JALEN BRADLEY, et al., v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al.
Case No. 2:24-cv-03118
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
August 26, 2025
Judge Michael H. Watson; Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Compel (Doc. 127). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. On or before September 2, 2025, Plaintiffs are ORDERED to (1) execute and produce to Defendants’ counsel authorizations for the release of all records reflecting phone calls made or received or text messages sent or received from May 5, 2023, to May 6, 2023, from Plaintiffs’ cell phone provider(s)/carrier(s); and (2) file a certification to the public docket stating they have done so. Plaintiffs are further ORDERED to respond to Defendants’ July 2, 2025, discovery requests by August 28, 2025.
I. BACKGROUND
Very briefly, this case is about the shooting of Plaintiffs Jalen Bradley and Ja-Dawn Bradley. (Doc. 92 (First Amended Complaint)). As alleged, in the early hours of May 6, 2023, the Bradleys were walking down High Street in Columbus, Ohio when they were “attacked by a group of males who were armed with weapons and began shooting at the Plaintiffs injuring both.” (Id. at ¶¶ 7–9 (also alleging the group were “gang members“)). Jalen returned fire. (Id. at ¶ 8). Then, as the two ran for cover, City of Columbus police officers Carl Harmon, Jacob Velas, and Ian Mansperger (the “Officer Defendants“) began shooting in their direction despite not knowing “what exactly was
Plaintiffs allege Defendants’ actions violated their Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 63, 64 (also alleging violations of Plaintiff‘s rights under
Following a recent status conference, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Complaint by August 29. (Doc. 119; see also Doc. 135 (transcript of the status conference proceedings)). On the same day, the parties notified the Court of a discovery dispute. The Court allowed Defendants to bring a Motion to Compel. (Doc. 121). The Motion is fully briefed and ready for review. (Docs. 127, 132, 138).
II. STANDARD
Two rules govern the Defendants’ Motions to compel.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants’ Motion seeks two things. First, Defendants request the Court order Plaintiffs to execute authorizations that allow them to subpoena Plaintiffs’ cell phone records for the hours surrounding the shooting. (Doc. 127 at 6–7). Second, Defendants pursue an order requiring Plaintiffs to provide substantive responses to their July 2, 2025, discovery requests about the evidentiary basis that “allowed Plaintiffs to assert a Monell claim and make the allegations in the First Amended Complaint in good faith under Rule 11.” (Id. at 3, 7–10). The Court finds Defendants are entitled to both.
A. Cell Phone Records
To begin, Defendants served discovery requests on Plaintiffs in August 2024. (Id. at 3). Interrogatory #23 requested that Plaintiffs “[i]dentify all individuals with whom [they] communicated via phone, email, or any other social media account on May 5, 2023 or May 6, 2023.” (Id.). Plaintiffs provided identical answers: “My father, Jay [Bradley], after my [sibling] and I were shot.” (Id.). Relatedly, Request for Production No. 27 sought,
Documents reflecting any calls made or received or any text messages made or received from any phone number you utilized to make or receive calls, or send or
receive text messages from April 1, 2023 through May 6, 2023. To the extent that you contend that you do not possess such documents, please execute, or to the extent you are not the subscriber have the subscriber execute, the attached release for each such phone number.
(Id.). Again, Plaintiffs provided identical responses. (Id.). Plaintiffs objected on the basis that the request was “overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not calculated to lead to discoverable evidence.” (Id. (also stating that without waiving objection, Plaintiffs will provide Defendants with the information if/when they come into possession of it)).
Defendants contend that the interrogatory responses are inaccurate and incomplete. (Id.). For example, during his deposition, Mr. Jay Bradley testified that he spoke with Ja-Dawn before and after the shooting, rather than only after. (See Doc. 118-2 at 26, 71–72). And he spoke to Jalen before the shooting instead of after. (Id. at 71). As another example, Plaintiffs’ supplemental initial disclosures identified Dayonna Rispress as having called Ja-Dawn “to tell her men were coming to shoot at her.” (Id. (noting Ja-Dawn did not revise her interrogatory response to reflect this information)). But Ms. Rispress testified to calling Ja-Dawn after she heard gunshots, but because Ja-Dawn did not answer, they did not speak on the phone. (Doc. 118-1 at 89–90).
Against this backdrop, Defendants argue that the identities of who Plaintiffs communicated with the night before and the morning of the shooting are discoverable, and the Court should compel Plaintiffs to execute signed authorizations which would allow for the release of their cell phone records. (Doc. 127 at 6). The Court agrees Defendants should have this information.
