OPINION
Appeal is taken from a conviction for murder. After finding appellant guilty, the jury assessed punishment at 12 years.
Appellant was convicted of having killed Freddie Lee in Temple on September 3, 1977. Appellant testified that he shot Lee in self-defense.
In his sole ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the admissibility of two items of clothing worn by the deceased at the time of the offense. Such clothing consisted of a shirt and a pair of trousers which were bloodstained. Appellant maintains that the clothing “did not tend to solve some disputed issue in the case” and was admitted solely to inflame the jury.
Appellant relies on
Hunter v. State,
Tex. Cr.App.,
“The general rule, long in force in this state, is that bloody clothing worn by the deceased in a homicide case, or by the injured party in an assault case, is not admissible. The admissibility of such clothing depends upon some exception to that rule. Among these exceptions is that the bloody clothing is admissible if such tends to solve some disputed issue in the case.”
See Marion
v. State,
Tex.Cr.App.,
In
Brown v. State,
Tex.Cr.App.,
“The general rule governing the admissibility of bloody clothing as set forth in 4 Branch’s Ann.P.C., 2d ed. Sec. 2029, p. 340, states:
“ ‘It is permissible to introduce bloody clothing in evidence only when the introduction serves to illustrate some point or solve some question, or serves to throw light upon the matter connected with the proper solution of the case, and under no other circumstances; but whenever the introduction of such clothing would, in the light of the whole case, aid the jury in arriving at *920 the very truth of the matter, the court should not hesitate to admit its production and exhibition.’
“While the general rule is in favor of exclusion, the exception which allows the introduction of bloody clothing may be based upon any ground of relevancy....”
In
Knox v. State,
Tex.Cr.App.,
In
Harrison v. State,
Tex.Cr.App.,
“By the device of stipulations, the appellant could not deprive the State of the duty and the function of presenting to the jury all relevant evidence, nor avoid facing the full facts of the crime.... “We have held in approving the admissibility of photographs that if a verbal description is relevant, then a photograph of the same may be used before the jury....
“It could not be argued that it was not relevant for witnesses to recount the discovery of the body and the bloody clothing in the vicinity and to fully describe the same. By the same reasoning as was used to approve the use of photographs, the clothing itself would be relevant and admissible. Such clothing would aid the jury to know the whole facts of the case, and it was entitled to no less.” Harrison v. State, supra at 669.
In
Garcia v. State,
Tex.Cr.App.,
In
Earvin v. State,
Tex.Cr.App.,
This Court has held that testimony concerning the scene of a murder, including a description of the body is admissible to throw light on the transaction and reveal its general nature.
Campbell v. State,
Tex. Cr.App.,
We hold that if a verbal description of the body and scene are admissible, the clothing worn by the victim of the offense, even if bloodstained, is admissible into evidence. 1 As hereinbefore noted, a number of recent cases are consistent with this holding. However, none of these cases have expressly overruled earlier decisions holding that it is necessary for bloody cloth *921 ing to solve some disputed issue before it is admissible. We now hold that all cases inconsistent with this opinion are overruled.
We find a description of the victim’s body and clothing at the scene of the offense were admissible to throw light on the transaction and reveal its general nature. Such a verbal description being admissible, the clothing worn by the deceased was likewise admissible into evidence. No error is shown in the trial court overruling appellant’s objection to the admission of the victim’s shirt and trousers.
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. Such clothing would not be admissible if it is offered solely to inflame the minds of the jury.
See Martin v. State, supra.
