JUDY BRAACH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. T. JANELLE GRAYBEAL, Clerk and Election Administrator of School District No. 1, County of Granite, State of Montana, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 99-031
In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana
September 29, 1999
296 Mont. 138 | 988 P.2d 761 | 1999 MT 234 | 56 St. Rep. 919
Submitted on Briefs May 13, 1999.
For Appellant: Shane A. Vannatta; Worden, Thane & Haines, Missoula.
For Respondent: Jeffrey M. Hindoien; Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman, Helena.
JUSTICE GRAY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Judy Braach (Braach) apрeals from the order of the Third Judicial District Court, Granite County, denying her motion for attorney fees. We affirm.
¶2 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in concluding Braach is not entitled to attorney fees in this action.
BACKGROUND
¶3 Braaсh was one of five duly elected members of the Board of Trustees (Trustees) for School District No. 1 in Granite County, Montana. In March of 1998, the other Trustees submitted a petition to the Clerk of the School District, T. Janelle Graybeal (Graybeal), requesting an election to determine whether Braach should be recalled from the office of Trustee. Graybeal reviewed the petition and approved it as complying with the form requirements set forth in
¶4 Braach filed a complaint in District Court alleging that Graybeal should not have accepted the petition because it was facially deficient and requesting the court to enjoin Graybeal from tаking any further action with regard to the recall election. The District Court granted a temporary restraining order to stop the election and scheduled a hearing on Braach‘s request for a preliminary injunction.
¶5 The parties subsequently stipulated to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting Graybeal from proceeding with the recall election. Braach then moved the District Court for an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party in the action and the court denied the motion. Braach appeals.
¶6 Generally, a district court‘s grant or denial of a motion for attorney fees is a discretionary ruling which we review to determine whether the court abused its discretion. See Goodover v. Lindey‘s, Inc. (1992), 255 Mont. 430, 449, 843 P.2d 765, 776. Here, the District Court denied Braach‘s motion for attorney fees based on its determination that there is no legal authority for such an award in this case. This underlying determination is a conclusion of law which we review to determine whеther the court interpreted the law correctly. Kunst v. Pass, 1998 MT 71, ¶ 19, 288 Mont. 264, ¶ 19, 957 P.2d 1, ¶ 19.
DISCUSSION
¶7 Did the District Court err in concluding Braach is not entitled to attorney fees in this action?
¶8 It is well-established in Montana that, absent contractual or statutory authority, attorney fees genеrally will not be awarded. Goodover, 255 Mont. at 445, 843 P.2d at 774 (citations omitted). Braach concedes that no contract or applicable statute authorizes an attorney fees award in this case. Notwithstanding the absence of such authority, however, shе argues entitlement to attorney fees as a matter of equity as the prevailing party in her action to enjoin the recall election proceedings. The District Court concluded that this case does not fall within the limited cirсumstances under which an equitable award of attorney fees is allowed in Montana. We agree.
¶9 We have held that a court, under its equity powers, may award attorney fees to make an injured party whole. Foy v. Anderson (1978), 176 Mont. 507, 511-12, 580 P.2d 114, 116-17. Such awards are to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Foy, 176 Mont. at 511, 580 P.2d at 117. In subsequent cases addressing the Foy “equitable” excеption, however, we have expressly limited its applicability to situations where a party has been forced to defend against a wholly frivolous or malicious action. See, e.g., Youderian Const., Inc. v. Hall (1997), 285 Mont. 1, 15, 945 P.2d 909, 917; Newman v. Wittmer (1996), 277 Mont. 1, 12, 917 P.2d 926, 933; Tanner v. Dream Island, Inc. (1996), 275 Mont. 414, 429-30, 913 P.2d 641, 651; Holmstrom Land Co. v. Hunter (1979), 182 Mont. 43, 48-49, 595 P.2d 360, 363.