1. Relevance
As noted, Defendants bear the initial burden of demonstrating that the communications at issue are relevant. Gruenbaum, 270 F.R.D. at 302. Under
Defendants argue that they are entitled to know who Plaintiffs communicated with, and when, on May 5 and 6. (Doc. 127 at 3). Defendants’ Motion draws the Court‘s attention to the allegations that Plaintiffs were with a large group of people prior to the shooting, and they were shot at by “a group of males” before the Officer Defendants became involved. (Doc. 127 at 3). They say that “the identity of the people with whom Plaintiffs were communicating immediately prior to, during, or after the shootings” will aid in learning details about the “gang member” shooting, as well other factual issues. (Doc. 138 at 2–3 (also claiming deposition testimony of arguments or confrontations the night of the shooting conflict with allegations in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint)). The Court agrees that who may have knowledge of the shootings at issue and who Plaintiffs were with that night is clearly relevant. Cf. Burghardt v. Ryan, No. 5:19-CV-325, 2020 WL 4350049 (N.D. Ohio July 29, 2020) (finding information on a cell phone relevant to a § 1983 action when the party argued it was the best means of determining actions, activities, locations, and communications leading up to a police encounter)).
Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Plaintiffs take issue that Defendants do not expressly identify a claim or defense for which Plaintiffs’ communications are relevant. (Doc. 132 at 3). The Court notes that it would be difficult for Defendants to point to a specific defense when they have not filed answers. (See, e.g., Doc. 5 (motion to dismiss the original complaint), 6 (same), 94 (motion to dismiss the amended complaint)). Procedural posture notwithstanding, the Court finds Defendants’ explanation, even if brief, sufficient to meet Rule 26‘s wide reach. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (“[D]iscovery is not limited to issues
The Court also notes that Plaintiffs’ argument against relevancy is somewhat disingenuous. According to Defendants, Plaintiffs requested the same or substantially similar information from the Officer Defendants. (Doc. 138 at 2). Even more, Defendants did not object to Interrogatory #23 on relevancy grounds either in whole or in part. (Doc. 127 at 4). And Plaintiffs’ objection to Request for Production No. 27 for being “not calculated to lead to discoverable evidence” (id. at 5), does not speak to the relevance of the request under the standard outlined in the Federal Rules.
In sum, the identities of the individuals with whom Plaintiffs communicated with on May 5 and 6, 2023, are relevant to this action.
2. Proportionality
The Court now considers what can reasonably be construed as Plaintiffs’ objection to the proportionality of the request. When considering whether discovery is proportional to the needs of a case, the Court considers factors such as the “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
Plaintiffs’ arguments are odd. Plaintiffs assert Defendants’ request that they produce signed authorizations for their cell phone records should be denied because: (1) Defendants have never obtained a warrant to search Plaintiffs’ cell phones; (2) Plaintiffs have not given consent for their phone to be searched; (3) the information on Plaintiffs’ phones may be privileged, private, or unrelated to this litigation; (4) counsel‘s agreement to release “any or all of Plaintiffs’ phone information without consent or a court ordered warrant” would open him up to a malpractice claim; (5) the same would violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, and counsel cannot waive those rights on behalf of his clients; (6) compelling electronic imaging would constitute an abuse of discretion; and (6) forensic imaging requires more than a mere suspicion of relevant evidence. (Doc. 132 at 4–5).
These arguments are unmoored from Defendants’ discovery request. Request for Production No. 27 seeks “documents reflecting any calls made or received or any text messages made or received from any phone number you utilized to make or receive calls, or send or receive text messages.” (Doc. 127 at 3). The proposed authorizations permit release to Defendants’ counsel from a cellphone carrier/provider “all records reflecting phone calls made or received or text messages sent or received from May 5, 2023 to May 6, 2023.” (Doc. 138-1). Neither the request for production nor the authorizations, on their face, seek or permit the release of the content of any phone calls or text messages themselves. They certainly do not seek or permit electronic or forensic imagining. In other words, Plaintiffs overstate the impact that producing the records or signing authorizations have on their interests.
