*1 May 7, 19646. In Bank. F. No. 1957.] [S. THE BRADLEY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR PARKS
JAMES OF SAN THE AND COUNTY OF CITY COURT (BRADLEY) FRANCES FRANCISCO, Respondent; Party Real in Interest. LANE, *4 & Sullivan, Roche, Farraher and Farraher Johnson James for Petitioner. - Respondent. for appearance
No Sidney for Real Cohen, Rudy N. and Ted Finman Aaron Party in Interest. of certiorari was issued for
SCHAUER, A writ J. adjudg purpose reviewing superior an order court refusing ing petitioner to be in for to make certain provisions wife in with payments to his former accordance divorce, and property agreement of their settlement decree petitioner imprisoned if he directing and be fails com ply payment. with the court’s order We have concluded although upon petitioner’s the record before us certain of interpretation concerning provisions contentions agreement property cannot upheld, settlement the order directing imprisonment contempt upon for his his continued payment failure to make should nevertheless be annulled as prohibition against constitutional imprison violation (Cal. 15.) ment for debt. Const., I, art. § petitioner and May, 1946, wife, his then Frances, entered agreement property into a settlement in which it is declared parties community both that the owned separate and property, agree and that separation desired to to a and to settle respective property rights and determine their to provide and custody for care and of their two minor The children. agreement further declares that it “is a Property intended as Agreement only Settlement and to property rights. refer (Italics . .” added.) . The wife then instituted divorce proceedings in the state of Nevada and June, 1946, was awarded a default divorce decree. Such decree its terms purports among to order, other things, that the prop- written erty agreement parties between the May 14, dated “hereby is approved, ratified, adopted confirmed and the Court, and part reference made judgment of this parties decree . . each . hereby ordered to carry out . .. each and all of provisions by him or her respectively required under the terms of said ...” In September, 1952, the Nevada decree was established California respondent decree of superior court and such California decree declares that “the hereby are ordered perform every obligation each provided by” Nevada decree. The California decree appeal affirmed on (See June, became final in 1954. Bradley Lane v. (1954), Cal.App.2d P.2d 1092].) property
Under the petitioner agreed, among things, other to transfer certain personal real and wife, to the Frances, place and to in escrow as security performance obligations of his under agree- *5 40,000 Bradley of evidencing shares of stock certificates
ment property petitioner Mining Company, ; which stock is the of the stock could sold with the under certain circumstances agreed pay Petitioner further to proceeds going to Frances. “forty (40%) income, of his net com- per to cent. Frances capital gains of January 1st, exclusive mencing capital, but before deduction out losses distributions per less one contributions, or charitable cent. of income taxes 1,000 40,000 net income each shares of said (1%) of such capital Bradley Mining Company placed stock shares been sold with the consent of First which have in escrow to pursuant this Party . . . contract.” [Frances] petitioner Following divorce, remarried in the Nevada in October, For March, 1948, and Frances remarried 1948. remarriage petitioner com- months after his four and one-half theory on that puted payments to Frances half his his community property to his wife as belonged new income obligated per pay to to Frances 40 he was that therefore community only of such Peti- cent of his one-half income. attorney represented who had was then advised tioner settlement preparing property parties in both theory that his apportionment was erroneous in his computation the amounts remarriage did not affect Thereafter, obligations to from his Frances. accruing under independent March, until he secured counsel August, payments his petitioner computed to Frances without remarriage. on his adjustment Then such inde- any based peti- petitioner opinion that in his pendent advised counsel only per obligated pay to to Frances cent of tioner was petitioner community and his new income one-half “net income” as used further, words wife, and, agreement meant net income as property purposes gross income (that is, for income tax less computed by petitioner taken theretofore deductions certain Frances). Relying upon to such payments computing his year only $1,800 during paid Frances petitioner advice computing used for such amount are (The data 1950. factual present record.) in the not shown 1951, petitioner April, consulted different Thereafter, remarriage and was advised that independent counsel petitioner’s obligations pay to her 40 terminated Frances overpaid already income that he had per cent of his net agreement. terms of the under the her payments, June, thereupon all and in ceased such Petitioner by which the 1951, Frances the action1 Nevada commenced decree the California divorce decree was established ground superior on the Petitioner defended action court. provision payment per of 40 cent that the Frances alimony provision his net income was and therefore remarriage The trial court terminated Frances. findings petitioner’s made its and conclusions to the effect that obligation continuing one make Frances was *6 which of “has terminated or been diminished reason remarriage plaintiff any the of or for other reason.” [Frances] Judgment awarding recovery was of entered Frances the sums theory accrued that date on the indicated in the above findings mentioned conclusions, establishing and and the Nevada decree this As the mentioned, state. hereinabove judgment, which became in June, final also ordered the perform “to every obligation provided each and for by” the Nevada decree.
