Br. C. v. Be. C.Br. C. v. Be. C.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Be. C. and Br. C. were married and had three-year-old twins, T.C. and L.C., during the following course of events. On March 16, 2022, Be. C. screamed at Br. C. for cooking their children dinner, lunged at her, and told her to “Get the fuck out of the kitchen or else.” He threw hot soup into the sink, which splashed onto L.C., and he threw a bag of cheese at Br. C. Be. C. continued to yell and look for more things to grab, so Br. C. called 911 and obtained an emergenсy protective order against Be. C.
In August 2022, the court held a trial on Br. C.‘s request for a DVRO against Be. C. Along with evidence of the March 16 incident, the trial court also heard evidence that Be. C. would slam cabinets, and plates, throw water bottles at walls, and yell at Br. C. during the twins’ bedtime. This occurred every night for approximately one year. Be. C. called Br. C. derogatory namеs on a daily basis, such as “fat psycho bitch,” “stupid,” and “lazy,” and said that she wanted to and deserved to “be treated like shit.” The twins would hear the fights and often beg their dad to stop yelling.
The trial court also heard two recordings from February 12, 2022. In the first one, Be. C. yelled at Br. C. in front of their children. He called her a “fucking moron,” and “[f]ucking bitch,” and told her to “get the fuck out [of] here. Cause I‘m better off without you anyway.” The second recording was taken while Be. C. was driving Br. C. in a car. Be. C. began to argue with Br. C., and she asked him numerous times to please pull over and let her out of the car. Be. C. refused, instead continually cursing, and berating her for taking four hours to get ready to leave. Br. C. apologized repeatedly.
After hearing eight witnesses and considering numerous exhibits, the trial court granted the DVRO. While it acknowledged that evidence of physical abuse was not substantial, it found that the evidence demonstrated conduct that destroyed the mental or emotional calm of Br. C., and placed her in apprehension of serious bodily injury. The order requires Be. C. to stay away from Br. C., their children, and their dogs, for a three-year period, except for court-ordered visitation with the children.
DISCUSSION
We initially address the deficiencies in Be. C.‘s briefing. An appellant‘s brief must “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the reсord” (
I
Admissibility of Recordings
First, Be. C. challenges the admission of the three audio recordings. The trial court initially granted Be. C.‘s motion to exclude the recordings on the ground that Be. C. did not know he was being recorded at the time, citing
Br. C. first contends that Be. C. failed to adequately preserve the objection for appeal because his counsel did not object when the trial court admitted the exhibits into evidence. Although Be. C.‘s counsel injected uncertainty into the record by declining to object at that time, we nonetheless find that Be. C.‘s motion in limine sufficiently preserved the issue for appeal. A motion in limine preserves an objection where “(1) a specific legal ground for exclusion was advanced through an in limine motion and
Here, as we discuss in greater detail below, the trial court did not err in finding
“Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a statute we ascertain the Legislature‘s intent in order to effectuate the law‘s purpose. [Citation.] We must look to the statute‘s words and give them ‘their usual and ordinary meaning.’ [Citation.] ‘The statute‘s plain meaning controls the court‘s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’ [Citations.] ‘If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts mаy consider other aids, such as the statute‘s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 387-388.)
First, although the statutory text could be read to require an active DVRO request before otherwise confidential communications are recorded, the statutory language does not explicitly require that a victim must petition for a DVRO before recording evidеnce of domestic abuse. While the Legislature could have drafted the statute with this express procedural precondition, it did not do so. Instead, it used the phrase “is seeking a [DVRO] from a court” when recording the communication. The use of more general language—“is seeking“—suggests a broader construction under which the victim is attempting to obtain evidence in support of a future DVRO. Thus, the primary inquiry
Further, to the extent the phrase “is seeking” is ambiguous, the legislative history supports our reading of the statute. The Legislature added subdivision (b) to section 633.6 in 2017 to “allow[] a party to a confidential communication to record the conversation for the purpose of obtaining information reasonably believed to relate to the crime of domestic violence.” (Stats. 2017, ch. 191, § 2; Assem. Floor Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 413 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.).) The comments explained that, before the bill‘s enactment, California was ” ‘one of only 11 states that does not allow a domestic violence survivor to use recorded evidence of her abuse in a courtroom unless the abuser gives consent to being recorded.’ ” (Assеm. Floor Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 413 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), as amended Jul. 11, 2017, p. 3 [quoting the bill‘s author‘s comments].) Consequently, a survivor who tried to admit recordings of domestic violence could ” ‘be sued in civil court by the abusive party and charged criminally by the state,’ ” and thus would be ” ‘in danger of not receiving the help they need from our court system.’ ” (Ibid.) Without the enactment of
Turning then to this case, there is no dispute here that Br. C. made the recordings before filing her DVRO petition. And, as we have discussed, the recordings were clearly germane to the question of the existence of, and extent of, Be. C.‘s abuse. Thus, the applicability of
The record on this question is fairly sparse. However, at the motion in limine hearing, Br. C. states under oath that she made the recordings “because of the domestic violence and [sic] not used to what was happening, and for the protection of myself and the children.” She testified that she told Be. C. when she was recording, and that “he needs to stop” his abusive behavior or she was “going to need to report.” This testimony
II
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, Be. C. contends that the trial court did not afford sufficient weight to his testimony and exhibits, appearing to gеnerally argue that the evidence does not support the grant of the DVRO. We conclude that substantial evidence of domestic violence supports the trial court‘s ruling.
“We review an order granting or denying a DVRO for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] In reviewing the trial court‘s factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence rule. [Citation.] The inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the court‘s finding, nоt whether a contrary finding might have been made. [Citation.] We accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court‘s findings and resolve every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.]” (M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1143-1144.)
Here, the trial court heard substantial evidence of Be. C.‘s abuse against Br. C., often in their children‘s presence. Be. C. threatened and harassed Br. C., аt times placing Br. C. in apprehension of imminent serious bodily harm. Br. C. testified that on numerous occasions, Be. C. would yell and curse at her and call her names. He would also slam and throw objects on a daily basis during the children‘s bedtime. On one
Based on the foregoing, the DVRO is affirmed.
The order is affirmed. Br. C. shall recover her costs on appeal. (
\s\
Krause. J.
We concur:
\s\
Earl, P. J.
\s\
Keithley, J.*
* Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to