could not set up as a counterclaim, a cause of action for the conversion of his interest in the steamboat, referred to in such contract; that the cause of action for the tort did not arise out of the contract or transaction set forth in the intervention complaint, as the foundation of the intervener’s claim, and is not connected with the subject of the action. Also, that the cause of action for tort could not be sustained as an equitable set-off, independent of statute, there being no averment that the interveners are insolvent, and that the mere fact that they are not residents of the state does not warran t
15. A judgment against an administrator in one state, has no binding force or effect against another administrator of the same estate in another state; and such judgment need not be pleaded in an action on the same account, against another administrator, in another state, in order to show that the demand sued on, had been given credit for the amount realized under the foreign judgment. Braithwaite v. Harvey, Adm'r, 14 Mont. 208, S. C. 27, L. R. A. 101, S. C. 36 Pac. Rep. 38. An administrator will not become bound by the judgment by assisting in the defense of a suit against another administrator of the same estate, in another state. Id.
16. A statement in a letter that “whatever is due is ready whenever I can safely pay you or” a third person named is not a sufficient new promise to take the claim out of the statute of limitations. Braithwaite v. Harvey, Adm'r, 14 Mont. 208, S C. 27 L. R. A. 101, S. C. 36 Pac. Rep. 38. Striking a paragraph from a complaint, on motion, is not reversible error, if it was not sufficient to authorize a recovery. Id.