1 Pin. 584 | Wis. | 1845
The bill of complainants is sworn to by Charles Bracken, one of complainants, who is also next friend of Sarah Daniels and Cecilia Daniels, of Michigan, minor children of Lyman J. Daniels, deceased. Amelia Daniels is the widow of said Lyman, deceased. The bill sets forth, that on the 18th day of November, A. D. 1835, Charles Bracken, David Irvin and Lyman J. Daniels entered at the land office at Mineral Point in Iowa county, the east half of the north-east quarter of section No. 5 in township No. 4 of range No. 3 east, containing 80 29-100 acres, and the receiver’s receipt for the payment of the purchase money of the same date, is presented as evidence, by which the parties became seized as tenants in common of the said land, and as such, have the absolute, sole, and exclusive right, to the use, occupancy, and possession of the said tract of land, and to all the rents, issues and profits of the same; and to all minerals, ore and mineral dirt, of whatever description or kind that were, or might at any time, be or exist in or upon said tract of land: That a very valuable mine of copper ore was discovered upon said land, which said mine has been extensively worked, and a large quantity of copper ore, and of dirt intermixed with copper ore,
The defendants’ answer was filed in the court of Iowa county on the 4th of February, 1843. They admit that the land aforesaid was entered by Bracken, Irvin and Daniels as set forth in the bill, but deny that said entry vested in them the fee of said lands, but that as no patent therefor had been issued, the fee remained in the United States. Admit that Bracken, Irvin and Daniels and the said widow and heirs of said Daniels, may have been seized and possessed as set forth in said bill, but aver that they always understood that Arthur Brunson, of New York, to whose agent defendants paid rent, was the owner of the interest of said Daniels. And defendants deny that the complainants had sole and exclusive right thereto during all the time to the filing of the bill; nor had they the sole right to all the mineral ore on said land, or to mine and dig on the same, but the right of complainants to the sole occupancy of said premises was restricted by their Leasing and letting the said premises to many persons to mine and dig upon. The defendants admit there was a valuable discovery of copper ore made on a part of said
The defendants attended upon the justice in the forcible entry and detainer case which plaintiffs discontinued, and immediately commenced a second prosecution, which was tried and a verdict rendered for the defendants; the complainant thereupon issued a writ of certiorari to remove the proceedings to the district court of Iowa county, where the same was pending. After the trial of this case, the defendants removed a large quantity of ore which they had raised to the wash place, and notified said Bracken and the agent of the owners, that the same was ready for division and market, which was taken by said Bracken and complainants by a writ of replevin.
The defendants say that those of them who own the said lot and discovery and who were not on the said lot and premises when the said discovery was first made, came into possession by purchase for a valuable consideration, and that they all claim under Andrew Remphrey, who leased in good faith from the said Charles Bracken, and had a right by common custom to dig . on such ground without such express consent. That they purchased in good faith, and have strictly complied with the terms of the letting to said Remphrey. Have never been in possession of any part of said.premises set forth in the bill, except the said lot and discovery; and that they have a right to the possession of said lot as long as they comply with the terms of the lease aforesaid, and faithfully work said lot as they have always done. And they deny that the said Charles Bracken was at any time after the said copper discovery in the quiet and peaceable possession of the said lot and discovery thereon, or that he was ever forcibly expelled therefrom,, but that defendants and
Bracken, in his petition to the court of Iowa county respecting the injunction, represents, that being the owner in fee of the equal, undivided one-third part of the said tract of land, and having the agency and charge of the other two-thirds, which were owned in fee by said Inin and Daniels’ heirs, he gave to Andrew Remphrey verbal permission to dig, etc.
Andrew Remphrey states in his deposition, that he asked Charles Bracken if the piece of land he wanted was the piece which "William Henry was promised, and he said no. Then asked Bracken if he could have it, and he said yes. Witness asked him the terms, and he said he would let it for one-fifth, and give him the privilege of the copper ; then witness said provided you give as much as any other person, and the only word he made in reply was, certainly. About the .limits of the land we did not finally agree then, but Bracken promised to meet witness on the ground. About four or five weeks after, Bracken met witness on the ground ; they hauled witness up out of the shaft, and he said, Andy, what way do you want your limits; witness replied 200 yards east from that stump, 100 yards north therefrom, 100 yards south. Bracken notified witness not to assign this lease or privilege. Witness assigned it to Preston in writing before suits were commenced.
