Bradley Barnett vs. Kawasaki Motors MFG Corp USA and Sentry Casualty Company

Sep 1, 2026
WD88459

Bradley Barnett appeals from a decision by Missouri‘s Labor and Industrial Relations Commission reducing the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)‘s impairment rating for Barnett‘s right shoulder following a work-related injury. Barnett raises two points on appeal. He argues that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by (1) relying solely on the impairment rating provided by the employer‘s physician, and (2) disregarding, without explanation, Barnett‘s unimpeached testimony, which the ALJ found credible. We affirm.

Background1

On June 21, 2023, while employed by Kawasaki Motors MFG Corp USA as a team lead in materials handling, Barnett, who is right-handed, injured his right shoulder. He was raising a large overhead dock door with his right arm and felt a sharp pain when the door caught; then, when he pushed the door down and tried to reopen it, he again experienced “intense pain” in his right shoulder. Barnett saw Kawasaki‘s physician (Physician), who ordered diagnostic imaging, which revealed a large, right shoulder rotator cuff tear. On August 17, 2023, Physician performed arthroscopic surgery on Barnett‘s shoulder.

Following surgery, Barnett participated in extensive physical therapy, involving progressive strengthening, passive and active range of motion, and neuromuscular rehabilitation. On January 16, 2024, Barnett passed a Fit for Duty examination. On February 5, 2024, Physician determined that Barnett was at maximum medical improvement and released him to return to full duty with no restrictions. Two days later, Physician stated, “a 7% rating for [Barnett‘s] right shoulder may be appropriate. This is related to the typical loss of strength and endurance with overhead activity and activity away from the body associated with a rotator cuff repair surgery.”

Barnett filed a claim with the Division of Workers’ Compensation on April 1, 2024. Before the hearing on Barnett‘s claim, he was reexamined by Physician on January 20, 2025. Following that examination, Physician determined that Barnett had “excellent range of motion and strength.”

Despite Physician‘s observations, Barnett reported that he was favoring his right upper extremity and having difficulty reaching behind his back and overhead and lifting heavy objects away from his body. Physician concluded,

I believe much of the range of motion difference from side to side is based on his lack of stretching on the right upper extremity due to concern that he is going to injure the shoulder. He states that he still does the home exercise program, although it sounds like he is really not doing this very often.

. . .

I do believe his symptoms will improve in the future, as Mr. Barnett has been very clear today that he has been avoiding doing certain activities, stretching, or strengthening exercises with his right upper extremity because of his concern that he would reinjure his shoulder. I believe once he restarts his home exercise program that his complaints will improve.

Barnett reported to Physician that, in July 2024, nearly five months after his release to full duty, he fell off his bicycle and onto his outstretched hands, fracturing his left wrist.2 Physician noted,

Mr. Barnett‘s symptoms are very mild in nature. He describes some mild soreness with certain activities. None of this is preventing him from accomplishing the task. However, as mentioned, if any current complaints are related to a distinct injury or event, this would have been the fall from his bike in July which is a concerning injury mechanism for a rotator cuff injury. However, again there is no indication on his clinical examination today that his rotator cuff is not functioning the way it should be.

Physician did not order any further treatment or place any restrictions on Barnett‘s activities. And Barnett continued to perform his job without restrictions until his retirement from Kawasaki on May 8, 2025.

A final hearing on Barnett‘s claim was held May 28, 2025. For purposes of the hearing, the parties stipulated that the only issue to be resolved was the nature and extent of the permanent partial disability (PPD) to Barnett‘s right shoulder, which resulted from a work injury. Barnett, who was 68 years old at the time of the hearing, was the only witness to testify. He explained that, despite being released to full duty with no restrictions, he continued to experience pain in his right shoulder while working and “had to be careful how [he] lifted boxes, somewhat favoring the right shoulder to avoid sharp pains.” At the time of the hearing, he was still experiencing discomfort daily and favoring his right shoulder to avoid exacerbating the pain when lifting anything. His right shoulder remained weaker, and his range of motion in that shoulder was still limited. Barnett reported that he was unable to participate in activities that he had engaged in before the work injury or that participation now caused pain, including riding a bicycle and a motorcycle. In addition, Barnett presented extensive physical therapy notes that documented his functional limitations and reports of residual pain, but he did not present his own impairment rating.

The ALJ concluded that Barnett had sustained a 25% PPD to his right shoulder and awarded him 58 weeks of PPD at the rate of $581.89, for a total of $33,749.62. The ALJ explained that he based his award on “medical records, credible testimony, functional limitations, and residual pain.” The ALJ also noted that Barnett had limited his physical activity to prevent pain or further injury, and doing so had “likely had an adverse impact on his recovery.” Further, the ALJ noted, “Here, the only disability rating submitted was by [Physician. Barnett] is not required to submit his own disability rating. I am familiar with [Physician‘s] ratings, having reviewed his reports in hundreds of cases.”

Kawasaki appealed the ALJ‘s award, alleging that the ALJ‘s award was inconsistent with credible evidence and “against the weight of the evidence as to causation of reported symptomology.” On October 30, 2025, the Commission issued a final award allowing compensation, but the Commission found Barnett

failed to carry his burden of proving the extent of his disability due to the work injury because he produced no credible, persuasive evidence that supported a greater level of disability than that assessed by the employer/insurer‘s authorized treating physician . . . . The ALJ then exceeded his authority by substituting his own lay opinion of treatment records and vaguely alluding to his experience with [Physician] in other cases to justify an award of three times greater PPD than is supported by any objective medical opinion evidence in the record.

Accordingly, the Commission modified the ALJ‘s award by reducing Barnett‘s PPD rating from 25% to 7% “of the shoulder at the 232-week level ($581.89 x 16.24 weeks) in the amount of $9,449.89.”

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Both of Barnett‘s points on appeal accuse the Commission of exceeding its statutory authority by reducing the ALJ‘s PPD rating from 25% to 7%. “Where the Commission reviews an ALJ‘s decision, [the Commission] essentially considers the matter de novo.” Glasco v. Treasurer of Mo., 534 S.W.3d 391, 400 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017); see Molder v. Mo. State Treasurer, 342 S.W.3d 406, 410 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (“Reviewing courts have emphasized that the Commission is not bound to follow the ALJ‘s decision, even concerning the assessment of witness credibility, but is entitled to reach its own conclusions.“). “On judicial review, [we] ‘review[] the findings of the Commission, not those of the ALJ.‘” Glasco, 534 S.W.3d at 400 (quoting Molder, 342 S.W.3d at 410).

We will affirm “the Commission‘s decision unless (i) the Commission acted in excess of its powers, (ii) the award was procured by fraud, (iii) the facts do not support the award, (iv) or insufficient competent evidence exists in the record to warrant the making of the award.” Treasurer of Mo. v. Majors, 506 S.W.3d 348, 352 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (citing § 287.4953). We “will affirm the Commission‘s decision if [we] determine[] that the Commission could have ‘reasonably made its findings, and reached its result, upon consideration of all the evidence before it.‘” Id. (quoting Hornbeck v. Spectra Painting, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Mo. banc 2012)); see also Glasco, 534 S.W.3d at 400 (“[W]e need determine only whether there was ‘substantial evidence supporting the decision reached by the Commission, even if the evidence would have also supported the opposite result.‘“) (quoting Molder, 342 S.W.3d at 411) (emphasis in original). In doing so, “[w]e defer to the Commission‘s determinations with regard to witness credibility and the weight accorded to conflicting evidence.” Hogenmiller v. Miss. Lime Co., 574 S.W.3d 333, 336 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). As the claimant, Barnett has both the burden of production of evidence and the burden of persuasion to prove his claim for benefits. Annayeva v. SAB of TSD of City of St. Louis, 597 S.W.3d 196, 200 n.8 (Mo. banc 2020).

Analysis

On appeal, Barnett raises two points, arguing that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by (1) relying solely on the impairment rating provided by Physician, and (2) disregarding, without explanation, Barnett‘s unimpeached testimony, which the ALJ found credible. Because the two arguments are interrelated, we consider them together.

“Permanent partial disability” is “a disability that is permanent in nature and partial in degree.” § 287.190.6. “Permanent partial disability . . . shall be demonstrated and certified by a physician. Medical opinions addressing compensability and disability shall be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” § 287.190.6(2).

In his first point, Barnett argues that the Commission acted in excess of its authority by effectively creating and applying a legal standard not found in § 287.190.6(2)—treating a physician‘s impairment rating as dispositive and disregarding all other competent evidence or requiring a competing physician impairment rating from the employee. While we agree with Barnett that § 287.190.6(2) does not require the Commission to treat a physician‘s impairment rating as dispositive or require the employee to provide a physician impairment rating of his own, we disagree with his conclusion that the Commission treated Kawasaki‘s physician‘s rating as dispositive in this case.

Section 287.190.6(2) “requires PPD . . . status to be physician-certified.” Patterson v. Cent. Freight Lines, 452 S.W.3d 759, 766 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (emphasis in original). In other words, the statute establishes a threshold requirement that a permanent disability exists and is medically related to the work injury. The statute does not prescribe how the degree of disability must be quantified or that the rating be certified by a physician. Id. Here, Physician certified the existence of a PPD causally related to Barnett‘s work injury. That is consistent with § 287.190.6(2).

In determining the rating, “the Commission is not bound by the medical testimony but may consider all the evidence, including the testimony of the employee, and draw all reasonable inferences from other testimony in arriving at the percentage of disability.” Fogelsong v. Banquet Foods Corp., 526 S.W.2d 886, 892 (Mo. App. 1975). Likewise, “[t]he Commission . . . is not obligated to award the same percentages assigned by experts.” Patterson, 452 S.W.3d at 767; see also Lewis v. Kan. Univ. Med. Ctr., 356 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (“The Commission is not bound by the expert‘s exact percentages and is free to find a disability rating higher or lower than that expressed in medical testimony.“) (quoting Pavia v. Smitty‘s Supermarket, 118 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003)).

The impairment rating is a question of fact, and “[w]e shall not substitute our judgment for that of the Commission on issues of fact.” Patterson, 452 S.W.3d at 767 (quoting Molder, 342 S.W.3d at 410); see also Lewis, 356 S.W.3d at 802 (“The extent and percentage of disability is a finding of fact within the special province of the . . . Commission.“) (quoting Pavia, 118 S.W.3d at 234). However, “the Commission may not arbitrarily disregard and ignore competent, substantial and undisputed evidence of witnesses who are not shown by the record to have been impeached, and the Commission may not base [its] finding upon conjecture or [its] own mere personal opinion unsupported by sufficient competent evidence.” Houston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004) (emphasis in original) (quoting Corp v. Joplin Cement Co., 337 S.W.2d 252, 258 (Mo. banc 1960)).

Barnett argues that Bock v. City of Columbia is dispositive as to Point I. In Bock, we held that, where a claimant‘s injury is “all within the realm of lay understanding,” the Commission may not require the claimant to present expert medical testimony as to the appropriate disability rating. Bock v. City of Columbia, 274 S.W.3d 555, 561 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008). In fact, we rejected a per se rule requiring expert testimony in cases even where the extent of the injury is complicated by a subsequent or pre-existing injury. Id. Instead, we determined,

Because none of Bock‘s injuries or their combined impact fall outside the realm of lay understanding, and because the Commission is competent to determine the extent of the disability attributable to the impact of the fallen pipe, the Commission erred in concluding that Bock‘s failure to present expert medical testimony barred his claim for benefits.

Id. at 563. We concluded “lay testimony, including that of [Bock] himself, constitute[d] competent and substantial evidence of the percentage attributable to the compensable injury.” Id. at 561-62.4

Consistent with Bock, the Commission did not require Barnett to present competing medical evidence. Instead, the Commission acknowledged that Barnett could have presented lay evidence sufficient to support the ALJ‘s award. Although the Commission stated that Barnett “failed to carry his burden of proving the extent of his disability due to the work injury because he produced no credible, persuasive evidence that supported a greater level of disability than that assessed by the employer/insurer‘s authorized treating physician[,]” the Commission did not limit the “credible, persuasive evidence” that Barnett could have presented to medical evidence. If Barnett had presented enough other evidence, he could have prevailed without presenting an impairment rating by another physician. The Commission simply did not find anything in Barnett‘s evidence that supported a disability rating above 7%. And the Commission was entitled to credit Physician‘s conclusion, following a full examination, that any residual immobility and discomfort were the result of Barnett‘s avoidance of certain activities, including stretching and strengthening exercises, due to his concern that he would reinjure his shoulder. At the end of the day, the percentage of disability is a finding of fact, Lewis, 356 S.W.3d at 802, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the Commission on a finding of fact. Pavia, 118 S.W.3d at 239.

We conclude that the Commission did not exceed its authority by relying solely on the impairment rating provided by Physician. Nor did the Commission require Barnett to provide his own physician rating. Rather, there was sufficient competent and substantial evidence upon which the Commission relied in setting Barnett‘s PPD at 7%. Despite Barnett‘s testimony regarding the lingering effects of his injury, the Commission was clearly persuaded by evidence that any lingering effects were the result of Barnett‘s hesitation to use his right shoulder. “[T]he [C]ommission‘s award is not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence and thus is supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record.” Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Mo. banc 2003).

Point I is denied.

