| Ark. | Oct 27, 1913
(after stating the facts). It is conceded that the sale of the lands for the nonpayment of the taxes of 1868 was void. Mrs. Lucy Ricks, one of thb appellants, paid the taxes for 1904 on March 25, 1905, and continued to pay the taxes for each successive year thereafter until the present suit was instituted, which was on April 29,1911. In the case of Updegraff v. Marked Tree Lumber Co., 83 Ark. 154" date_filed="1907-05-06" court="Ark." case_name="Updegraff v. Marked Tree Lumber Co.">83 Ark. 154, the court, in discussing the question of title acquired by payment of taxes on unimproved and unenclosed land, said:
“And we think it necessarily follows from that conclusion that there must be an unbroken possession for a period of seven years from the date of the first payment, and that the mere payment of taxes seven times is not of itself seven years’ possession, where the possession is broken by the commencement of an action within seven years after the date of the first payment. We are therefore of the opinion that appellee failed to show title by limitation.”
So here the lands were unenclosed and unimproved, and there was not seven years from the date of the first payment of taxes by Mrs. Ricks until the institution of this suit.
Appellants also invoke the doctrine of laches to bar appellees of their right of recovery in this action. It is true that appellees did not pay taxes on the lands after they were forfeited in 1869, and that they did not thereafter exercise any control over the lands until the institution of the present suit; but the lands were wild and unimproved, and there was no need or occasion for them to exercise any control over them. The mere fact that they did not pay the taxes and remained silent during all these years did not estop them from claiming title to the lands, or bar them of their right of recovery in this action. It is also true that the lands increased in value, and that this increase in value was partly due to the fact that appellants, and other sawmill companies, established sawmills in that part of the country, and for the further reason that a railroad was constructed there. Thus, it will be seen that the increase in value was common to all the lands in that part of the country, and was not due to any act of appellants exclusively in regard to the lands in question. Appellees did nothing to cause appellants to believe that they had abandoned their title to the lands or to induce appellants to purchase the same on the faith that they did not claim title thereto. Mere inaction on the part of appellees and the failure to pay taxes by them short of the statutory period do not constitute supervening equities calling for the application of the doctrine of laches. Updegraff v. Marked Tree Lumber Co., supra, and cases cited; Chancellor v. Banks, 92 Ark. 497" date_filed="1909-11-22" court="Ark." case_name="Chancellor v. Banks">92 Ark. 497; Tatum v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 103 Ark. 251" date_filed="1912-02-26" court="Ark." case_name="Tatum v. Arkansas Lumber Co.">103 Ark. 251. Moreover, the decree must be affirmed for another reason. The recitals of the decree originally rendered in the chancery court shows that, in addition to the depositions and documentary evidence read in the cause, it was submitted upon the oral testimony of three witnesses. This oral testimony is not brought into the record by a bill of exceptions nor by any other proper method. Appellants sought to remedy that defect by a nunc pro tunc order made at a subsequent term of the court. By that order the decree is made to read as before with this addition: “And the oral testimony of these three witnesses was to the point, and only to the point, of identifying the records of sale of forfeited lands for taxes in 1868, set out above, so far as the court remembers.” In the case of Bradley Lumber Co. v. Hamilton, 109 Ark. 1, 159 S. W. 35, this court said, in regard to a precisely similar contention, that the chancery court could not by nunc pro tunc entry bring oral testimony into the record by recitals in the decree of its recollection of the testimony. It follows that the decree must be affirmed.