In February, 1955, present contempt instituted Frances the proceeding, asserting that petitioner since 16, 1951, June has wilfully failed and pay per refused to to her 40 cent of his net income, except payment for a on $15,000 and account, that of February, as 1955, he owed her an additional $37,969.30. Petitioner ground defended on the that the term “net income” should be permit construed so toas him to make various deductions and salary (i.e., that one-half his one-half of community the present income of himself and his wife) should be excluded on theory the that it not his was belonged income but to such wife. The evidence presented which was con- the trial court part sisted in judgment roll in the the California action. testimony addition was form submitted the of affidavits. The court found in using that the term “net income” the parties had not petitioner intended any that be allowed the for deductions which he or half the contended that a community Judg- income be excluded in case he remarried. ment was rendered accordingly, petitioner and was held imprisoned and ordered unless he made installment pursuant to Frances to a schedule forth in set the order of contempt petition This commitment. review followed.
Petitioner, contending the trial court erred finding its meaning income,” as to the term “net cites brevity 1Hereinafter the California referred as action. (Messenger (1956), Messenger v. 46 Cal.2d 626 [4] “In 988]) quotes P.2d the rule that the absence of meaning conflicting agree extrinsic as to the evidence ment, interpretation binding the trial court’s it is not on here, conflicting where, this But extrinsic evi court.” quoted presented, apply. dence rule does not On contrary, there is under such circumstances if evidence interpretation, court’s supports including which the trial in reasonably draw, on appeal it the court ferences which could placed by the interpretation trial court on will adhere parties. (Quader-Kino writings A. and conduct G. v. Nebenzal (1950), 35 Cal.2d [1] P.2d (1952), v. therein; Abbott Hauschild cited Cal. cases sug- 41].) Petitioner’s App.2d 383, 387 [2] [248 present gestion, pre- in the case the evidence was because orally weighed than it will be affidavit rather sented (See Riley Turpin court, is merit. appellate without 834].) (1956), 152, 157 47 Cal.2d [6] [301 stated, appears that the Following the rule evidence interpretation supports trial court’s here finding the intent involved, upon parties. as to its based consists of affidavits of Frances supporting evidence Such attorney agreement, language who drafted the and of the petitioner’s own conduct. Inas agreement itself, *7 weight of the evidence rather argues the petitioner much seriously urging that no evidence whatsoever there is than agreement, the no construction of supporting the trial court’s by relating here the served evidence purpose useful would be remarriage argument that since his in detail.2 Petitioner’s community (one-half) in earn interest his present his wife’s per computation of the 40 cent ings must deducted before merit in view of Frances, is without the payable likewise a con deduction was that such trial court’s determination and Frances at the time petitioner trary to the intentions of Further, a such contract contract. executed their assignment of not constitute settling property rights-does by Judge Sweigert opinion following portions rendered oral of the 2The (the supports his ably which trial evidence much the summarize enlightenment “ place court’s) [Tjhere look for is no better decision: parties admissions and . . . [T]he themselves than to the the conduct of acquiescence litigation and his in the the defendant husband attitude of power long period following furnish of the the executions a According present in to the evidence the ful rebuttal his claims. agreement, present case, of the from the date the defendant husband 14th, 1946, 16th, 1948, May of his own the date at March least nearly years, computéd remarriage, period his net income two a salary wages provisions or the of section 300 of within the assignment. Code, limiting Labor such any asserting performed and rights 1948, without ever of the deduction the remarriage, 16th, . Now after his March which he now claims . . express opinion his did the new wife’s the defendant commu- salary nity for several months who had So far as asserted or even sulted deduction his should and he acted on share of be excluded that view by contrary attorney until advised to the . . . the drafting agreement. represented in both of the . . . rights appears any deduction kind no other were ever March, 1950, mentioned until when the defendant con- regarding his another counsel . . . who confirmed view community his wife and of the interest of who also raised time, point, apparently first that the for the defendant was further Thereupon take all income tax deductions. . . . entitled to defendant theory already overpaid plaintiff. on the that he had ceased noted, however, that the defendant husband “It should be himself con- his first belief that he could exclude all tax cedes that income deductions March, April, appears in was in 1950. That defendant’s affidavit . . . “In the defendant husband consulted other and addi- obligations him tional counsel who then advised that all of his under by plaintiff’s remarriage had been terminated 1948. What advice if contract 21st, any by April, was October received him in 1951, regarding possible At appear. deductions under the contract does not any rate, when the action to establish and enforce the Nevada decree June, 1951, complaint alleged was commenced that between January 1st, 1950, 15th, 1951, and June the defendant’s net had income given amount, thirty-three been a thousand some odd dollars. This allegation of the matter was answer, although admitted was the defendant his the fact was, fact, computation that amount without regard any of the deductions now claimed the defendant. . . . point sole raised The the defendant in the suit was not formula for plaintiff’s remarriage upon net but the effect of the income the contract obligations of the defendant. is “It rather difficult for a court to see how a man of considerable wealth, keeping accounts, accustomed to conscious of tax and other factors, having available at all times the advice of accountants and choosing, pay his counsel of substantial own would continue to out under a contract contemplated over amounts and above that which he himself and intended when the contract was made. these circumstances such alleged overpayments explainable by ignorance; are not inadvertence or only paid reasonable conclusion is that the defendant husband out exactly originally obligations what he believed and intended to be his long under the terms contract until he advised after interpreted contract was something made that it could be to mean original his go different than own intent. inBut this situation we even appears It further than that. received tract, here that after the defendant husband express concerning possible interpretation advice of the con- pending obligations even then a formal lawsuit in which his involved, under the contract were makes a [he] formal admission of interpretation fact which counter to the of the contract which he now claims. For these reasons ... I have come to the conclusion that even assuming by susceptible interpretation placed this contract to be on it *8 plaintiff susceptible interpretation wife and placed also of the upon husband, assuming it the defendant and even that the contract ambiguous respect, is formance of the the accordance in per- that that the evidence of the conduct and any concerning defendant husband is such that doubt meaning according of the contract to its terms must be resolved in performance with the kind of which the defendant rendered imprison Petitioner further contends that to him for payments make to Frances under the property failure to agreement here involved pro settlement would violate the forbidding imprisonment visions of state Constitution (Cal. I, 15.)3 art. This Const., contention sound. debt. § specifically finally it action was deter the California payments mined, parties, as between the that the here involved integrated adjustment of part an of are “an inseverable all parties property pro of the and not a relations ... severable ’’ alimony, section vision for that therefore 139 of the upon so apply terminate, did as to remar Civil Code not obligation petitioner’s pay to riage Frances, of make such Bradley (1954), supra, (Lane Cal.App.2d 661, ments. already herein, mentioned the property And as 666-667.) itself declares that it “is intended . . . rights. is, course, It only to ...” of property to refer subject to if the rule that a decree is modification also the alimony, or provided are for maintenance therein property