78 Tex. 109 | Tex. | 1890
Lead Opinion
Appellants brought this suit to recover •■a tract of land containing 1200 acres. The cause was tried without a jury and a judgment was rendered in favor of defendants. There is no statement of the facts.
A bill of exceptions shows that defendants were permitted to introduce in evidence the record of another cause tried in the District Court of Comal County in which the plaintiffs in this suit were plaintiffs, and one
The defendant in that suit pleaded that said note had been paid off and discharged by a conveyance to the plaintiffs of the land now in controversy. The plaintiffs filed a replication to the answer, denying that any such settlement of the note sued upon had ever been made, and especially denying that the land in controversy had ever been conveyed to them, and also charging that if said deed was ever executed, as defendants alleged, it was upon conditions prescribed in a deed of release sent by Erskine for execution as a part and parcel of said deed, which plaintiffs refused to accept or ratify, and that they also refused to accept the deed in satisfaction of the note, wherefore they charged the deed was null and void.
The record introduced in evidence contains the pleadings, evidence, and judgment in said cause.
It is evident from the record that the plaintiffs had a valid and subsisting note and were entitled to a judgment for its recovery if it had not been discharged by a conveyance to them of the land in controversy.
The result of that suit was a judgment in favor of defendant and that plaintiffs take nothing.
The judge filed in the cause now before us the following conclusions of law and fact:
“1. That the parties prove title to the land sued for under a common source by deeds from M. Erskine.
“2. That plaintiffs’ deed from Erskine is of older date than that under which defendants claim.
“3. That defendants have proved a regular chain of transfer from and under the sovereignty of the soil under color of title or title, and were in peaceable and quiet possession of the land sued for for more than three years before the institution of this suit.
“4. That defendants have had peaceable and adverse possession of the laud sued for, holding and enjoying the same, paying taxes thereon, and claiming under deeds duly registered, for more than five years next before the institution of this suit. -
" 5. That defendants have not had such possession of said land as would -entitle them to the bar of the ten years limitation, the actual possession of the land not having been in them for ten years before the institution of this suit.
“ 6. The defendants have proved by the certified copy of the record of the suit of W. F. M. Ehringhaus et ais. v. John P. Erskine (admitted in evidence over the objection of plaintiffs), decided in the District Court of Comal County, October 11, 1873, on change of venue from this county, and by other evidence, that the parties to this suit plaintiffs herein and those under whom these plaintiffs claim were plaintiffs in said suit, and*116 that they in said suit renounced and disclaimed any interest in or claim to the land now herein sued for.
“7. The court further finds that all of the parties plaintiff except. Mrs. Bradford and the minor Culpepper are barred by the three and five years statutes of limitation; that the parties plaintiffs, seven in number, would, were they entitled to recover in this suit, have a one-seventh interest each in the land sued for, they being the same parties and their legal representatives to whom Erskine conveyed the land in May, I860.
“8. That the plea of coverture and minority interposed by the said Mrs. Bradford and the minor Culpepper is proved, and that they are not barred by said statutes of three or five years.
“Whereupon the court holds as a conclusion of law that by reason of the legal effect to be given the judgment and record in the suit decided by the District Court of Comal County, that neither of the parties plaintiff can recover in this suit, they having elected in said suit by their proper representatives to repudiate the deed under which they claim now; that they are bound by the recitals in said suit and the judgment therein; and therefore judgment is given for the defendants,”
We think that the judgment rendered in 1873 must be given exactly the opposite effect to that held by the court in its conclusion of law.
By the pleadings an issue was made as to whether or not the conveyance of the land to plaintiffs ever did take effect. If it did, the note then sued on was discharged, because the title to the land now in controversy had been conveyed to and vested in plaintiffs by the owner of the land—or at least such title as the maker of the deed could convey. If it did not, plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment for the amount of their note.
Between the parties to that suit the judgment therein rendered as much settled that the land had been conveyed to plaintiffs as it did that they could not recover upon the note. The record of the first suit shows that, a controversy existed as to whether or not the plaintiffs owned an unpaid note or the land. It was only because the land had been conveyed to them to discharge it that they were precluded from recovering on the note. It'was their right to have that issue tried and to recover upon the note if it had not been discharged by a conveyance of the land.
The rights of parties to other suits in which final judgments have been rendered must be controlled by the judgments and not by recitals in their pleadings treated either as admissions or estoppels. In such cases the pleadings and other proceedings, as between the parties and their privies, can only be looked to for the purpose of ascertaining what was the issue that was decided.
When the issue on trial is such as to make the admissions of the parties contained in pleadings in other suits pertinent evidence, we do not think that pleadings of married women nor of minors appearing by their
When pleadings in another suit or other admissions are properly admissible it does not follow that other proceedings in the cause, including the evidence, may also be admitted.
We are not able to determine from the record before us whether or not the defendants in the present suit claim the land under the defendant in the former suit, nor whether the defendant in that suit then owned the land in controversy, nor how he derived his title if he ever owned it.
he then owned it in such manner as to affect his title by that judgment as an estoppel and defendants hold in privity with him, the judgment in the former suit and so much of the proceedings therein as are proper to show what issues were decided may properly be received in evideuce upon the trial of this cause to prove title in plaintiffs by estoppel. If the relations of the parties are not such as to make the record admissible to prove such estoppel in favor of plaintiffs, we do not think that it should be admitted for any purpose.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Delivered June 6, 1890.
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
James II. Burts and John Ireland, for appellees, filed a motion for rehearing.
Rust & Goodrich, for appellants, resisting.
We are asked to reconsider our decision in this case because the opinion “ ignores the issue o'f want of consideration as made in the record of proceedings from Comal District Court.”
The record shows that the note referred to was a joint and several note signed by Michael Erskine, John P. Erskine, and A. E. Erskine. The petition alleged that both Michael Erskine and A. N. Erskine were dead.
John P. Erskine, the sole defendant, answered, admitting the execution of the note by said parties, and further answering says: “The note sued on is now and was when executed null and void for the reason that there was no consideration to support the same, and therefore this defendant is not liable on the same.” Defendant further says “that some time in the year 1853 liis father, the said M. Erskine, obtained from J. C. Ehringhaus about the sum of $2300 money belonging to the plaintiffs in this suit, said J. C. Ehringhaus being at the time the guardian of petitioners; that said Ehringhaus made a contract with said Michael Erskine for him to take said sum of money and invest it in lands in the State of Texas; * * *
We do not find in the pleadings any other or different allegation with regard to the consideration of the note then in issue, nor with regard to a failure or want of consideration. The evidence on the subject corresponds in every particular with the allegation. It is evident that the issue of want of consideration was not in the case and did not require mention-in our opinion.
In the motion for rehearing it is urged that m our opinion we over- • looked the fact that the suit in the District Court of Comal County ivas, against only one party to the note, and that in the opinion there is expressed “a doubt as to whether J. P. Erskine, the defendant in the Comal suit,pvas the owner of the land in controversy, while the proceedings show that he did not pretend to own the land.” It is true that the record shows that M. Erskine owned and conveyed the land on the loth day of May, 1860.
It will be seen, however, by reference to the court’s findings of facts Nos. 1 and 2 that he conveyed it tw'ice, and that defendants, as well as plaintiffs, claim the land through him. The record in no way discloses through what source their title reached the present defendants from M. Erskine, except that plaintiffs allege in this suit that they hold under John P. Erskine.
The statement is made in the brief of counsel for appellees that ‘“John P. Erskine was the defendant in the Comal suit—a son and heir of Michael Erskine and vendor of the defendant in this suit. He was one of the makers of the note said to be the consideration for this land as now claimed, and was undoubtedly a privy. * * * The plaintiffs are the same and defendants in privity.”
The original petition in the Comal suit was filed on the 18th day of September, 1871, and the final judgment therein was rendered on the 11th day of October, 1873.
We are still unable to determine whether or not the defendant in the Comal suit owned the land in controversy when he made it an issue in the Comal suit, so as to make the judgment therein binding as an estoppel against him and his privies.
If he did not, or if the present defendants do not hold in privity with him, there can be no question of estoppel arising out of that suit, and the
In view of another trial, and to avoid any misinterpretation of our meaning, we will say that there is in the record evidence indicating that when Michael Erskine made the deed through which plaintiffs claim the land it was subject to a mortgage and was subsequently sold under that mortgage. The record does not disclose who was the purchaser under the mortgage.
If John P. Erskine acquired a valid title under that mortgage, whether he so acquired it before or after the Comal suit, and if it was an older title than the one acquired by plaintiffs through the deed of M. Erskine to them, we do not think that in such case the pleading of the said deed by John Erskine in the Comal suit would make the judgment rendered in that suit estop him or his vendees.
The doctrine of estoppel on account of the issue made by him.and tried in that suit can not be applied in this cause, unless it shall appear that' the present defendants hold under him and that he holds under Michael Erskine either as his heir or as a purchaser by deed made subsequent to the mortgage.
It is unnecessary for us to say that if he was a purchaser under a mortgage, the title thus acquired related back to the date of the mortgage.
The motion is overruled.
Motion overruled.
Delivered June 27, 1890.