149 Iowa 51 | Iowa | 1910
The freight train left Emmetsburg for Dows at about 1:45 o’clock in the morning of July 1, 1908. The plaintiff was head brakeman and had been in defendant’s employment about twenty months. He was directed by the conductor at Graattinger to take two stock cars from the side track and place them immediately back of two refrigerator cars next the engine. In order to accomplish this, he uncoupled the remainder of the train from the refrigerator cars, and, after disposing of it and attending to switching, got on the second refrigerator car at the end toward the engine and rode as these backed on the side track on which the stock cars stood. Both his feet were in the stirrup at the side and near the end of the car, one hand hold of the fourth rung of the ladder, and the other carrying a lantern. When the cars had moved to the depot platform, he was about to get off; but, as one foot reached the platform, his glove caught on a bolt between the third and fourth rung of the ladder, and this jerked him between the cars, where he hung an instant and then fell to the ground. The wheel of the car ran over his right arm, so injuring it that amputation was necessary. The negligence alleged was the leaving of the bolt protruding at a locality likely to cause injury. The defendant pleaded that the risk had been assumed, and adduced evidence tending to show that from all its refrigerator cars bolts protruded with nuts on them an half inch thick, from which the ends of the bolts usually extended beyond the nut from nothing to five-eighths of an inch, and that in every car was a bolt about where the one occasioning the injury was located. - On the other hand, the evidence tended to show that the ends of most of the bolts were flush with the nuts, and that plaintiff had no knowledge of this bolt. Plaintiff had been in defendant’s employment as brakeman about twenty months, and one or more refrigerator cars was in nearly every train.
II. Evidence was received, subject to objection, showing that, as part of the train, a carload of eggs was being transported from Ellsworth, Minn., through this state to Chicago, 111., and that several other carloads of freight were being taken to the latter place and other points in Illinois. After all the evidence had been introduced, defendant moved that the jury be directed to return a verdict in its favor,, for that, among other things, plaintiff at the time of receiving the injury was employed in the opera
It will be noted that the rulings raise the following questions: (1) Was evidence tending to show that defendant was engaged in interstate commerce admissible in the absence of anything in the answer so asserting? (2) If not, did the court err in striking the amendment so pleading from the files? (3) In either event, can “the right created by the so-called employer’s liability act be enforced in the state courts?
For convenience, the last may be disposed of first. The constitutionality of the act is not assailed. That it is likely to be upheld finally is fairly to be inferred from the several opinions in Howard v. Ill. Cent. Ry., 207 U. S. 463 (28 Sup. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297), though a different view appears to have been entertained by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. Hoxie v. Railway, 82 Conn. 352 (73 Atl. 754). See El Paso & N. E. R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87 (30 Sup. Ct. 21, 54 L. Ed. -). In the Howard case, the court held that Congress had the power, under the clause of the Constitution authorizing it to
Eor the purposes of this case, it may be conceded that the facts bring it within the terms of the federal statute, and that plaintiff must recover thereon, if at all. The petition stated a cause of action thereunder, and, unless it can be said that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in the enforcement of rights created or declared in advancement of those previously existing, there is no ground for interfering with the judgment entered. The matter of jurisdiction is not touched in the act of Congress,
In the case first above cited, the Supreme Court, speaking through Bradley, J., said:
The general question, whether state courts can exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts in cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, has been elaborately discussed, both on the bench and in published treatises, sometimes with a leaning in one direction and sometimes in the other; but the result of these discussions has, in our judgment, been, as seen in the above cases, to affirm the jurisdiction, where it is not excluded by express provisions or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case. When we consider the structure and true relations of the federal and state governments, there is really no just foundation for excluding the state courts from all such jurisdiction. The laws of the United States are laws of the several states, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the sítate laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several states, but is a concurrent and, within its jurisdiction, paramount sovereignty. Every citizen of a state is a subject of two distinct sovereignties, having concurrent jurisdiction in the state; concurrent as to places and person, though distinct as to subject-matter. Legal or equitable rights, acquired under either system of laws, may be enforced in any court*58 of either sovereignty competent to hear and determine such' kind of rights and not restrained by its Constitution in the-exercise of such jurisdiction. Thus a legal or equitable right acquired under the state laws may be prosecuted in the state counts, and also, if the parties reside in different states, in the federal courts. So rights, whether legal or equitable, acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prosecuted in the United States courts, or in the state courts, competent to decide rights of the like character and class; subject, however, to this qualification, that, where a right arises under a law of the United States, Congress may,-if it see fit, give to the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is sometimes exclusive by express enactment, and sometimes by implication. If an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a state court. The fact that a state court derives its existence and functions from the state laws is no reason why it should not afford relief; because it -is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the state as it is to recognize the state laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the state; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.
