Plaintiffs, John W. and Margaret A. Bra-den (Bradens), appeal from a judgment granted in favor of St. Francis Hospital (hospital). We affirm.
The Bradens filed their complaint alleging negligence by the hospital. After the hospitаl’s failure to answer, a default judgment against the hospital was entered. Subsequently, under C.R.C.P. 60(b), the trial court found that the failure of the hospital to answer timely the Bradens’ complaint was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and it therefore set aside the default judgment. In addition to filing an answеr, the hospital also moved for summary judgment which was granted following a hearing.
I.
The Bradens first argue that the hоspital did not meet its burden in proving excusable neglect is without merit. A motion to vacate and set aside a default judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed absеnt an abuse of that discretion.
Craig v. Rider,
The Bradens contend that the trial court’s grant of a summary judgment in favor of the hospital is nоt justified. We disagree.
In their complaint, the Bradens alleged that an unnecessary and wrongful mid-thigh amputation of both of John Bradens’ legs was performed by a staff surgeon, Dr. Graul, in January 1982. Specifically, the Bradens alleged in count one that the hospital had a duty to exercise proper supervision to prevent unnecessary and wrongful surgery, and that it breached this duty. In count two, they alleged that the hospital had сontrol over, and in fact had undertaken a duty to control and supervise phy *507 sicians such as Dr. Graul, and that the hospital breached this duty.
In support of these allegations and in response to the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, the Bradens supplied the trial court with statistics showing that Dr. Graul had performed significantly more amputations than the average number of amputations performed by other surgeons on the hospital staff. The Bradens also presented certain letters and reports, implying inappropriаte treatments by Dr. Graul, but which related to other operations or procedures performed by him. Finally, the Bradens provided the trial court with a copy of the hospital’s by-laws.
In support of its motion for summаry judgment, the hospital submitted an affidavit by its president and chief executive officer stating that he has no knowledge, information, or belief which would indicate or imply that Dr. Graul has been the subject of any hospital inquiry or investigation into alleged substandard treatment, or that Dr. Graul lacks the skill or judgment of a competеnt surgeon and physician.
The Bradens concede that the general principle governing hospital negligence is that stated in
Western Insurance Co. v. Brochner,
Based on the affidavit of its president and chief executive officer, the hospital made a convincing showing that genuine issues of fact were lacking.
See
C.R.C.P. 56(c);
Ginter v. Palmer & Co.,
The Bradens’ statistics do not, in themselves, indicate a proclivity on the part of Dr. Graul to perform unnecessary amputations, because multiple surgeries do not support a reasonable inference that any one procedure, including the procedure in this case, was unnecessаry or negligently performed. These statistics do not support the Bradens’ contention that the hospitаl knew or should have known of any alleged misconduct.
Similarly, although the hospital’s by-laws show a rather elаborate administrative structure of supervision and monitoring to ensure quality health care, they do not suрport the Bradens’ contention that the hospital knew or should have known of any mistreatments. Likewise unsupportive are the remainder of materials submitted by the Bradens since none of those materials рrovide any information of or support for the allegations of specific harm contained in thе Bradens’ complaint.
Finally, we find inapplicable Bra-dens’ argument of constructive knowledge or of direct chain of command leading to negligence of the hospital. A hospital has certain inherent responsibilities regarding the quality of medical care furnished to its patients, and to meet this standard of responsibility, the hospital has a duty to supervise the competence of its staff.
Fridena v. Evans,
Under these circumstances, the summary judgment was properly granted. C.R.C.P. 56; Hadley, supra.
The judgment is affirmed.