3 F. Cas. 1172 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina | 1879
This cause came on to be heard upon the pleading, and the testimony taken and reported by James E. Ha-good, special master. The substantial facts in the cause seem to be that the defendant company is a corporation under the laws of the state of South Carolina, was organized under the act entitled “An act to regulate the formation of corporations,” approved December 10th, 1869, which act was subsequently amended by act of March 9th, 1871. These acts were subsequently embodied in the General Statutes of South Carolina, in chapter 64, commencing on page 357. The capital stock of this corporation was fixed and limited at five hundred thousand dollars, and the same divided into five thousand shares, of one hundred dollars each. There has-been paid in of said capital stock but two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, or fifty dollars per share. It is admitted that at the date of the filing of the bill in this cause, Louis D. Mowry was the owner and holder of seventy-five shares of said capital stock in said company; that F. J. Pelzer, F. S. Rogers, Wesley G. Muckenfuss, and Thomas S. Inglesby, constituting the firm of Pelzer, Rogers & Co., were the owners and holders of one hundred and seventy-six shares of said capital stock in said company, and that George W. Williams, William Birnie, Joseph R. Robertson, James Bridge, Jr., Frank E. Taylor, and Robert S. Cath-cart, constituting the firm of George W. Williams & Co., were the owners of one hundred and twenty-eight shares of said capital stock in said company. These persons named were made, with the said company, defendants in this action, have answered, and are now before the court
The cause of action in this case grows out of the unpaid portion of a bond, executed by the defendant company on the 28th day of December, 1872, in the sum of twenty-thousand dollars, to William J. Gayer, receiver. This bond, it appears, was given for ($20,000) money loaned by said Gayer to the said company. Said bond was payable on the 1st day of July following the date thereof, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. In said bond is the following covenant: “We, the said company, do further covenant and agree that the above bond constitutes a lien upon the property of said company, and that the same is issued under and pursuant to the provisions of section 39 of chapter 64 of the General Statutes.” The said bond was duly recorded in the office of the register of mesne conveyances for Charleston county, South Carolina, on the 3d day of January, A. D. 1873. Said bond was not any portion of it paid at maturity by said Marine and River Phosphate Mining and Manufacturing Company of South Carolina, but was allowed to lie along without change or renewal (the said company paying the interest thereon) until some time in March, 1874, when C. C. Puffer, receiver, successor of William J. Gayer, receiver, demanded payment of said bond. At the time of said demand for payment of said bond, said company was in some financial embarrassment, and was not in possession of funds to pay the same. In consequence of this embarrassment, D. T. Corbin, who was then president of the company, induced one A. J. Coe to enter into negotiation with said C. C. Puffer, receiver, with the view to purchase said bond, he, said Corbin, furnishing said Coe, from his own private property, the means (three hundred shares, or $30,000 of the capital stock of said company) to effect such purchase. The bond was purchased by Coe from C. C. Puffer, receiver, and the same was delivered to him. This sale and delivery of said bond was effected about the middle of April, 1874. Soon after its purchase said A. J. Coe assigned and delivered said bond to said D. T. Corbin, in consideration of the thirty thousand dollars of stock
The defence to this action made by the defendant company is, first, that said bond was “paid” by the $30,000 in stock of said company, which said C. C. Puffer received therefor from A. J. Coe. As to this defence, it is sufficient to say, that there is no evidence that shows that said purchase of said bond by A. J. Coe was intended as a payment thereof. That none of the parties to this transaction — Puffer, Coe, or Corbin — so understood it, but the very reverse; and further, the consideration paid, although it was $30,000 of the capital stock of said company, was not the property of the company, but the private property of D. T. Corbin. It is not pretended that the company paid or furnished the means to pay said bond at the time C. C. Puffer parted with the same to A. J. Coe, in April, 1874; and the only basis for the claim of payment is the entry made in the final accounts of C. C. Puffer, receiver, made to the court of common pleas for Charleston county, in which it appears that this bond is accounted for as “paid” by the transfer to him of‘three hundred shares of stock in the Marine and River Phosphate Mining and Manufacturing Company of South Carolina. That this entry is not technically correct is shown by the admitted fact that the company furnished no means to pay the bond then, and neither did Corbin or Coe purchase on behalf of the company. This entry is explained by Mr. Puffer as his method of recording the transaction, and it meant, so far as the fund in his hand as receiver was concerned, that the bond was exchanged for said $30,000 of stock. But it may be further remarked, that neither Cor-, bin or Coe, as far as appears, was a party to the said entry in Puffer’s account as receiver, and that entry, hence, does not conclude them. There is, therefore, no ground for asserting that said bond was or has been paid by or for the defendant company.
A further defence is made that D. T. Cor-bin was, at the time of the purchase of said bond from C. C. Puffer, the president of the defendant company, and as such president he was incapacitated to speculate in the paper of the company, and so forth; and all benefit and advantage arising from said purchase of said bond by him inured to the benefit of the company, and so forth. This defence set up, if sound in principle, which it is not, does not appear to have sufficient basis of fact to rest upon. It is not alleged in the pleadings or proved by the evidence of the defendants that D. T. Corbin paid less than twenty thousand dollars in value for said bond, and hence there is no ground for saying he speculated in the sense of making profit out of the paper of the company. So far as appears, he paid a full price for the bond; and it still further appears that he entered into the transaction to protect the credit of the company, and to save it from embarrassment, because the company was not in funds at the time to pay the bond. If D. T. Corbin, as the president and agent of the company, had purchased said bond with the funds or credit of the company, said transaction would now be held to have been made for the benefit of the company, without doubt, and the company would be entitled to any benefit or advantage, if any, accruing therefrom. But as the transaction was made with his own means, and because the company had no means with which to make it, the bond became his own private property just as much as the private property was his that he exchanged for it. There was nothing in his position, as president, that forbade the purchase of this bond if he chose to make it.
But it is further said, that the renewal in-dorsement put upon the said bond by order of the board of directors, on May 13th, 1874, was null and void, because said board was not aware at the time that said D. T. Corbin was the holder of said bond, and the same was in fraud of the rights of stockholders. As to this defence it may be again said it
The result is, that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree against the defendant company' in the sum of ten thousand dollars, with interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent-per annum, payable quarterly, from January 1st, 1877, to the present time. The defendants named as stockholders are, by the charter of the company, jointly and severally liable for the said sum, and the execution decreed against the company may, by the terms of the charter, be levied upon their property or the property of either of them. The plaintiff is also entitled to have the lien of the bond upon the property of the company foreclosed, and the property sold to pay and satisfy the sum now found to be due. A decree will be entered in accordance with this opinion.