Richard Crocker states in his deposition about the same in substance as contained in Remphrey’s deposition
The bill presents a case of trespass with a continuando', and prays for a preliminary injunction, to prevent the defendants from committing irreparable injury to the premises during the pendency of a prosecution for forcible entry and detainer. It also prays for a final decree for surrender of the premises; for an account; and that the complainants may be quieted in their title and possession. The defendants allege and prove that they are in possession of the mine, claiming the right. What right the defendants have to the possession it is not necessary in this case to determine ; whether there is a lease or a license between the parties, or whether it was a mere contract for personal service on the land of the complainants, we will not stop to consider.
From an examination of the authorities upon the subject, it appears, that an injunction lies to restrain a trespass, in order to quiet the possession; or where there is danger of irreparable mischief, or where the value of
Trespass in digging mineral or mining on the land of another, comes within the cognizance of a court of equity, when committed by a mere trespasser, or where a party exceeds the limited rights with which he is clothed.
Every bill must contain within itself sufficient matter of fact, per se, to maintain the case of the plaintiff; and the proof must be according to the allegations of the parties. Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 483. The plaintiffs in this case, acknowledge themselves out of possession. The bill sets forth: “That after the copper mine had been discovered and worked, and after large quantities of copper ore had been raised, the defendants, without law or right, and contrary to the will of complainants, entered and took possession of said tract on or about the 25th day of June, 1845, and continued therein until the 20th of July of the same year, and refused to permit the complainants to take the possession of, or in any manner occupy or enjoy that portion of said tract embracing said copper mine ; and during all that time took and carried away large quantities of copper ore; and during all that time converted to their own use the whole of the
The policy of preventing irreparable injury has introduced an exception to the general rule in cases of waste, or of mischief analogous to waste, but this does not extend to questions of title. 1 Smith’s Ch. 595; Morphett v. Jones, 19 Vesey, 350. The complainants in cases of waste must, generally, have the possession of the premises, or have established their right at law, or have brought an action to recover the possession, or in cases of tenants, after notice to quit. 1 Smith’s Ch. Pr. 593; 3 Barb. & Harrington’s Dig. 478, 479; Scott v. Wharton, 2 Hen. & Munf. 25; Duvall v. Waters, 1 Bland. 576; 2 Story’s Eq. 177, 207; Hart v. The Mayor of Albany, 3 Paige, 213. In such cases courts are generally cautious, and they will not grant relief when the complainant is out of possession. In cases of this nature courts make a great difference between restraining a defendant from working a mine already opened, and restraining him from opening one. Gray v. Duke of Northumberland, 13 Vesey, 236. And it is held in many cases referred to on pages 51 and 52 of Fonblanque’s Equity, that the plaintiff’s exclusive right must be admitted by the defendant or established at law, to warrant the interference of a court of chancery.
No injunction will be allowed, in cases of trespass, with an account, where the plaintiffs cannot maintain an action
When a bill seeks an account of ore dug the court of chancery will decree it in a proper case, Bishop of Winchester v. Knight, 1 P. Wms. 406; because the working of a mine is a kind of trade, Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atkyns, 630; Marguis of Lansdowne v. Marchioness of Lansdowne, 1 Mad. 73, but the plaintiff must show his possession. Lyn v. Pierce, 5 Vesey, 259. “Neither will equity, in all cases, decree an account of mesne profits ; for where a man has title to the possession of lands, and makes an entry, whereby he becomes entitled to damages at law for the time that possession was detained from him, he shall not after his entry, turn that action at law into a suit in equity, and bring a bill for an account of the profits, except in the case of an infant, or some other very particular circumstances, which extend to all those cases that involve an equity which cannot be made available at law.” Eonbl. Eq. 31, 32.
Although the defendants have not shown a legal right
So if a bill should be brought for the possession of land, which is commonly called an ejectment bill, it would be demurrable, for the proper redress is at law. And even if such bill should charge that the defendant had gotten the title deeds and mixed the boundaries ; and should, on that ground, pray for a discovery, possession, and account, a demurrer (at least upon the doctrine maintained in England) would lie. For although the plaintiff would be entitled to the discovery of the title deeds, yet he would not have any title to the relief; that after the discovery being properly given, it is at law ; and by praying relief as well as discovery, his whole bill would be demurrable ; Story’s Eq. Pl. 374, 375, and cases there cited.
The court is not willing to exercise its chancery jurisdiction, unless in clear cases properly presented, and in which it satisfactorily appears, that full and complete
It is therefore considered and adjudged by the court, that the decree of the district court of Milwaukee county, dismissing complainant’s bill, be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.