The Court is not saying that Plaintiffs’ have no interest in records reflecting the identity of
Plaintiffs also have not demonstrated that producing the phone records or signing authorizations would be otherwise disproportional to the needs of this case. As noted above, who Plaintiffs communicated with the night of the shooting has importance to resolving issues in this litigation, and Defendants have sufficiently demonstrated the information they have from Plaintiffs—that they communicated only with their father after the shooting—may be inaccurate. (See, e.g., Doc. 118-2 at 36, 71–72; Doc. 118-1 at 89–90). While Plaintiffs suggest Defendants can simply depose Plaintiffs about these discrepancies, Defendants are not required to rely on that
Therefore, on or before September 2, 2025, Plaintiffs are ORDERED to (1) execute and produce to Defendants’ counsel authorizations for the release of all records reflecting phone calls made or received or text messages sent or received from May 5, 2023, to May 6, 2023, from Plaintiffs’ cell phone provider(s)/carrier(s); and (2) file a certification to the public docket stating they have done so.
B. July 2, 2025, Discovery Requests
Defendants additionally seek an order compelling Plaintiffs to respond to discovery requests seeking “the evidentiary basis for Plaintiffs’ claim against the City and certain allegations in the First Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 127 at 1).
As stated, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint alleges liability against the City, presumably under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (See generally Doc. 92). On July 2, Defendants served discovery requests upon Plaintiffs related to the evidentiary basis underlying this claim and other allegations in the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 127-2). Plaintiffs provided the exact same response to each of the thirteen interrogatories and fourteen requests for production. (Id.).
By way of example, Interrogatory #3 requested Plaintiffs to “[i]dentify in full the factual
The Court will not belabor the point. Plaintiffs’ prematurity objections are baseless, and they cite no authority saying otherwise. Though Plaintiffs have been ordered to file a Second Amended Complaint, the First Amended Complaint is, at this moment in time, operative. And discovery is permitted “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party‘s claim or defense[.]”
Plaintiffs assert that “counsel is yet unsure what changes, additions, and/or deletions will be made to comply with the Court‘s order for its Second Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 132 at 5). Even if true that some claims or factual allegations will ultimately differ, the information Defendants seek now would still have import on this case and be within the realm of permissible discovery. See, e.g., Heeter v. Bowers, No. 2:20-CV-6481, 2025 WL 1725770 (S.D. Ohio June 20, 2025) (“When original pleadings are amended, the original allegations—though no longer judicial admissions—may still be admissible at trial as evidentiary admissions.” (collecting
Further, Plaintiffs have been engaged in discovery for almost a year. (See Docs. 11, 12). They do not argue they have insufficient information to respond to Defendants’ requests nor do they claim that providing responses would be overly burdensome. Defendants do not have to wait to discover the factual basis for Plaintiffs’ claims against the City and other allegations made in the First Amended Complaint. (See Doc. 127-2); cf. U.S. S.E.C. v. Blackwell, No. 2:03-CV-63, 2004 WL 6829614, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2004) (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and noting the rationale behind postponing contention interrogatories was not present where a party conducted significant discovery and was “required” to have “adequate information to support the contentions in its Complaint“).
The Court also finds merit in Defendants’ claim that they would likely suffer prejudice if they are forced to wait until late September—at the very earliest—for responses to re-served requests, given the currently scheduled depositions in mid-September and the December 1 discovery deadline. (Doc. 119). Plaintiffs make assurances that Defendants will not be prejudiced if they receive delayed responses because Plaintiffs “are confident the parties will be able to resolve any remaining discovery issues [or reschedule depositions] during that timeframe.” (Doc. 132 at 6). The Court does not share Plaintiffs’ optimism. As has been well-documented, discovery in this case has rarely gone to plan, which, in no small part, can be attributed to Plaintiffs. (See,
In short, Plaintiffs cannot avoid responding to Defendants’ discovery requests merely on prematurity grounds. The Court‘s observation that “the complaint in this case is a mess” (Doc. 135 at 3), and subsequent order for a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 119), does not justify Plaintiffs skirting their discovery obligations. Consequently, Plaintiffs are ORDERED to respond to Defendants’ July 2, 2025, discovery requests by August 28, 2025.
As a final note, the Court will not extend the deadlines contained in this order. Plaintiffs’ counsel are WARNED that they and their clients risk sanctions if they fail to meet them.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Compel (Doc. 127) is GRANTED. On or before September 2, 2025, Plaintiffs are ORDERED to (1) execute and produce to Defendants’ counsel authorizations for the release of all records reflecting phone calls made or received or text messages sent or received from May 5, 2023, to May 6, 2023, from Plaintiffs’ cell phone provider(s)/carrier(s); and (2) file a certification to the public docket stating they have done so. Plaintiffs are further ORDERED to respond to Defendants’ July 2, 2025, discovery requests by August 28, 2025.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: August 26, 2025
/s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE