9 S.E.2d 861 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1940
1. "The clerk of the superior court of each county shall be required to keep a general execution docket; and as against the interest of third parties acting in good faith and without notice, who may have acquired a transfer or lien binding the defendant's property, no money judgment obtained within the county of defendant's residence, in any court of this State, whether superior court, ordinary's court, county court, city court, or justice court, or United States court in this State, municipal court or other courts, shall have a lien upon the property of the defendant from the rendition thereof, unless the execution issuing thereon shall be entered upon said docket within 10 days from the time the judgment is rendered. When the execution shall be entered upon the docket after the 10 days, the lien shall date from such entry." Code, § 39-701.
2. "The removal of a defendant from the county in which a judgment was rendered against him will not render necessary entering upon the general execution docket, of the county to which he removes, an execution issued upon such judgment. If in such a case, within ten days from the date of judgment, the execution issued thereon is entered on such docket in the county in which the judgment was rendered, the lien of such judgment attaches to all his property from the date of its rendition. If such entry be postponed beyond ten days, the lien of the judgment attaches only from the date when the entry is actually made. In no event is so entering the execution in the county to which the defendant removes necessary to effectuate the lien of the judgment as to his property therein." Smith v. Howell,
3. G. A. Booth obtained in the city court of Athens, Clarke County, a judgment against John S. Bradley, on March 2, 1938. The execution from this judgment was properly recorded on the general execution docket in Clarke County on March 2, 1938. On January 28, 1939, Bradley, then living in Gainesville, Hall County, bought an automobile. On May 22, 1939, Bradley sold the car to Jack McGinnis, and on May 29, 1939, McGinnis sold it to C. L. Bullock. On August 1, 1939, G. A. Booth, the plaintiff in fi. fa., caused the sheriff of Hall County to levy on the *771 automobile in the possession of Bullock, who filed a claim. Held, that the judge did not err in finding the property subject to the prior judgment against the defendant in fi. fa., Bradley.
The sole question presented is whether the property is subject to the fi. fa. The plaintiff in error contends that with reference to the Code, §§ 39-701, 39-702, "there can be but one interpretation, and that is when one has obtained a judgment in a county, then that judgment must be recorded in that countywithin ten days after it has been obtained. If in the meantime the defendant in execution has moved to another county, thensaid judgment must *772 be recorded within thirty days from the date it is obtained inthe county to which defendant has moved. If the above recording is not had as thus stated, then liens only date from the day they are recorded in the respective counties." We can not agree to this contention. A judgment is a security of record. In our State it has never been questioned that the judgment binds the propertyat any time owned by the defendant after its rendition, although in the hands of a bona fide purchaser (Kollock v.Jackson,
With reference to § 39-701, as qualified by § 39-703, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Bank v. Jenkins,
Among the instances where § 39-702 applies is where a suit is brought against joint obligors, joint promisors, copartners, or joint trespassers, residing in different counties, and is tried in the county of one of such defendants; and in order for a successful plaintiff in such suit to have a lien upon the personal property of such nonresident joint defendant in any other county than where the judgment was obtained, he must enter the execution issuing upon such judgment upon the general execution docket of the county of his residence within thirty days from the time the judgment is rendered. And we think that § 39-701 applies only when the judgment was obtained in the county which was the defendant's residence at the time the judgment was obtained; and in such event, in order for said judgment to be a lien upon the personal property of the defendant (in whatever county located) from the rendition of the judgment, the execution issued thereon shall be entered within ten days on the general execution docket in the county where the judgment was obtained. In discussing the removal *774 of a defendant from the county in which a judgment was rendered against him, the Supreme Court said, in Smith v. Howell, supra, that such removal "will not render necessary entering upon the general execution docket of the county to which he removes an execution issued upon such judgment. If in such a case, within ten days from the date of judgment, the execution issued thereon is entered on such docket in the county in which the judgment was rendered, the lien of such judgment attaches to all his property from the date of its rendition. If such entry be postponed beyond ten days, the lien of the judgment attaches only from the date when the entry is actually made. In no event is so entering the execution in the county to which the defendant removes necessary to effectuate the lien of the judgment as to his property therein." This and other similar decisions, however, would no longer apply to judgment liens on realty located in a county other than where judgment was obtained; for since the rendition of that decision the legislature enacted § 39-703 (Ga. L. 1914, p. 98), requiring record of the execution issuing on the judgment in the county where the land lies. It follows from what has been said that the judge did not err in finding the property in question subject to the judgment in favor of G. A. Booth.
Judgment affirmed. Broyles, C. J., and Gardner, J., concur.