agree though based on a support, even already this in case, not determined in ment, if, as but part adjustment integral of an are themselves (1950), rights. Cal.2d (Codorniz v. Codorniz Hough (1945), 612-615 ; Hough v. Cal.2d P.2d 32] Or, in Dexter v. Dexter 15].) as declared “to 41-42 the extent (1954), 42 Cal.2d represent a division of the payments] they [monthly period than in with his accordance rather under for a considerable presently-asserted interpretation the contract. ruling . . that the Nevada de- I will make a . these “Now for reasons September 26th, 1952, 24th, 1946, as established herein cree of June approved May 14th, 1946, property agreement and made and the interpreted express part decrees, an intention of the must be ., per parties pay cent his net was to income . . that the defendant capital, capital gains but and distributions out and losses exclusive of presently . . claimed . defendant] various deductions before [the question separately whether not the considered the or “. . I have . present half-community in come to his wife interest of defendant’s claim that the contract, salary but I his under this have should be deductible any theory under it could be deducted . . . ... conclusion agreement. interpretation It seems me that of the negotiated contemplation in defendant husband’s income at separation parties. time of the It would be unreasonable in had mind but did not mention non-existent assume that substantially possible suddenly but the which would alter future event income . . .’’ factors defendant’s person any action, imprisoned No shall be for debt civil 3“See. 15. process, fraud, final unless in actions and no on or eases nor civil mesne torts, except person property; injury of wilful cases or person imprisoned peace.” shall be for a militia fine time of
519 community property itself, inseparable or part constitute an property settlement, they the of the consideration for are not alimony, accordingly changing and cannot be without modified parties.” of the the terms of the Legislature may nor the impair Neither the court the (Cal. Const., obligation I, 1, 16) a valid art. contract §§ lawfully provisions disregard a court cannot such deny party rights or to either his thereunder. contracts Majors (Majors (1945), Cal.App.2d 619, v. 70 627 [10] [161 494]; 100 (1893), 339, see also v. P.2d McClure McClure Cal. Hensley Hensley (1918), 822]; 284, 343 P. v. 179 Cal. [34 Superior ; (1937), 287-288 P. Miller v. Court 9 Cal. [183 445] 733, ; (1943), 737 Hill 23 2d P.2d Hill v. Cal.2d 868] [4] [72 82, 417]; P.2d Adams 29 (1947), 621, 90 v. Adams Cal.2d [142 ; (1948), 624 P.2d Patton v. 32 Patton Cal.2d [1] [177 265] 524 520, 909].) P.2d in the Although, pro “As case all constitutional designed safeguard person, visions of the liberties every liberty doubt should be resolved in favor of the citizen in the provision enforcement the constitutional that person (11 imprisoned no shall be for 1128, debt” Am.Jur. 327; id., 670, 59; see also 16 1004, 204(1)), C.J.S. a court § § § may punish by imprisonment contempt nevertheless as a (or spouse spouse) who, willful act of a having former ability opportunity deliberately comply, refuses to obey a valid pay alimony order to or an allowance for the support spouse (or spouse). other former other It held obligation that to make such is not a meaning within the guaranty “debt” the constitutional against imprisonment (Miller Superior for debt. v. Court (1937), supra, 733, ; parte Spencer 9 Ex Cal.2d 737 [3] (1890), 395, Am.St.Rep 83 266]; Cal. P. see Am.Jur., 1129-1130.) also however,
Where, payments provided prop in a erty adjustment prop constitute an erty interests, alimony, support, maintenance, rather than or generally prevailing more to be that rule is stated decrees by contempt proceedings. based thereon are not enforceable 466, 468-469.) (154 Washington A.L.R. The rule in is “that provisions decrees, of such relate to the as [divorce]' payment alimony money (as distinguished sup from or port money children), for cannot be enforced proceedings. Washington pointed As [Citations cases.] Corrigeux Corrigeux out [1950, 37 Wn.2d provision back of these eases is the constitutional (state imprisonment
that
can be no
debt
constitu-
there
tion,
17), together
holdings by
with
I,
Art.
sec.
this court
money generally
alimony
support
and courts
purview
such constitu-
children is
a debt within
(Robinson
provisions.”
