183 So. 682 | Ala. | 1938
The reversal of the judgment of conviction by the Court of Appeals is rested upon the refusal of charge 6, requested by defendant, and reproduced in the opinion of that court.
That the concluding clause as to the burden of proof resting upon the State, under the stated circumstances, to show defendant was not free from fault, stated a correct principle, is of course well understood, and not here controverted. Bluitt v. State,
But in consideration of refused charges, to save error, the rule of strict construction has been here approved, Jebeles-Colias Confectionery Co. v. Booze,
The State insists the charge is subject to criticism for a failure to qualify defendant's belief as an honest belief, as so designated in Bluitt v. State, supra; Mathews v. State,
The point is well taken. Charge 27 considered in Davis v. State,
As to charge 7, the opinion of the Court of Appeals states that it involves the same principle as presented in charge 6. Whether there is material difference so far as this latter point, as found in Hudson v. State, supra, is concerned, we need not stop to inquire, as the argument both for the State and the defendant is confined to the question of the necessity of an honest belief in charges relating to apparent danger. Defendant insists that charge 7 (copied in brief) does not relate to apparent danger, and cites our authorities, Walker v. State,
We appreciate the distinction, but find ourselves unable to agree to this construction of charge 7. It makes no effort to treat of actual imminent peril, but speaks of an attack of such a character "as to raise in the mind of a reasonable man the belief that he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm, and that he had such belief." The charge, therefore, as we read it, treats of belief of danger and not of actual danger. In this respect, therefore, it is not to be distinguished from charge 6, and is of consequence subject to the same criticism as first hereinabove considered.
It results, therefore, that in our opinion reversal of the judgment cannot properly be rested upon the refusal of charges 6 and 7, and that the writ of certiorari should be awarded, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further consideration in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Writ awarded. Reversed and remanded.
All the Justices concur.