134 Ala. 165 | Ala. | 1901
It is admitted that defendant was engaged in the practice of osteopathy as a profession and means of livelihood without having obtained a certificate of qualification from one of the authorized boards of medical examiners.
The most important question presented is whether the practice of osteopathy is “the practice of medicine in any of its branches or departments,” within the meaning of section 3261 of the Civil Code and 5333 of the Criminal Code. The contention of defendant is, that it is not. He predicates his insistence mainly, indeed, we may say wholly, upon the fact that in the practice of osteopathy no drugs or other medicinal substances are administered or applied, internally or externally; nor
So, too, a practitioner of medicine is required to know anatomy,, physiology, hygiene, histology, and pathology, in order to enable him to skillfully and scientifically determine from what disease his patient is suffering, and after so determining he must also know how and what remedial agents should be prescribed for the alleviation or cure of the disease. So, after all, the only difference between the two is in the matter of therapeutics — that branch of medical science which considers the application of remedies as a means of cure. The former, as we have shown, applies his external remedies exclusively,
But, it is said the words “the practice of medicine” or “who practices medicine,” as used in the statutes, should not be extended to all practitioners of the art or science of healing or curing diseases, but that their proper interpretation or construction includes only those persons who employ medicinal substances or drugs as remedial agents for the alleviation or healing of diseases. This contention is based upon the proposition, that the word “medicine,” in its popular sense and as commonly understood, is a remedial substance, or ,dru,g; and that the practice of medicine, as popularly understood, inseparably includes as its great and overruling constituent the administration of drugs and other medicinal substances as remedial agents. Indeed, the whole superstructure of defendant’s theory, that as a practitioner of osteopathy he is not engaged in the practice of medicine, has for its foundation that the interpretation of the words “medicine” or “practice of medicine” must be accepted in the sense in which these words are commonly used. With this foundation or base destroyed, his theory must fall. In other words, if his premise is shown to be fallacious, of necessity his conclusion must be false. So, then, the question is, what is the correct rule of interpretation of these words ? Shall we interpret them in their popular sense or as commonly understood, or are they to be interpreted, being technical words, used in reference to a technical subject, according to- the meaning or use they have when applied to the particular art or science with reference to which they are used? ' It can not be well doubted that if they are technical words, having a technical meaning, when applied to the particular art or science to which they refer, that such use or meaning must be given to them, unless, from the context of the statutes, a different use or meaning is made apparent. — 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, (2d ed.), 13; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, (1st ed.), 324. This rule is stated by Mr. Endlich in his work on the Interpreta
It will not be doubted that the word “medicine,” however, whenever and wherever used, has reference to the subject of a science or art, a technical word denoting the science or art of curing diseases; and that one who engages in the practice of it is a scientist or artist, professionally known by the name of “physician” or doctor.” It may be, and doubtless is, true that it is not and has never
The Avord “medicine” (Latin, medicina,) is derived from medeor — to heal. 'It is defined by the eminent lexicographer of medical Avords or terms, Gould, to be: “The science and art of preserving health, and preventing and curing disease; the ‘healing art,’ including also the science of obstetrics;” by Dunglison, another author of a medical dictionary, to be: “The healing art; physic. A science, the object of which is the cure of disease and the preservation of health.” Bigelow, an eminent physician and author of medical works, says: “Medicine is the art of understanding diseases and curing or relieving them, AAdien possible.” The Universal Cyclopedia, edited by Rossiter Johnson, Ph. D., L. L. D., after giving the derivation of the word “medicine” from the Latin word “medicina ” defines it to be “the art of a physician, or of healing; the art and science of curing diseases.” The Encyclopedia Britannica, under the title, “Medicine,” sub-title, “Synoptical view of Medicine,” says: “Medicine, the subject matter of one of the learned professions, includes as it now stands, a Avide range of scientific knoAvledge and practical skill. * *
* The science of medicine is the theory of disease and remedies.”
Definitions might be quoted from other writers, but these Avill suffice to show not only the word “medicine”, is a technical word, denoting a science or art, comprehending not only therapeutics, but the art of understanding the nature of diseases, the causes that produce them, as well as the art of knowing how to prevent them, hygiene, sanitation, and the like. These definitions are fully supported and their correctness thoroughly established by the history of medicine, and its practice as a science or art.
Dr. Boswell Park, in his Epitome of the History of Medicine, speaks of the origin of medicine as having-been nearly contemporaneous with the origin of civilization. He points out that the earliest records of probable, authenticity are perhaps to be met with in the scriptures, from which may be gathered here and there a fair notion of Egyptian knowledge and practice. Thus, we read in the 50th chapter of Genesis, that “Joseph commanded his servants, the physicians, to embalm his father; and the physicians embalmed Israel.” He also speaks of medicine as the healing art, and traces the practice of it] among the Greeks to- Aesculapius, who, he says, was the leading character in medicine of all the ancients, with the possible exception of Hermes among the Egyptians. He shows that this great physician cured ulcers, wounds, fever, and pain of all who applied to him, by enchantments, potions, incisions, and by external applications. So renowned became the name of this illustrious physician, that temples were erected to his fame and in his honor, in which schools of medicine were established and the science taught. These temples existed for centuries and the schools were presided over by the priests, who treated all sick persons who repaired to or were conveyed to them. The sick person or his representative after ablution, prayer and a sacrifice, was made to sleep on the hide of a sacrificed animal or at the feet of the statue of the god, while sacred rights were performed. In his sleep the appropriate remedy was indicated by a dream. Moral or dietetic remedies were
Thus it is made entirely clear both by definitions and history that the Avord “medicine” has a technical meaning, is a technical art or science, and as a science the practitioners of it are not simply those Avho prescribe drugs or other medicinal substances as remedial agents, but that it is broad enough to include and does include all persons who diagnose diseases and prescribe or apply any therapeutic agent for its cure.
Is there anything in the language of the statutes Avhich prevents giving to the word “medicine” its legitimate technical use or meaning? This question can be best ansAvered by tracing the history of the legislation on this subject, culminating in the present statutes. Before doing so, hoSvever, Ave should bring to mind the purpose of these enactments and constantly keep Before us that the legislative purpose was to protect the public against charlatanism, ignorance and quackery. — Brooks v. The State, 88 Ala. 122. The first enactment on this subject
Thus has been the growth and development of the law in this State regulating “the practice of medicine in any of its branches or deparments as a profession.” From this growth and development, can it be seriously doubted that it was not the intention or purpose of the legislative mind to restrict the examination of those desir
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the defendant was engaged in the practice of medicine within the meaning of the statutes. This conclusion is fully supported by the decisions of other courts. In Bibber v. Simpson, 59 Maine, 181, Appleton, O. J., speaking for the court, said: “The services rendered were medical in their character. True,' the plaintiff does not call herself a physician, but she visits her sick patients, examines their condition, determines the nature of the disease, and prescribes the remedies deemed by her most appropriate Whether the plaintiff calls herself a medical clairvoyant, or a clairvoyant physician, or a cleai'-seeing physician, matters little; assuredly, such services as the plaintiff claims to have rendered, purport to be and are to be deemed medical.” So it was held that she was not entitled to-recover for her services, she having no license to practice- medicine.
In Hewitt v. Charier, 16 Pick. 353, it was held, Shaw,. C. J., delivering the opinion, that “a person who practices bonesetting and reducing sprains, swellings and contractions of the sinews, by friction and fomentation, but no other branch of the healing art, is a person practising surgery, within the meaning of St. 1818, o. 113, § 1, which provides, that no person practising physic or surgery shall be entitled to the benefit of law for the recovery of his fees, unless he shall have been licensed by the Massachusetts Medical Society or graduated doctor in medicine in Harvard University.”
In Davidson v. Bohlman, 37 Mo. App. 576, it was held that: “The statutes restricting the right to prac
The case of Eastman v. The People, 71 Ill. 236, is directly in point. The appellant there, as here, was engaged in the practice of osteopathy. The statute of Illinois defined practitioners of medicine in this language: “Any person shall be regarded as practicing medicine within the meaning of this act who shall treat, operate on or prescribe for any physical- ailment of another.” The Court after saying that the appellant “professes to be able to diagnose and advise in respect to a long list of diseases, and to furnish discriminating and efficient treatment to those who may come to him, and while he may rely wholly upon manipulation, flexing, rubbing, extension, etc., yet he professes to have skill and judgment in these methods, so as properly to adapt the treatment to each case, giving it what is appropriate, in amount, and with repetition at such times and to such extent as may be dictated by his knowledge and experience;” and after1 stating Bigelow’s and Dunglison’s definition of medicine, held that the practice of osteopathy was the practice of medicine. We need only add that our statutes are not so materially different from the statute construed in that case as to impair the decision of it, in any degree, as an authority directly upon the question in hand. So, also, is the case of Little v. The State, 51 L. R. A. 717, being an osteopathy case, directly in point. See also Underwood v. Scott (Kan.), 23 Pac. Rep. 942; Jones v. People, 82 Ill. App. 453; People v. Gordon, 62 N. E. Rep. 858.
We have examined the cases relied upon by appellant. Some of them are perhaps in point, but are opposed to our view of the law.
The next point we shall consider is the one assailing the constitutionality of these statutes. We need but to refer to the following cases and the reasoning em
So, likewise, the contention that the associations and boards of censors are not regularly organized under the constitution of the “Medical Asociation of the State of Alabama” is untenable. It is enough that the boards of examiners are de facto acting under the provisions of the statutes and that its certificate of qualification would protect defendant from prosecution for a violation of the criminal statute.
The remaining insistence relied on, rather as an excuse or palliation for a violation by defendant of the law, is no justification or excuse a.t all. It is, that the boards of examiners, as presently constituted, discriminate in favor of those physicians who practice the regular system of medicine against all who practice other systems or belong to other schools. If it be conceded that this fact is shown by the record, it furnishes to defendant no right to violate the criminal laws of the State. His remedy is by proper procedure in the civil courts, in the event his application for license is rejected. It strikes us that this defense is an afterthought. The record does not even hint at any attempt on the part of the defendant to procure a license. He rather chose to construe the law to suit his own notions and engaged in the practice of medicine without even making any effort whatever to comply with its mandates or even to have the unjust discrimination of which he complains removed before engaging in the practice.- — Dent v. West Virginia, supra; Harding v. People, supra; Alopathic State Board, etc., v. Fowler, supra; Iowa Asso. v. Schrader, 20 L. R. A. 355.
The defendant was properly convicted.
Affirmed.