134 Ky. 769 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1909
— Affirming.
It appears that in the year 1907 there was a school tax levied for the benefit of some school district in Mason county, Ky., and that appellant was appointed collector thereof. This action was instituted in the police court of the city of Maysville in the month of March, 1908, in which appellee procured an order restraining appellant from proceeding to collect of hú i taxes alleged to be due, amounting to $14, upon the ground that the levy of the tax was illegal and void.
It appears that appellant did not answer, and on the 7th day of September, 1908, the following order was entered: “This cause coming on for trial on the regular call of the docket, and the defendant failing to appear, and the court having considered the pleadings herein, and on proof heard and argument of conn sel, and being advised, now orders and adjudges that the restraining order granted herein on March 17, 1908, be now made permanent, and that the plaintiff recover from defendant his cost herein expended. And the parties are hence dismissed. ’ ’
Appellant appealed from this judgment direct to the circuit court, and that court entered an order dismissing the appeal, which is as follows:
“The court having considered appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal herein, for the reason that this court has no jurisdiction of same, and being advised sustains the motion; and it is ordered that the appeal herein be, and the same is, now dismissed, and that the appellee recover of appellant his costs herein expended. To all of which appellant objects and exr cepts, and prays an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which is granted. ’ ’
“In all civil cases an appeal shall lie to the quarterly court or to the circuit court of the county, where the amout exceeds twenty-five dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, and under the rules and regulations prescribed by law for appeals from inferior courts to circuit courts. ’ ’
Appellee claims that this section is unconstitutional as it applies alone to police courts in fourth-class cities; that it is inhibited by section 59 of the Constitution, which declares that the General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts with reference to the -jurisdiction of courts.
It is not necessary for us to consider and pass upon this question, as we have arrived at the conclusion that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the appeal, for the reason that the judgment of the police court was void, as it had no jurisdiction of the action. The action was not instituted in the police court to recover a judgment for money or personal property. The only purpose was to restrain the collecting officer from levying upon appellee’s property and col
“The General Assembly may confer civil jurisdiction on police courts in cities and towns of the fourth and fifth classes, and in towns of the sixth class having a population of two hundred and fifty or more, which jurisdiction shall be uniform throughout the state, and not exceed that of justices of the peace.” We find from this section that civil jurisdiction may be conferred only upon police courts.in the fourth, fifth, and sixth class towns, and it shall not exceed the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. By section 3513, Ky. St., which applies to fourth-class cities, the General Assembly conferred civil jurisdiction upon police courts “equal to that of justices of the peace.” In section 142 of the Constitution,, it is provided :
‘ The jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall be coextensive with the county and shall be equal and uniform throughout the state.”
It will be observed that the General Assembly has authority to confer such jurisdiction upon justices’ courts as-it deems proper; but it must be uniform. The General Assembly, acting within its power under the section of the •Constitution'referred to last, enacted section 1086 of the Kentucky Statutes, which is as follows: • < ■ ■ ' ■
“ Justices’ courts shall have jurisdiction concurrent with circuit-and-quarterly' courts 'of-this commonwealth-of all actions and proceedings for the recovery of money or-personal property in civil cases, where the matter in controversy, exclusive of -interest and costs, does not exceed one hundred, dollars, and shall have jurisdiction, exclusive of circuit -courts, 'and concurrent with quarterly courts in civil cases, of all ac
The quarterly court had no jurisdiction of an appeal from the judgment of the police court, nor would it- have had original jurisdiction thereof. By section 139 of the Constitution it is provided, in effect, that the quarterly courts should have such jurisdiction as is conferred by the General Assembly. By section 1051, Ky. St. there is conferred upon quarterly courts civil jurisdiction of all actions for the recovery of money or personal property. Therefore the quarterly courts have no jurisdiction of cases like the one at bar. The circuit court of Mason county was the only court that had original jurisdiction of the cause of action presented by appellee. ' Its jurisdiction was exclusive, as the General Assembly had not conferred it upon any other court. Although the circuit corirt had original jurisdiction, it had no 'right to entertain the case on an appeal from an inferior court that had no jurisdiction. Section 966, Ky. St., provides that circuit courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all
Our opinion is that the action of the police court in the case at bar was without authority, was a nullity and constituted no bar to the collection of the tax, and the action of the lower court in dismissing the appeal was proper.
For these reasons, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.