¶ 1 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma certified two first impression questions of Oklahoma law to this Court under the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.2001 §§ 1601, et seq. The federal court asks:
“1. Whether, under Oklahoma Law, the term ‘any insured’ in an ‘Auto Exclusion’ clause of a commercial general liability policy excludes from coverage all automobile occurrences attributable to any of the insureds?; and
2. Whether, under Oklahoma Law, the inclusion of both an ‘Auto Exclusion’ clause and a ‘separation of insureds’ clause in a commercial general liability policy creates an ambiguity in the contract?”
We answer the initial question, “yes”. Our answer to the second question is “no”. Our first determination: is supported by the plain language of the commercial general liability policy (general liability policy) clearly excluding all coverage for automotive incidents involving any insured; 1 aligns us with the *834 overwhelming majority of courts addressing the issue; and is supported by this Court’s jurisprudence. As to the second question, we are convinced that the position taken by those jurisdictions recognizing that a clear and unambiguous exclusion should not be negated by a severability clause is consistent with Oklahoma law. We also find significant the clear and unambiguous exclusion coupled with no indication that any premium was paid for that automotive liability coverage under the general liability policy.
CERTIFIED FACTS 2 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 2 In June of 2001, the plaintiff/appellant, B.P. America, Inc. (insured/BP), entered into a construction contract with Doyal W. Rowland Construction, Inc. (Rowland). Besides being obligated under the contract to do certain construction work, the contract also required B.P. to obtain $1,000,000.00 in general liability coverage and automotive liability insurance. 3
*835 ¶ 3 As required under the construction contract, the defendant/appellee, State Auto and Casualty Insurance Company 4 (insurer), issued two policies. The first was issued on January 20, 2002, covering the general liability requirements of the contract. It listed Rowland as the named insured and BP as an additional insured. Less than a month later, on February 7, 2002, the second policy issued covering automotive liability containing the same designations for Rowland and BP as named insured, and additional insured, respectively. Both policies were in full force and effect from April Í6, 2002, to April 16, 2003.
¶ 4 On July 23, 2002, a multi-ear accident occurred involving a dump truck driven by a Rowland employee. Three individuals were fatally injured and a fourth sustained significant injuries. Multiple lawsuits were filed as a result of the accident. In different combinations, the suits named the employee, Rowland, BP and the insurer as defendants. All the personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits were settled with the insurer contributing $1,000,000.00 to the settlement pursuant to the automotive liability policy.
¶ 5 On June 16, 2004, the insured filed suit against the insurer in federal court seeking recovery under the general liability policy. Recognizing that the lawsuit involved issues of first impression Oklahoma law, the federal court certified questions to this Court pursuant to the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.2001 §§ 1601, et seq. We set a briefing cycle which was concluded on August 16, 2005.
WELL-SETTLED OKLAHOMA STANDARDS FOR INSURANCE CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION
¶ 6 Insurance policies are contracts 5 interpreted as a matter of law. 6 Parties may contract for risk coverage and will be bound by policy terms. 7 When policy provisions are unambiguous and clear, the employed language is accorded its ordinary, plain meaning; and the contract is enforced carrying out the parties’ intentions. 8 The policy is read as a whole, giving the words and terms their ordinary meaning, enforcing each part thereof. 9 ■ This Court may not rewrite an insurance contract to benefit either party. 10 It is the insurer’s responsibility to draft clear provisions of exclusion. 11 We will *836 not impose coverage where the policy language clearly does not intend that a particular individual or risk should be covered. 12 Furthermore, a split in authority over whether a certain term is ambiguous will not, in itself, establish an ambiguity 13 nor will the fact that the parties disagree, 14 as the issue is one of law for the Court. 15 Finally, payment of premiums is a crucial factor in determining whether a specific coverage is available to the insured. 16
DISCUSSION
¶ 7 a. Usage of the term “any insured” in an exclusionary clause clearly and unambiguously indicates that coverage will be denied to all insureds — even innocent parties.
¶8 The exclusionary clause provides in pertinent part:
“... 2. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
... g. Aircraft, Auto Or Watercraft
‘Bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any ... ‘auto’ ... owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured. Use includes operation and ‘loading or unloading’.... ”
¶ 9 The insured maintains that the language is not so clear as to be unambiguous and that “any” should be read, not in the sense of “all”, but as “the”. Under this interpretation, the insured contends that only negligent insureds should be denied coverage. The insurer asserts that the exclusion clearly and unambiguously negates coverage to all insureds when any individual insured’s actions fall within the exclusionary clause. It argues that the provision cannot be interpreted to allow coverage to an innocent insured when all automotive liability coverage of any insured is specifically disallowed.