For his second point, Barnett asserts that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by disregarding, without explanation, Barnett‘s unimpeached testimony, which the ALJ found credible. We are not persuaded by Barnett‘s argument for several reasons.

First, although the Commission could have better explained its reasoning for reducing the ALJ‘s rating of Barnett‘s PPD, there is no indication in the record that Barnett asked for any clarification of the Commission‘s factual summary or any additional findings of fact. “Such a request must be made if either party feels that the findings are inadequate and the request cannot be made for the first time on appeal.” Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Jones, 557 S.W.3d 328, 334 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (citations omitted). As the Court stated decades ago,

Undoubtedly, if any party feels that the commission‘s findings of fact are not clear, leave the reason for its conclusion and award in doubt, or should be amplified for any other reason, he should ask the commission to modify them by making additional findings instead of complaining in the appellate court that findings of fact, which are not inconsistent with the result reached, do not contain a finding concerning all disputed questions of fact which must necessarily have been decided in order to make and support the award.

Id. (quoting State ex rel. Probst v. Haid, 62 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Mo. 1933)).

Second, the Commission owes no deference to the ALJ‘s credibility determinations or evaluation of evidence. “[T]he Commission is not bound to follow the ALJ‘s decision, even concerning the assessment of witness credibility, but is entitled to reach its own conclusions.” Molder, 342 S.W.3d at 410. Here, the Commission was entitled to weigh the medical evidence, including Physician‘s impairment rating, more heavily than Barnett‘s testimony on the extent of his disability and its relation to his work injury. And the Commission was entitled to credit Physician‘s conclusion that Barnett‘s reluctance to use his right shoulder negatively impacted his rate and degree of recovery, something that the ALJ acknowledged in his award. “Deferring to the Commission on its factual findings [including disability ratings], as we must, we find that the Commission reasonably could have made its findings and reached its result based upon all of the evidence before it, even if we might have reached a different conclusion.” Glasco, 534 S.W.3d at 402 (internal quotations omitted).

Third, Barnett‘s second point is based on the false premise that, in the absence of evidence impugning Barnett‘s credibility, the Commission was required to affirm the ALJ‘s PPD rating. “[W]here the record is wholly silent concerning the Commission‘s weighing of credibility and . . . the claimant . . . [is not] contradicted or impeached, the Commission may not arbitrarily disregard and ignore competent, substantial[,] and undisputed evidence.” Fields v. Treasurer of Mo., 628 S.W.3d 803, 815 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting Hazeltine v. Second Injury Fund, 591 S.W.3d 45, 59 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (internal quotations omitted)). But that is not what happened here. While Barnett‘s testimony regarding ongoing pain and functional limitations was not contradicted or impeached, that does not mean that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from his testimony was a PPD rating of 25%. The Commission could have taken his testimony at face value and, based on other competent and substantial evidence in the record—namely that Barnett‘s residual discomfort and immobility resulted from his excessive caution in using his right shoulder—concluded that a 7% rating was appropriate. Contrary to Barnett‘s assertion, this is not “the type of ‘rare’ case in which the Commission‘s disregard of credited, unimpeached testimony renders its decision contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”

Point II is denied.

Conclusion

The Commission did not exceed its authority by reducing Barnett‘s PPD from 25% to 7% based on the Commission‘s assessment of the record as a whole. The Commission‘s award is affirmed.

Karen King Mitchell, Judge

Thomas N. Chapman, Presiding Judge, and Janet Sutton, Judge, concur.

Notes

1
“Upon review of the Commission‘s decision, ‘we view the evidence objectively and not in the light most favorable to the decision of the Commission.‘” Treasurer of Mo. v. Majors, 506 S.W.3d 348, 352 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (quoting Poarch v. Treasurer of Mo., 365 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)).
2
Barnett testified that he did not experience any additional pain in his right shoulder as a result of the fall.
3
All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri, Cum. Supp. 2023.
4
Although in dicta, in Bock we suggested that where surgery was required the injury might be of the nature to require expert testimony, we do not believe that Bock should be read to suggest a strict rule for when medical evidence is necessary. Bock v. City of Columbia, 274 S.W.3d 555, 561 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (“Whether expert testimony is needed . . . depends upon whether the injury or injuries are ‘sophisticated,’ meaning requiring surgery or ‘highly scientific technique for diagnosis.‘“). Certainly here, where the issue is not the nature of the underlying injury or its relationship to Barnett‘s employment, but rather a question of the ongoing effects of the injury, there was no requirement that Barnett present any expert evidence.