(1950),
tional
v. Robinson
37 Wn.
Maryland it
411, 413].)
2d
has been held
only
alimony payments may
enforced
modifiable
support
pay-
contempt, and that both child
unmodifiable
agreement (even though
parties’
on the
written
ments based
“alimony” in
payments might
such
be characterized
proceedings)
fall
the con-
order
the divorce
within
court’s
imprisonment
for debt.
provision prohibiting
stitutional
*10
(Bushman
A.
(1929), 157 Md.
v. Bushman
A.
491-492]; Dickey Dickey (1928),
No case has been California passed squarely presented on. point the has been supra, 733, 737, (1937), Cal.2d Superior Court Miller v. provisions of a contempt allowed of the by was enforcement payment providing the agreement property settlement pointed (p. out However, court there the month. $75 a obligation in the case Cal.2d) “The basis the of 9 agreement] and order property settlement approval a [of on allowance not based an award of in the case of pay, to as support statutory obligation of marital agreement, the is meaning of the constitutional the within is not a ‘debt’ which monthly pay the order to a view that We are of the provision. agreement the allowance, with though in accordance even meaning of the constitu the not a ‘debt’ within parties, is say, That to (Italics.-added.) prohibition.” tional party has fact that a in which the may be situations there alimony amount as or ascertainable pay some fixed agreed to obligation the character change or control not does Merely adding the con- other. by sought to enforced pay support element of to sensual does oblit existing duty. legal In the erate an absence of a waiver by contracting spouses (expressly by necessary implica or reciprocal tion) rights support to other provided than as may agreement, party properly in the either seek to enforce proceeding obligations imposed by in the divorce as law marriage. incidents of But where the bar gain agree with each other and that the terms of their con thereupon grant, tract shall and thenceforth delimit and ex clusively respective rights obligations define their inter se, alone, then it is to the contract pro conventional civil ceedings for enforcement of rights, contract remedy must look for in the event breach. Inclu in judgment sion of such a contract may divorce furnish subsequent proceedings leading a basis for to issuance of a support writ execution but cannot a commitment im prisonment pay judgment for failure to debt. (1940), Cal.App.2d In In re Lazar theory that the analogous ordered were sup money part upon
port support relied enforcement property of a carried into the may decree. It be also divorce noted that that case, citing Superior Court, supra, Miller v. (p. asserts 331 of 37 Cal. compliance App.2d) that with an order “directing the settle separate property may ment of rights, be enforced im prisonment,” whereas, already pointed out, the decision in the Miller case actually upon theory rested of marital support. Further, payments provided *11 agreement involved in In re were, Lazar some nine later, (Supreme) months stated this court to be for ali mony, support and wife, maintenance of the rather than as an adjustment case of (1940), Tripp 16 Cal.2d v. property rights. Superior 621-622 Court [5] (1923), (Lazar [107 61 v. P.2d Cal.App. Superior 249].) 64, 67 Court The upon P. also relied Lazar, in In re appears likewise to turn part upon obligation in the husband’s “proper make provision support for the and maintenance of wife, pro the that it first petitioner vided were ascertained that guilty charges against made him in the divorce action.” Moreover, no mention of the provision constitutional is made Tripp case, holding and the property settle ment and divorce decree there involved were en by contempt proceedings forceable was reached without cita authority tion of support thereof.
522 “alimony” recognized that the term
It is to be does property general contemplate a settlement of interests or not law, “Like the alimentum the civil of wealth. endowment evidently derived, has for its sole which the word was from food, clothing, habitation, and other object provision (17 support.” for . . . Am.Jur. and cases necessaries object” It to attain that “sole 12.) note is cited, obligation regarded something is as imposes an which law may by contempt and which be enforced than a debt other upon appropriate showing. judgment Here the proceedings negotiated agreement manifestly purports to sanction a rather imposed law. obligation than an payments better satisfied that the view is that We are property which are found provided a property adjustment interests, rather than constitute alimony, should be held to provision fall severable a proscription against imprisonment the constitutional within obligation sought is, if the to be That enforced for debt. negotiated, distinguished as from marital contractual though law, even the contract relates to mar imposed by remedy appropriate must be to the obligations, riage Payments category into which fall right asserted. alimony separate or maintenance are based law-imposed statutory obligation support, may marital upon the showing, ordinarily upon proper a court modified may properly party, of either with the death terminate meaning a “debt” within the not to constitute be held exemption special No such case for provision. constitutional proscription can be made where the the constitutional from bargain negotiated by result of represent respective interests, adjustment of their parties contrary may to the which be found in the implications any (1922), disapproved: In 56 re Rasmussen following eases are ; (1930), Ex Parte Weiler P. Cal. Cal.App. 368 72] (1940), supra, 645]; In re Lazar P. Cal. App. 485 [289 Seymour (1937), Seymour Cal.App.2d 327; v. App.2d (1923), supra, ; Tripp Superior v. Court 481 [64 168] (1949), Shogren Superior 64; Court Cal. Cal.App. App.2d 108]. determined, finally it has been be Inasmuch as by peti payments to be made parties, that the these tween present ease constitute “an insever in the to Prances tioner adjustment of all rela integrated part of an able provision and. ... severable tions of the
523 (Lane Bradley (1954), supra, alimony” Cal.App.2d v. 666-667), pay- we conclude enforcement of such by contempt proceedings is forbidden the constitu- ments against imprisonment prohibition tional for debt. This con- unnecessary discussion of other clusion makes attacks made by petitioner upon contempt order. stated, above the order holding petitioner
For the reasons contempt is annulled. J., Shenk, J., Spence, J., Gibson, McComb, J., C. con- curred. judgment I concurin
CARTER, annulling J. the con agree generally I tempt expressed order and with the views majority opinion, but since certain decisions of this court Dexter, 42 (Dexter 873]; Messenger v. Cal.2d 36 Messenger, 988]) Cal.2d with which I do not agree upon majority cited and relied in the opinion, are I my unqualified feel constrained to withhold concurrence therefrom. case of Herda the recent v. Herda decided this court I 22, 1957, concurring took occasion in a
on March and dis- senting opinion great to call attention confusion which in this field of law due to now exists irreconcilable conflicts appellate in the decisions this court and the courts this the main issue in the case at bar state. Since involves the application I, interpretation article section of the there is no need for further California dis- Constitution relating to this conflict. cussion
TRAYNOR, J. I dissent. majority opinion alimony concedes that an award
The of the is con- on the enforeible based (see Holloway, Holloway v. tempt also Ohio St. 439]; 449) 579, 154 A.L.R. 154 A.L.R. since is suffi-
N.E.
statutory duty
support
ciently
to the
incident
related
relationship
marriage
as to be outside the constitutional
I,
(Cal.
imprisonment
Const.,
art
prohibition debt.
respect
property growing
Rights and duties with
15.)
§
crystallized
marriage relationship and
in a court
out
scope
provision.
outside the
of that
Such
order are likewise
special
has not less a
character because it
based
an order
alimony
parties than an
award based
on an
theory
very
agreement.
Indeed, in some states the
on such an
underlying
use of
alimony
enforce awards of
*13
alimony is
adjustment
is that
itself an
of property rights.
(Lyon
Lyon,
185,
21 Conn.
196-197;
v.
v. Cook,
State
66
568,
St.
567,
566
N.E.
58
625];
L.R.A.
v.West
[64
Ohio.
West,
Even if the were the sole enforcing court the ma- contempt, cation for such orders in jority stating error in that opinion would still be an order pursuant integrated bargain to an payments to make cannot has remarried. In Dexter enforced, be so when the wife not 41-42 Dexter, we stated: Cal.2d pro- the have the “When, , in this ease . . . made integral part their support and maintenance an vision for monthly payments agreement, the will property settlement they the character. To extent that ordinarily have a dual support and discharge obligation the designed to are ordinarily they reflect the characteristics will maintenance alimony. have the indicia Cita- obligation thus [ that they represent hand, to the extent the other On tions.] itself, or community property constitute division of the property the settle- inseparable part of the consideration accordingly cannot be modified alimony, not ment, are agree- property settlement of the changing the terms without ’’ remarried, long as the wife has parties. of the So ment obligation maintenance support the characteristics contempt. Such justify enforcement alone remain and court care case, Miller where the took in implicit rule is pursuant point were to a out that changed could not settlement and be without the consent (9 parties. also, concurring at 740 Cal.2d and dis- [see Dexter, senting opinion Carter, in Dexter v. J. Cal.2d 36, 45 : “The rule such a case should be that 873] approved by part if the entire the court and of its provisions incorporated per- decree and order to be are may formed, portions included those decree enforced by contempt proceedings.”].) obligation payments pursuant to make the
Even if the order court did constitute a debt within the mean ing provision, obligor’s of the constitutional wilful re them when to do fusal make he is able so would be a “ease meaning exception pro fraud” within sustaining validity vision. of a criminal statute deal ing nonpayment wages with this court stated: “The his *14 torical 15 of background section article I and similar con clearly guaranties stitutional other states shows that provisions adopted poor protect to were but honest debtor pay debts, to and who is unable his were not intended to shield man who an a dishonest takes unconscionable advantage long recognized It has another. been that [Citations.] ordinary wages debts, may preferred are that be over that, claims, other and of the position because economic of the and, average particular, dependence in worker his wages on for necessities life for himself family, and his it is public that pay essential to the welfare he receive his when An employer it is due. who knows wages that [Citations.] ability due, pay them, are to has the and still pay refuses to them, against good dealing, acts morals fair and neces intentionally sarily prejudices does an act which rights employee. of his Such conduct amounts to a ‘ease of fraud’ meaning exception of the to pro within the constitutional may punished by (In hibition be statute.” re Trombley, 734]; 809-810 parte Cal.2d also Ex see [193 Grace, ; parte Am.Dec. Iowa Ex Clark, 529] 394].) 650-651 N.J.L. Am.Dec. Trombley reasoning Whether or not the case would apply any pay refusal a debt obligor wilful when the pay, clearly applies obligations able to arising out agreements irrespective of whether the payments solely alimony. “Property agree- are occupy position ments a favored the law of this state (Adams are Adams, sanctioned Civil v. Code.” cited.) may- 621, 624 There cases Cal.2d community prop- order practical considerations be business, remain and that wife erty, going such as a intact payments. pay- such periodic her share in Whether receive discharge duty support, they also ments are intended to As may actually only support. the wife’s means wages, may to collect be difficult the case obligation by repeated The executions. enforcement imprisonment is no more tantamount debt punishment wages. to pay than criminal for the wilful refusal I adhere law of state and affirm would to the settled this holding petitioner contempt. the order rehearing petition party The the real interest for opinion Traynor, J., was denied June was of 5, 1957. petition granted. should be May 8, A. No. 24535. Bank. [L. 1957.] CASE, Petitioner, B. CHARLES SUPERIOR COURT Respondent. COUNTY, LOS OF ANGELES *15 Petitioner. & Cantillon Cantillon Attorney General, Norman Brown, H. Edmund G. Attorney General, Respondent. Sokolow, Deputy petition for a writ mandate to McCOMB, J. This isa setting bail in the trial restore its order compel court to $1,000. sum