84 Pa. Commw. 331 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1984
Opinion by
Eugene Brady (claimant) appeals from two final orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, holding that: (1) claimant’s job-related injury did not qualify for compensation under a Collective Bargaining Agreement, effective January 1, 1973; and (2) claimant was not entitled to benefits under the Heart and Lung Act
Claimant was a full-time salaried fireman with the Dunmore Borough Fire Department from 1964 until December 28,1972. On that date, while fighting a fire, claimant suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized. Mr. Brady never returned to work after that date.
On February 15, 1973 claimant filed a claim with the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board seeking compensation pursuant to Section 108(o) of the Occupational Disease Act.
Mr. Brady then requested compensation from the Borough pursuant to Article VIII
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The first issue presented concerns whether claimant’s disability is compensable under Article VIH, Paragraph A of the Collective Bargaining Contract effective January 1, 1973,
It is undisputed that the injury occurred on December 28, 1972, four days prior to the new agreement’s effective date. Claimant contends that the date of the onset of the disability is irrelevant and that any disability existing during the effective period of the Collective Bargaining Agreement starting on January 1, 1973 would be covered by Article VIII, Paragraph A.
Here we have two .separate and distinct contracts. One is in effect from January 1, 1970 to December 31, 1972; the second ran from January 1, 1973 to Decem
The claimant’s assertion that Article VIH could have been more artfully drafted is well-taken. However, we are guided by the well-settled law of contracts that parties write their own contracts, and the function of the Court is to interpret those contracts and to enforce them as made. See Borough of Ambridge Water Authority v. Columbia, 458 Pa. 546, 328 A.2d 498 (1974).
Accordingly, the decision of the Court below that claimant’s injury was not covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective January 1, 1973, must be affirmed.
Mr. Brady next contends that the Court below erred in determining that he was not eligible for Heart and Lung Act benefits from and after October 23,1973 because his disability was no longer temporary, but permanent. The Act provides, in pertinent part, that:
any . . . fireman ... of any County, City, Borough, town or township, who is injured in the performance of his duties . . . and by reason thereof is temporarily incapacitated from performing his duties, shall be paid ... by the . . . municipality, by which he is employed, his full rate of salary, as fixed by ordinance or resolution, until the disability arising therefrom has ceased.5 (Emphasis added.)
The language of the act specifically provides benefits for temporary and not permanent disability.
Questions as to the sufficiency of proof are ordinarily within the discretion of the Trial Court and will not be reviewed by an appellate court unless there is a clear absence of proof to support the ruling. City of Philadelphia v. Keyser, 45 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 271, 407 A.2d 55 (1979). Pennsylvania courts have long recognized the broad discretion given to the fact-finding Trial Court, that is a judge sitting without a jury. Luria v. Robbins, 233 Pa. Superior Ct. 456, 302 A.2d 361 (1973).
The record indicates that Mr. Brady sustained his heart attack on December 28, 1972 and never returned to work. Appellant’s own assertion of his status was that he was totally, permanently disabled. Mr. Brady applied for and received .Social Security total permanent disability status and benefits. Mr. Brady never requested to return to work, nor did he assert that he was well enough to return to work. Further,
The Trial Court’s determination of permanent disability is unquestionably supported by the evidence on the record below.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Obdeb in 33 T.D. 1982
And Now, August 3, 1984, the decision and order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, No. 576, March Term, 1977, dated May 4, 1982, are hereby affirmed.
Obdeb in 34 T.D. 1982
And Now, August 3, 1984, the decision and order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, No. 172 May Term, 1978, dated May 4, 1982, are hereby affirmed.
Act of June 28,1935, P.L. 477, as amended, May 31, 1974, P.L. 809, No. 99.
Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 566, as amended, 77 P.S. §1208(o).
The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Borough and the Union was signed on February 14, 1973 and provides in Article VIII:
Whenever a member of the Fire Department is incapacitated from duty because of an injury sustained in the performance of his duty, he shall be entitled to injury leave with full pay during the period which he is unable to perform his duties or until such time as he has been accepted for retirement by the Firemen’s Pension System. The Borough shall be entitled to offset benefits paid to said member under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or Heart and Lung Act in accordance with provisions for such offsets contained in the aforesaid legislation.
The Collective Bargaining Agreements in question were between the International Association of Firefighters, Local 860, AFL-CIO and the Borough of Dunmore, Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.
53 P.S. §637(a).