¶ 10 The overwhelming number of courts, addressing policy language similar to that at issue here, determines, as a matter of law, that the term “any insured” in an exclusionary clause is unambiguous and expresses a definite and certain intent to deny coverage to all insureds — even to innocent parties. 17 *837 These jurisdictions recognize that to impose liability on the insurer would raise coverage where none was intended and no premium was collected. 18 Furthermore, the majority acknowledges that only by ignoring the plain language of the contract relating to “any insured” will an ambiguity be created. 19 Insureds have not been allowed to avoid the clear application of exclusions relating to “any insured” by conjuring up ambiguities nor have they convinced courts to apply tortured interpretations to create them. 20 One court has clearly instructed insurers that ex-elusions will be upheld where the clause refers to “any insured” as opposed to “a insured”, “an insured” or “the insured”. 21
¶ 11 As does the majority, this Court upholds coverage exclusions where policy language is clear and unambiguous. 22 Furthermore, we wdll not interpret an insurance contract to extend coverage where none is intended. 23 Finally, except where public policy concerns demand the imposition of coverage, insurers are not required to cover a loss for which no premium has been *838 paid — as is the situation here. 24 Rather, we uphold clear and unambiguous exclusionary clauses.
¶ 12 In
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Cowen Construction, Inc.,
¶ 13 We again addressed exclusions under a general liability policy in
Dodson v. Saint Paul Ins. Co.,
¶ 14 We upheld an automotive liability exclusion in a homeowner’s policy in
Phillips v. Estate of Greenfield,
¶ 15 We find the reasoning of the majority persuasive. It is also consistent with this Court’s interpretative position on general liability insurance contracts expressed in Cow-en and Dodson 27 and our upholding of the automotive liability exclusion in Phillips 28 — recognizing that to rule otherwise would re *839 quire us to ignore the clear language of an exclusion and expand the policy terms well beyond the parties’ reasonable expectations. 29 As does this Court, the majority: treats the insurance policy as a contract, enforcing it consistent with the expressed intentions of the parties; considers and gives effect to all policy provisions; and focuses on a reasonable person’s understanding. 30 Furthermore, adopting the position advanced by the insured would require that we unilaterally convert a general liability policy — without motor vehicle coverage — into a automotive liability policy. This we will not do. 31
¶ 16 The first certified question is answered in the affirmative. We hold that, under Oklahoma Law, the term ‘any insured’ in an ‘Auto Exclusion’ clause of a commercial general liability policy excludes from coverage all automotive occurrences attributable to any of the insureds.
¶ 17 b. The inclusion of a severability clause in an insurance policy does not render an otherwise clear and unambiguous exclusionary clause questionable.
¶ 18 The commercial policy’s severability clause is denoted as “Separation of Insureds” providing:
“Except with respect to the Limits of Insurance, and any rights or duties specifically assigned in this Coverage Part to the first Named Insured, this insurance applies:
a. As if each Named Insured were the only Named Insured; and
b. Separately as to each insured against whom claim is made or ‘suit’ is brought.”
¶ 19 The insured argues that, even if the exclusionary clause is clear when read in isolation, the insurer’s inclusion of a sev-erability of interests provision renders it ambiguous. The assertion rests on an argument that if, under the severability clause, each insured is treated as having a separate policy, only the negligent insured should be denied coverage. In contrast, the insurer insists that, by ignoring the term “any insured” in the exclusionary clause and imposing coverage where none was intended, otherwise clear and unambiguous policy provisions are rendered meaningless.
¶ 20 Severability clauses are intended to spread protection, to the limits of coverage, among all the named insureds. Some courts determine that the existence of an exclusion coupled with a severability clause raises an ambiguity extending coverage to innocent insureds under the policy. 32 These *840 tribunals treat a severance clause as creating individual coverage for each separate insured. 33 Nevertheless, the courts recognize that policy language similar to that at issue here, relating to “any insured”, may make it clear that all coverage was intended to be excluded. 34 Furthermore, at least one jurisdiction has acknowledged that disallowing the exclusion makes the phrase “any insured” superfluous. 35
¶21 Other courts note that utilization of the term “any insured” in the presence of a severability clause does not create an ambiguity giving rise to insurance coverage where the exclusion is clear. 36 They reason that to hold otherwise would effectively nullify exclusions from coverage in any case involving coinsureds — despite a clearly drafted exclusionary provision. 37 These courts realize that imposing coverage requires a tortured reading of the insurance agreement, expanding liability beyond that bargained for by a reasonable person under the plain policy language. 38 It also invites collusion among insureds, whereby any one insured could make a damage claim caused by any other insured. 39 These courts determine that, in the presence of an exclusionary clause utilizing the term “any insured”, a claim made against any insured for conduct arising out of the specific conduct within the exclusionary clause, is barred. 40 Failure to so hold results in the specific terms of the exclusionary clause being overriden by a more general *841 severability provision. 41 Furthermore, it requires the court to ignore and treat as superfluous, the term “any” in the policy language. 42 It also ignores the purpose of the severability clause — to afford each insured a full measure of coverage up to the policy limits, rather than to negate bargained-for and plainly-worded exclusions. 43 Finally, at least one court has refused to engage in semantics and simply determines that once you find there is no potential for coverage, coverage may not be imposed simply because the policy also applies severally. 44
¶22 The majority/minority split is not as dramatic on this issue as it is in relation to interpretation of the exclusionary provision. Nevertheless, clearly most courts addressing the issue of whether a severability clause will render a clear and unambiguous exclusionary provision doubtful determine that the clear language of the exclusion must prevail.
