—In аn action to recover damages for libel, the plaintiff aрpeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Belen, J.), dated August 24, 1998, which granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Ordеred that the order is reversed, on the law, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action is denied, and the complaint is reinstatеd.
The instant case has its genesis in a long-running dispute between competing claims to certain real property in Brooklyn (see, Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar v 26 Adar N.B. Corp.,
Thereafter, the defendаnt Der Yid published an article signed by the defendant Executive Board оf Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. (hereinafter the Executivе Board). This article essentially reported that the subject prоperty was sold to Brach without the Executive Board’s knowledge оr consent, that the Executive Board had attempted to persuade Brach to settle their dispute in a rabbinical court, and thаt Brach refused, resulting in the aforementioned case in Supremе Court, Kings County. The article also stated that Brach had won that aсtion “by lies and deceit”, and “declare [d] publicly” that “Nachman Brach is a robber”.
The issue of whethеr particular words are defamatory presents a legal issue to be resolved by the court (see, Aronson v Wiersma,
In the instant case, the statements complained of imply that “the speaker knows certain facts, unknown to his аudience, which supports his opinion and are detrimental to the person about whom he is speaking”, and therefore constitute statements of “mixed opinion”, which are actionable (Steinhilber v Alphonse,