¶10 In the present case, Braach was not required to defend against a frivolous lawsuit. Rather, she initiated this action as the plaintiff. We specifically have held that attorney fees are not available under the Foy exception for parties who initiate legal action. See YouderianConst., 285 Mont. at 15, 945 P.2d at 917; Newman, 277 Mont. at 12, 917 P.2d at 933; Tanner, 275 Mont. at 429, 913 P.2d at 651.
¶11 Braach asserts that, even though she initiated this action, she is in a situation similar to that faced by defendants forced to defend frivolous lawsuits because she was forced to bring this action to protect herself from a defective recall petition and had no other recourse. She cites State ex rel. Wilson v. Dept. of Natural Resources (1982), 199 Mont. 189, 648 P.2d 766, for the proposition that the designation of a party in a lawsuit is not necessarily dispositive.
¶12 In Wilson, property owners were forced to intervene in an action brought by Wilson against the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation in order to protect their rights to appropriate water from a creek. After the district court granted injunctive relief against Wilson, the intervenors sought and were awarded attorney fees. Wilson, 199 Mont. at 193, 648 P.2d at 768. We reversed the distriсt court‘s grant of attorney fees to the intervenors, but stated that “there is room within the Foy exception for those who reasonably find it necessary to intervene in a frivolous action, although not technically forced to becоme parties.” Wilson, 199 Mont. at 197, 648 P.2d at 770.
¶13 In Wilson, the intervenors were not defendants, but they found it necessary to become parties to an action brought by another person in order to protect their rights. They did not bring the action themselves, however. Thus, the intervenors found themselves in circumstances similar to those of defendants asserting a Foy-based entitlement to an equitable award of attorney fees. As stated above, Braach initiated this action requesting injunctive relief. She was not forced to intervene or otherwise become involved in a legal action initiated by another. Consequently, Wilson does not support her argument here. Moreover, parties bringing actions for injunctive relief to protect their own rights are not entitled to attorney fees under the Foy exception. See, e.g., Parker v. Elder (1992), 254 Mont. 270, 836 P.2d 1236; Newman, 277 Mont. at 12, 917 P.2d at 933. We conclude that Foy‘s narrowly defined “equitable” exception to the general attorney fees rule is not applicable in the present case.
¶14 Braach also argues that, because a rеcall petition sponsor is allowed to recover attorney fees for successfully compelling a clerk to approve a recall petition, we should extend a reciprocal right to recover attorney fees to parties who successfully enjoin a defective recall petition. We decline to do so.
¶16 Braach‘s final argument relates to the language in
¶17
¶18 We hold that the District Court correctly concluded Braach is not entitled to attorney fees in this action.
¶19 Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, JUSTICES NELSON and TRIEWEILER concur.
JUSTICE REGNIER dissenting.
¶20 I resрectfully dissent from the majority‘s conclusion to affirm the District Court and deny Ms. Braach reimbursement for her attorney fees. I would remand this matter back to the District Court for a determination of her reasonable attorney fees.
¶21 The majоrity has correctly stated that it is well established in Montana that a party in a civil action is generally not entitled to fees absent a specific contractual or statutory provision. Certainly, in this case there was no contrаct between Braach and Graybeal which could serve as a basis for the award of attorney fees, nor does any Montana statute explicitly provide Braach a right to recover attorney fees in this situation. In my view, howеver, I would expand the Foy doctrine in a limited fashion to cover this situation.
¶22 The District Court determined that the recall petition against Braach was deficient on its face. The Montana Recall Act specifically provides that an election administrator must review a recall petition before it is circulated among the electorate. See
¶23 Braach did not initiatе the recall election process nor did she have any role in drafting the recall petition. Graybeal‘s decision to proceed with the recall election inserted Braach into a recall election which wаs, on its face, legally defective. With the election eminent, Braach had no other option than to file this action to stop the process.
¶24 I would expand Foy to include situations such as this where an elected official is compelled to set aside a defective recall petition.