¶23 In the context of exclusionary language relating to “any insured”, the majority determines that the severability clause’s only effect is to alter the meaning of the term “the insured” to reflect who is seeking coverage. 45 The separation of insureds clause has no effect on the clear language of the exclusionary clause. Simply, a claim made against any insured is excluded. The purpose of severability is not to negate plainly worded exclusions. 46
¶ 24 Here, the first indication that automotive coverage was never anticipated under the general liability policy is the contract between the insured and Rowland. The contract specifically required two policies: one for general liability insurance and the second for automotive liability insurance. The contract is also instructive in that it recognized the general liability policy would contain some exclusions from coverage. The only exclusion that the contract specifically provides shall be deleted from the general liability policy is one for watercraft operation, if work is to be done over navigable waters. It does not require that the automotive liability exclusion be deleted. 47
¶ 25 The second indication that automotive liability coverage was not intended to be included in the general liability policy appears on the series one contractor’s general liability policy common declaration’s page. Premiums were collected for commercial general liability coverage and an item delineated as “contractors special coverage”. There is no premium listed for automotive liability coverage.
¶26 The third clue that no automobile liability coverage was intended under the general liability insurance contract is seen in the policy on a page denominated as “Commercial General Liability Coverage Form”. It specifically provides that various provisions in the policy restrict coverage. It then lists the coverages for bodily injury and property damage and the exclusions. The automotive liability exclusion appears as § 2(g). 48
¶ 27 The position taken by those jurisdictions recognizing that a clear and unambiguous exclusion should not be negated by a severability clause is most consistent with the manner in which this Court views policy exclusions.
Wynn v. Avemco Ins. Co.,
¶ 28 We have already determined that the automotive liability exclusion is clear and contains no ambiguity. The contract between the insured and Rowland anticipated that there would be two policies purchased— one for general liability and one for automotive liability. 49 The contract did not require coverage for automotive liability to be included in the general liability policy. Rather, a second policy was purchased to insure against automotive liability claims. The general declaration’s page of the general liability policy contained no charge for automotive coverage and the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form specifically provides that various provisions in the policy restrict coverage. It lists coverages for bodily injury and property damage, specifically excluding automotive liability. 50
¶ 29 We answer the second certified question in the negative. Under the facts presented, where the exclusion is clear and unambiguous and there is no indication that automotive liability coverage was intended in the general liability policy, the inclusion of both an “Auto Exclusion” clause and a “separation of insureds” clause in a commercial general liability policy will not create an ambiguity in the contract.
CONCLUSION
¶ 30 Upholding the vehicle exclusion in the general liability policy does not burden the insured with an unjust result. The liability limits of the automotive policy have been paid, and there is no evidence that a specific premium was collected for automotive coverage in the general liability policy. 51 We are persuaded by those jurisdictions which refuse to let a general severability provision trump a clear and unambiguous exclusion. To do otherwise, would require that we rewrite the contract — a task we may not undertake. 52
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
Notes
. The commercial policy provides in pertinent part:
"... 2. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
... g. Aircraft, Auto Or Watercraft
'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or en-trustment to others of any ... 'auto' ... owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any *834 insured. Use includes operation and 'loading or unloading’...." [Emphasis in original.]
. In answering a certified question, the Court does not presume facts outside those offered by the certification order.
In re Harris,
The insured relies primarily on a 10 th Circuit case,
West American Ins. Co. v. AV & S,
. The Master Service Contract provides in pertinent part:
"... (D) The following insurance policies and coverages are required:
... Commercial General Liability Insurance, including bodily injury and property damage with minimum limits not less than $1,000,000.00 per occurrence. The Commercial General Liability policy shall include the following coverages as they apply to the Work to be performed, each with minimum limits not less than $1,000,000.00 per occurrence.
(a) Independent Contractors' and Contractual Liability coverage required for all Work, without exception.
(b) Products Liability/Completed Operations coverage required for any Work that results in a finished product or that involves or results in the construction.
(c) Explosion, collapse, and underground hazards coverage required for any Work involving excavation, blasting, use of explosives, or construction, erection, or installation of buildings, structures, or equipment.
