30 N.Y. 211 | NY | 1864
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *213 Two questions have been submitted to us on this appeal.
1. Whether the assignment under which the plaintiffs claim, is not void for giving a preference for debts for which the assignor might thereafter become liable to the plaintiffs, or either of them. *214
2. Whether the defendants in any way directed an interference with, or did any acts making themselves liable for the acts of the sheriff in selling the property seized under the attachment.
(1.) The words of the assignment complained of are, "shall pay and discharge in full all debts, bonds, notes, bills and sums of money, due or to grow due to the parties of the second part, or either of them, from the assignor, or for which he is liable or may become liable, including notes, bills and drafts indorsed and guaranteed by them, c., and all debts, demands and sums of money for or upon which or on account of which they, or either of them, have become or may be rendered liable for or on account of the party of the first part." The objection made to this provision is that it includes drafts and liabilities not then in existence. If this provision was intended to secure debts or claims not then in existence, but which were afterwards to be created either by the assignor or the assignee, it would be void. This was settled inSheldon v. Dodge (4 Denio, 217), where an assignment contained a provision giving a preference to debts which should thereafter become pressing, and for which Dodge should, as surety, become responsible; and the objection to it was that the instrument reserved to the assignee the power of declaring which of the debts in a certain class should become preferred, by agreeing subsequently to become liable therefor. This principle was previously settled in Grover v. Wakeman (11 Wend. 187), viz: that the assignment must declare who are to be preferred, and a reservation of that power either to the assignor or assignee rendered it void. (See also Barnum v. Hempstead, 7 Paige, 568.) But, as is said in the latter case by the Chancellor, I do not think that this clause of the assignment is subject to such a construction. It provides for the payment of debts, bonds, notes, bills and sums of money due and to grow due. This evidently applies only to claims then in existence; whether *215 due or to grow due was immaterial. It further provides "or for which the assignor was liable, or may become liable to them, including notes, bills and drafts endorsed by them." This evidently referred to such notes, c., on which the assignees were endorsers or guarantors, and in which the liability had not yet become fixed by protest; claims which they might pay, or become liable to pay, by reason of endorsements or other responsibilities which they had already made or incurred for the assignor. (Van Dine v. Willett, 24 How. Pr. R. 206.) The remaining part of the clause is still less objectionable, as it provides for the payment of all debts, demands and sums of money for or on account of which they have become or may be rendered liable. This clearly applies only to past debts, and not to new ones to be created, and vests no discretion in the assignee. It only secures debts which have been assumed or on which they may be rendered liable. The instrument throughout bears a construction perfectly consistent with an honest intention; and as fraud is not to be presumed where the instrument is consistent with an honest intention, I see no reason for imputing a fraudulent intent to the parties in making this assignment.
I am unable to find in the case any evidence that this question was raised on the trial, or submitted to the referee, and there is no finding by the referee either of fact or law to which the defendants have excepted which properly raises this question. Even if there were doubts as to the assignment, I think the objection should have been taken below, to make it available in this court.
(2.) The other ground of appeal is that there are no facts in evidence to make the defendants liable for the levy made by the sheriff, if such levy was upon property belonging to the plaintiffs.
The referee held the defendants liable for acts occurring before the sale, as well as the receipt of the money after the sale, with full knowledge of the source from which the *216 money was obtained. We are asked by the appellants to confine ourselves to the finding of the referee in this case, and not to look into the testimony to see whether there is enough to sustain it.
The report of the referee is very imperfectly made up if it is intended as a substitute for findings of fact or law. But where the findings are thus imperfect, it is the duty of the party who is not satisfied with them to apply for more specific findings, and not seek to avail himself of such defects; and this court has held that in such cases the finding of facts necessary to sustain the judgment will be presumed.
But I think there is evidence enough in the case to warrant the submission of this question as one of fact. The defendants knew that the sheriff had levied on property claimed by the plaintiffs as assignees. They knew that a suit was threatened by the assignees. They issued the execution without any directions as to this lumber which the sheriff was by law required to sell and apply to the execution, unless otherwise directed. Their attorney refused to give the sheriff directions not to sell it. The defendants knew the lumber was advertised for sale under the execution, and afterwards they received the proceeds of the sale in payment of their execution. All these facts as found by the referee would have been, on a trial before a jury, sufficient to submit to them the question whether the defendants had not, by these acts, ratified the taking of the goods by the sheriff, and the subsequent sale of them to pay their claim. (Judson v.Cook, 11 Barb. 642; Fox v. Jackson, 8 Barb. 357.)
The case of Wilson v. Tumman, et al. (6 Manning Gr. 236), relied on by the appellants, was one where the plaintiff did no act and was sought to be charged by proof that he had said he had a claim on the property, but nothing was done to the property by him or, so far as the case shows, by the sheriff, after that declaration. Without *217 expressing an opinion as to the agreement of this case with some of the decisions in this state on that question, it is enough to say that the present case differs very materially from the former, in that the plaintiffs in the execution, with full knowledge of all the facts, and without objection, received the proceeds of the property and applied them to their own use. Such receipt of the proceeds of the sale to their use on the execution, with the knowledge they possessed, is a ratification of the levy made by the sheriff, and makes them liable for the property so sold, to the real owner.
In Freeman v. Ritchie (13 Ad. Ell., N.S. 780), the mere receipt of the money, without knowledge of the illegal taking, was held to be insufficient to make out a ratification of the seizure; but in that case the court recognize the distinction between the receipt of the money with the knowledge that a trespass had been committed, and taking it without such knowledge. In the former case it might amount to a ratification.
The judgment should be affirmed.
SELDEN, J., also read an opinion in favor of affirmance, and all the other judges concurring, judgment affirmed. *218