In January 1995, BP moved for a summary judgment. BP argued that when it supplied gasoline to its own company-owned stations, it did not use a "transfer price" within the meaning of the AMFMA. BP also contended that, in any event, it did not violate the AMFMA because, it said, the AMFMA does not require integrated oil companies like BP to establish a transfer price.
The Hopkinses opposed BP's motion for a summary judgment. They contended that the AMFMA requires BP and other vertically integrated refiners to establish a transfer price for gasoline transferred to company-operated stations from their marketing unit.
The circuit court denied BP's motion, without an opinion. This Court granted BP permission to appeal from the denial of the summary judgment. See Rule 5, Ala.R.App.P.
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce in this state to . . . transfer motor fuel to itself . . . at a transfer price that is below cost or lower than the price it charges a person who purchases for resale on the same day and at the same distribution level, within the same market area, where the effect is to injure competition."
Section
"TRANSFER PRICE: Includes the price used by a person in transferring motor fuel to itself or an affiliate for resale at another marketing level. Such price shall be determined *1054 using standard, functional accounting procedures."
Section
"All persons engaged in commerce in this state are required to disclose, upon request, their transfer prices on each grade of motor fuel transferred or sold to itself or an affiliate for resale at another marketing level of distribution. Such disclosure shall only be made to those persons affected by such transfer prices or in any legal proceedings arising from this chapter."
BP argues that because it has not established a transfer price between its marketing unit and its company-owned and -operated stations, then the provisions of the AMFMA do not apply to BP. The Hopkinses, on the other hand, argue that the AMFMA requires BP and other vertically integrated refiners to establish a transfer price for gasoline supplied to company-operated stations. Any other interpretation of the AMFMA, the Hopkinses argue, would defeat the chief objective of the AMFMA. We agree with the Hopkinses.
"In construing a statute, the intent of the legislature, as expressed in the statute, is ascertained and effectuated, and that intent may be gleaned from considering the language used, the reason and necessity for the act, and the goals sought to be accomplished." McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc.,
If we were to adopt BP's argument that an integrated oil company like BP can decide for itself whether it will maintain a transfer price, then every integrated refiner operating retail outlets in Alabama could avoid AMFMA liability by refusing to establish a transfer price when transferring gasoline to company-operated stations. Such an interpretation of the AMFMA would defeat the purpose of that statute and would nullify and eliminate the statute entirely — it would be impossible to establish a violation of the AMFMA's prohibition of discriminatory pricing unless there are two prices to compare. In order to give a reasonable interpretation to the statute and to effectuate the legislative intent to "encourage fair and honest competition," we interpret the statute as requiring that an oil company furnishing gasoline both to independent stations and to company-operated stations establish a transfer price with respect to intracompany transfers of gasoline to its company-operated retail stations.
BP contends that an interpretation of the AMFMA that requires an oil company to establish a transfer price makes the statute unconstitutionally vague. We disagree. " 'For [the statute] to constitute a deprivation of due process, it must be "so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all." ' " Friday v. Ethanol Corp.,
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied BP's motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
MADDOX, HOUSTON, KENNEDY and COOK, JJ., concur.
