67 Mo. 221 | Mo. | 1877
This is a proceeding in equity, commenced in the circuit court of Lewis county, on the 26th day of' March, 1873, for the purpose of setting aside a deed made by plaintiff, Elizabeth Bradshaw, in April, 1863, conveying to defendant certain land therein described. It is substantially alleged in the petition that William Barclay died in April, 1848, leaving a widow and three children, of whom plaintiff, Elizabeth, was one, and possessed, besides personal estate, of three hundred and ten acres of land;.
- • The defendant’s answer is as follows: “The defendant, for answer, admits the making of the deed, but denies that the same was obtained by him from said Elizabeth by fraud, misrepresentations or undue influence exercised by this defendant over said Elizabeth; that said deed was made by said Elizabeth long after her arrival to the years of her majority, of her own free will and accord, for a legal and valid consideration.” It is further alleged that plaintiff acquiesced in said deed till the suit was brought, and that defendant in the meantime, with the knowledge of plaintiff, and without objection from her, made lasting and valuable improvements on said land, and that she ought, therefore, to be estopped. The cause was tried by the court and judgment rendered for defendant, from which the plaintiffs have appealed to this court.
The only denial which the answer contains is to the conclusion which the pleader in his petition reached upon the allegation made therein, viz : that the deed sought to be avoided was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. This does not amount to a denial of the facts alleged in the petition on which the pleader based the allegation, as a legal conclusion, that the deed was ob
In Street v. Goss, 62 Mo. 228, it was held that “ the rule on this point was of universal recognition, and applies eo-extensively with the existence of confidential relations. In such cases it is not necessary to show that fraud or imposition was practiced upon him who bestows the confidence, but simply the existence of such confidential relations, and that during that time the conveyance was made. When this is done, the onus of showing the fair-ness of the transaction is on him who claims under the conveyance.” . “When confidential relations are shown to exist, courts of equity, where the inferior makes a conveyance to the superior, look narrowly to the' circumstances, and require the act to be done with reasonable knowledge of all the facts necessary to a full understanding of what the grantor is doing.” (Ranken et al. v. Patton et al., 65 Mo. 378.)
The allegations of the petition being admitted, because-not denied, shows clearly the existence of such relations between the plaintiff and defendant when the deed now assailed was made, and, also, that it was executed by plaintiff' to carry out the will of defendant, which, by reason of confidence reposed on account of said relations, had been stamped upon the mind of plaintiff so -as to makeher thoughts on the subject matter of the transaction the thoughts of defendant. A deed executed under such circ
This is especially applicable in the present case, for ■even if, in truth, 'the mother of plaintiff should have had u, child’s part allotted to her- in the land, the subject of this controversy whereby she-would- have taken the fee, if ■any obligation at all by reason thereof was cast upon plaintiff, it could have extended ho farther than thé-exe-' •cution of -a deed to her mother.- Defendant, by reason of any 'such supposed obligation, would not in any view have been entitled to, the land, and'by causing -the deed to be made to himself, changed the entire course of descent therein.
These settlements have been adverted to for the purpose of showing that defendant looked well to his own interests, as evidenced by the fact that, for the first four years of his guardianship, he consumed the personal estate of his ward by charging her for board Avhile an inmate of her mother’s house, as a member of defendant’s family, and liAÚng on the land left by her father, from which the family of defendant, as well as that of Barclay, derived their support, and this before partition of the land. They also shoAV a state of facts which would have made it eminently proper that plaintiff should have had in the final settlement, between her and defendant in-1864, nearly one year after the execution of the deed, the advice of some one besides the defendant, who was conversant with such matters. The fact that it was made Avithout the advice of such a person tends strongly to show the implicit reliance
It is, however, said that plaintiff has-acquiesoed in the transaction for' such a length of time as to bar her right to relief in equity. The doctrine is unquestioned that courts of equity discountenance laches, even to the extent of denying.aid to those who have slept upon their rights for such length of time as that it would be against good conscience, and operate as a fraud upon the other party -to allow them to be asserted. "What shall be deemed due diligence, in the institution of an equitable proceeding of this- character, is not susceptible of a definite rule, but must,'in a degree, depend upon the. circumstances of the particular case, and be governed by the sound discretion of the court. Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Caines’ Cases 19; Landrum v. Union Bank, 63 Mo. 56. There is no especial rule, but each; case,-as it arises, must be determined by its own particular circumstances. McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall. 19.
In Kelly v. Hurt, 61 Mo. 466, it was held that mere, lapse of time, short of the period fixed by the statute of limitations, will not bar a claim to equitable relief where the right is:clear and there are no countervailing circumstances. It results from the. principle contained in the authority last cited, that the mere fact that plaintiff did not institute her suit for nearly ten years after the execution of the deed, is not sufficient to bar her right to relief, unless there 'are circumstances countervailing this right. We do not think-the circumstances connected with this case' are of that .character. Plaintiff, for about a year after- the execution of the deed, remained an inmate of defendant’s family, arid was under the same influence which
"With the concurrence of the other judges, the judgment is reversed and cause remanded, to be disposed of in accordance with the views herein expressed.
REVERSED.