*835 (d) Deletion of non-owned watercraft exclusion if any Work is performed on or over navigable waters or involves maritime workers or vessels.
3.Automobile Liability Insurance with minimum limits not less than $1,000,000.00, and including bodily injury, property damage, and contractual auto liability, for all owned, hired, and non-owned vehicles that will be used in the performance of Work under this Contract....”
. Although our order of July 7, 2005, setting a briefing schedule referred to the defendant/appel-lee as State Automobile Insurance Company, it appears that the company was terminated as a party and State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Company was added by minute order of January 7, 2005. Furthermore, an unopposed motion was filed on September 6, 2005, requesting the style change.
.
American Economy Ins. Co. v. Bogdahn,
see note 2 at ¶ 8, supra;
Cranfill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
.
Dodson v. Saint Paul Ins. Co.,
.
American Economy Ins. Co. v. Bogdahn,
see note 2, supra;
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v.
Cow
en Constr., Inc.,
. Title 15 O.S.2001 § 154; 36 O.S.2001 § 3621;
Phillips v. Estate of Greenfield,
.
United States v. H.G. Cozad Construction Co.,
. American Economy Ins. Co. v. Bogdahn, see note 2, supra; Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., see note 2, supra; Wiley v. Travelers Ins. Co., see note 7, supra.
.
McDonald v. Schreiner,
. American Economy Ins. Co. v. Bogdahn, see note 2, supra.
. Id. at ¶ 20, supra.
.
Southern Hospitality, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co.,
. Dodson v. Saint Paul Ins. Co., see note 6, supra.
. See,
Spears v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.,
.
Canutillo Independent School Dist. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
To the contrary, see,
Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Corp. v. Benfield,
. Canutillo Independent School Dist. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, see note 17, supra; Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Sampson, see note 17, supra.
. Michael Carbone, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., see note 17, supra; Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Moore, see note 17, supra; Murphy v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., see note 17, supra.
. Spezialetti v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., see note 17, supra; Stearns-Roger Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., see note 17, supra.
.
Northern Security Ins. Co. v. Perron,
. VBF, Inc. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., see note 2; Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, see note 2, supra.
. Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., see note 25 at ¶ 14, infra.
. See,
Breakfield v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mutual Ins. Co.,
. See also,
Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc.
. It is instructive to note that in deciding
Phillips, v. Estate of Greenfield,
see note 8, supra, we cited a case from South Dakota. In
Great Central Ins. Co. v. Roemmich,
. Our holdings are not in conflict with
Hartline v. Hartline,
. The insured’s arguments that
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Cowen Construction, Inc.,
. Also supportive of our determination is
Pierce v. Oklahoma Property & Casualty Ins, Co.,
. Chacon v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., see note 17, supra.
. See, City of Manchester v. General Reinsurance Corp., note 17, supra.
.West American Ins. Co. v. AV & S,
see note 2, supra [Applying Utah law.];
Shapiro v. American Home Assurance Co.,
see note 7, supra;
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
.
Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Association,
. See, American Nat’l Fire Insurance Co. v. Fournelle, see note 32, supra; Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of New York v. Watson, see note 32, supra. But see, Brumley v. Lee, see note 32, supra.
. Worcester Mutual Ins. Co. v. Marnell, see note 32, supra
.
All American Ins. Co. v. Burns,
see note 17, supra;
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim,
see note 17, supra;
American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Corrigan;
see note 17, supra;
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Moore,
see note 17, supra;
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,
see note 17, supra;
Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C.,
see note 17, supra;
Petticrew v. ABB Lummus Global, Inc.,
.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim,
see note 17, supra;
Northwest G.F. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Norgard,
see note 36, infra;
American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Eastman,
.
McAllister v. Millville Mutual Ins. Co.,
. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Maxey, see note 17, supra.
. Id.
. Caroff v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, see note 17, supra.
.
Id.; Worcester Mutual Ins. Co. v. Marnell,
.
California Casualty Ins. Co. v. Northland Ins. Co.,
see note 36, supra;
Jones v. Reliable Security Inc.,
see note 36, supra;
Hayes v. United Fire & Casualty Co.,
.
Castro v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Maxey, see note 17, supra. See also, American Nat’l Fire Insurance Co. v. Fournelle, note 32, supra.
. Northwest G.F. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Norgard, see note 36, supra; American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moore, see note 17, supra.
. See Master Contract provisions, note 3, supra.
. See note 1, supra.
. The issuance of two distinct policies evidences some intent to avoid duplicated coverage. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., see note 17, supra; Oaks v. Dupuy, see note 36, supra.
. See note 1, supra.
. Oaks v. Dupuy, see note 36, supra.
.
Wynn v. Avemco Ins. Co.,