An illustration of the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by the federal courts will be found in Copp v. Ry., 43 La. Ann. 511 (9 South. 441, 26 Am. St. Rep. 198, 12 L. R. A. 725), where a plea to the jurisdiction of the state court was sustained on .the ground that the act of Congress on which the action for damages was based directed that it be brought in the United States courts. In Hoxie v. Ry., supra, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reached the conclusion that by fair implication the act of Congress excludes jurisdiction of the state courts, and, in any event, the state court was under no obligation to enforce the rights
The prevailing rule is that, where a cause of action accrues by virtue of the statute of any state, the action may be maintained in any other state if not contrary to the public policy or law of the place where the suit is brought. Boyce v. Railway, 63 Iowa, 70; Morris v. Railway, 65 Iowa, 727. See cases collected in note to Reeves v. Railway, 70 L. R. A. 513. In such cases, the law of the place where the right was acquired or the liability incurred will govern as to the right of action, while all that pertains merely to the remedy will be controlled by the law of the state where the action is brought. Herrick v. Railway, 31 Minn. 11 (16 N. W. 413, 47 Am. Rep. 771).
Even where the cause of action arises in a' foreign country, suits may be maintained in our courts, though jurisdiction can be declined; but this is seldom done unless from fear of inability to do full justice through lack of knowledge of the laws of the place where the cause of action arose. Mason v. The Blaireau, 6 U. S. 240 (2 L. Ed. 266); Roberts v. Dunsmuir, 75 Cal. 203 (16 Pac. 782); Great Western R. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305; Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332 (44 N. W. 623, 7 L. R. A. 511); Evey v. Railway, 81 Fed. 294 (26 C. C. A. 407, 38 L. R. A. 387); 11 Cyc. 663. The reasons which induce state courts to exercise jurisdiction of causes of action arising in a foreign country or under legislation of another state should be quite as persuasive in favor of assuming jurisdiction over causes of action arising under the statutes of the United States, with this in addition, that these are the laws of the very people the jurisdiction of whose courts is invoked. See 11 Cyc. 996. If a cause of action has become fixed and a legal liability in
Sec. 1. That every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several states and territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the states or teritories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and if none, then of such employee’s parents; and if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insiifficiency due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.
Sec. 3. That in all actions hereafter brought against*61 any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, ithat no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation of such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.
Sec. 4. That in any action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act to recover damages for injuries to or the death of any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.
Sec. 6. That no action shall be maintained under this act unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.
It is manifest from the mere reading that this act effects quite as important a change in the trial of such causes in the federal courts as would be possible in the state courts. Thus the federal decisions are harmonious on the proposition that the negligence of complainant which contributes proximately to the injury will defeat the recovery of damages therefor. So, too, in the absence of local statutes, the fellow-servant doctrine and that of assumption of risks have been broadly applied in all federal courts. Hereafter all of these rules are to be modified or eliminated where the injuries are such as contemplated in the above act. If inconvenience and confusion would result from an attempt to enforce the acts in the state courts, like consequences will he the outcome of a similar undertaking in the courts of
It must be borne in mind that this act does not relate to the distribution of the personal property of an estate. The cause of action does not belong to the estate of the deceased person, but to certain classes for whose benefit the administrator is authorized to recover damages, and we see no ground for saying this is contrary to our law or its policy. In a few states, notably Connecticut, the fellow-servant doctrine is still applied in cases of injury caused in the use and operation of railways, and it seems to have been thought in the Hoxie case that for a state court to apply that doctrine in causes based on injuries received in intrastate commerce, and to proceed in actions based on the federal statute on the theory that the master is responsible for the acts of the fellow-servant, would create confusion “setting up in the same tribunal different standards of right and policy and practice.” More than fifty years ago, the fellow-servant doctrine was eliminated by the Legislature of this state wherever the injury was occasioned by the negligent act of -the fellow-servant engaged in the use and operation of a railway, and, though that doctrine has been continually applied in all cases involving injuries suffered in other employments, little difficulty has been experienced in discriminating between situations exacting the application of the different rules. Indeed, the situation of employees engaged in the operation of railways ordinarily is such that they can exert little direct or personal influence upon each other in discharging their respective duties, and their opportunities for guarding against the negligent acts of one another are so limited that in many, if not in most, of the states, laws have been enacted declaring the master liable for the negligent acts of the servant when engaged in the use and operation of railways, even though the injured party be a fellow-servant.