55 N.Y.S. 506 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1899
On the 1st of July, 1889, the Julien Electric Traction Company issued 102 bonds, in each of which it promised to pay to the Mercantile. Trust Company or the bearer a thousand dollars, with interest at six per cent. To secure the payment of those bonds the corporation gave a mortgage to the Mercantile Trust Company as trustee. On the. 28th of April, 1890, the Union Electric Traction Company made an agreement with the Mercantile Trust Company as trustee, for the-owners and holders of the bonds, by which it guaranteed the payment of the bonds of the Julien Company. As security for that-guaranty there was deposited with the Atlantic Trust Company 30,000 shares of stock of the Consolidated Electric Storage Company, the receipt of which stock was acknowledged by an indorse
The complaint further alleged that during the time wherein the Atlantic Trust Company insisted upon the possession of those bonds- and refused to deliver them to the Mercantile Trust Company the stock stéadily declined in value, so that in the month of April, 1896, when it. was sold as above stated, it realized only the sum of seven cents a share, or $2,100' in all. It was further alleged that the Julien Electric Traction Company, the maker of the bonds, and the United Electric Traction Company, its guarantor, were absolutely insolvent and had no assets whatever. Other facts were set up by way of showing special damage, which it is unnecessary to consider in this connection. The relief asked for was that .the plaintiff andShoaff, as the bondholders of the Julien Company, might recover the damages which they suffered by what was said to be the unlawful retention of the storage company’s bonds by the Atlantic Trust-Company, by reason of which they became of no value as security for the payment of the Julien Company’s bonds. The Atlantic-Trust Company defended this action, and in addition to certain facts, which it is unnecessary to consider, it set up the judgment recovered by the Mercantile Trust Company, as trustee, to obtain possession of the stock. Upon the trial there was practically- no-disputed question of fact, except the value of the stock, and the
But it is said by the plaintiff that, to be effectual as a bar, the judgment must have been pleaded. (Brazill v. Isham, 12 N. Y. 9.) Undoubtedly that is so. But the judgment is pleaded. The' answer of the Atlantic Trust Company sets out the fact that the judgment was rendered, and that was all it was required to do. (Coatsworth, v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 156 N. Y. 451, 457.) If it put the court in possession of the fact that an action of that nature had been brought and judgment rendered in it, it was not called upon in its pleading to set up any legal conclusions from that fact. The court upon proof of it was called upon to draw the legal conclusions that necessarily followed therefrom, and to give to the defendant the benefit of all those conclusions. We are then brought
One party may bring against another as many separate actions as he has 'Causes of action against him, and he is not bound to unite them all in one action or even to bring them all at the same time, so that a judgment in one action has no effect whatever as an estoppel in regard to any distinct cause of action, except so far as1 possibly it may determine facts which are material in the other action. But in each action the plaintiff is called upon to assert every right which necessarily inheres in- or grows out of the alleged catise of action as a mere increment of .it. (Big. Estop. [4th ed.] -159.) It is with reference to this principle that the rule applies, that the estoppel of- a former judgment extends not only to every material matter which was litigated and determined in it, but as to every other matter which, though it may not have been determined or even considered, was necessarily involved in the thing which was determined. (Pray v. Hegeman, 98.N. Y. 351; Griffin v. L. I. R. R. Co., 102 id. 449.). The question thus presented is whether in the action -which was brought by the Mercantile Trust Company as trustee, for the possession of this stock, based upon the refusal of the Atlantic Trust Company to deliver it, the damages, if any, which had been suffered by the trustee of the bondholders, because of the depreciation of the stock, might have been and should have been recovered.
The action was, in form, aii action on the equity side of the court for the delivery of the stock to the plaintiff, because of an alleged right which the plaintiff had to it. It might be that as the plaintiff had not the legal title to the stock, it could not have maintained the action of replevin, but yet it sought in another way to obtain precisely the same relief that might have been obtained in that action.
The cause of action in the case at bar stands upon facts which existed at the time of the trial of the original action. To enable the plaintiff to recover; it is bound to prove every fact which the Mercantile Trust Company proved in that case, and, in addition, the single further fact of the depreciation of the stock between the time when the demand was made and the time of its delivery. In the original action the plaintiff might have proved, had it so desired, in addition to the facts which it did prove, the depreciation of the stock from the time of the demand to the time of the trial of that action, and upon proving it it would have been entitled to damages for such depreciation as its compensation for the unlawful detention of the property. That right, to compensation grew out of the original wrong only. It was a necessary result of it, and, therefore, inhered in it as an essential part of the right of recovery. It was just as much within the purview of the equitable action as damages for the unlawful detention of property are within the purview of an action for replevin, and whatever is within the purview of the action is conclusively presumed to have been disposed of when another action is brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant to recover it. (Hayes v. Reese, 34 Barb. 155 ; Stockton v. Ford, 18 How. [U. S.] 418 ; Cromwell v. Comity of Sac, 94 U. S. 351.) Even if this be regarded as an action for the specific performance by the Atlantic Trust' Company of its contract to hold
The same question precisely was presented to the Supreme Court, of Judicature of England in 1885. (Serrao v. Noel, 15 Q. B. Div. 549.) In that court an action was brought to recover damages for the detention of certain shares of stock. It appeared on the trial of the action that the plaintiff had delivered the stock to a broker who unlawfully attempted to transfer it to the defendant. .The-plaintiff had brought a'former action against the defendant and the-corporation whose shares were involved, to restrain the transfer of the stock to the name of the defendant, and to require the delivery of the stock to him. No damages were sought for in that action.. The plaintiff there recovered a judgment for the delivery of the stock to him. Pending the suit the stock had seriously declined in value, and after the delivery to the plaintiff, he brought an action against the defendant, as. is stated, to recover damages for the unlawful detention. The defendant in the last action pleaded an estoppel by the judgment of the Chancery Division by which he was decreed.
The judgment in the case of the Mercantile Trust Company as-trustee against the Atlantic Trust Company, entered on the 21st of' January, 1895, constitutes an estoppel against the right of the plaintiff to maintain this action for damages which he suffered by the retention of the stock down to the time of the trial of that action. Neither can he recover damages which may have accrued for the-subsequent detention of the stock until, April, 1896, if there were-any. Three days after the entry of the judgment on the 21st of'. January, 1895, the Atlantic Trust Company appealed to the General Term, and, upon an affirmance at the General Term, it promptly appealed to the Court of Appeals. It does not appear that any stay of proceedings was granted by the court upon either of those
If, however,.upon that appeal a stay had been granted to the Atlantic Company, then it would not be a wrongdoer for a refusal to perform the judgment, and it could not be held liable for the •depreciation of the property during the time that, by permission of the court, it refrained from delivering it pending the final determh nation from its appeal. A stay could only be granted in such a ■case by the order of the court; and, upon the making of that order, the court had the power to, and undoubtedly would, upon, the application of the plaintiff, impose such terms as would completely indemnify the party recovering the judgment from any. injury
For these reasons we are of the opinion that the former recovery constituted a perfect estoppel against the right of the plaintiff to have damages in this action, and it should have been so held.
The judgment and order are, therefore, reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the result of the action.
Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson, Ingraham and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred.
Judgment and order reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellants to abide event.