delivered the opinion of the Court.
•This is а writ of error to the circuit court of the district of Maryland, between the same parties, and upon the same judgment on which the bill in equity, which has just been disposed of, was founded. The facts relative to the judgments need not be again repeated, as they arе fully disclosed in the preceding cause.
The object of the present writ of error is to revise the decision of the circuit court in refusing to quash a writ of venditioni exponas issued for the sale of the ship General Smith, which Was seized upon the fieri facias оn the judgment, upon a motion made by the counsel for Boyle for that purpose.
The first question naturally presenting itself upon this posture of the facts is, whether a writ of error lies in such a case. It is material to state, thаt no error is assigned on the origihal judgment, or on the award of the fieri facias, which indeed are conceded to have been rightfully issued, and to be above exception. But the error assigned is the supposed irregularity and incorrectness of the awаrd of the venditioni exponas, after the writ of injunction from the chancery side of the court had been granted.
The argument to maintain the writ of error has proceeded, in a great measure, upon grounds which are not in the slightest degree controvertеd by this court. It is admitted that the language in Co. Litt. 288, b. is entirely correct, in stating that
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a writ of error lieth when a man is grieved by an error in
In Brooks v. Hunt, 17 Johns. Rep. 484, Mr Chancellor Kent, in delivering the opinion of the court of errors, alluding to this practice, said, “it is notan uncommon thing for a court of law, if the case be difficult or dubious, to refuse to relieve a party after judgment and execution in a summary. way by motion, and to put him to his audita querela.” That was a case very similar to the present. A motion was made to the supreme court of New York to set aside a fieri facias, on the ground that the party was discharged under the insolvent laws of that state. The court refused the motion; and on error brought, the court of errors of New York quashed the writ of error. Mr Chancellor Kent, on behalf of the court, assigned as one of the grounds of quashing the writ of error, that the rulp or order denying the motion was not a judgment within the meaning.of the constitution or laws of New York. It was only a decision upon a collateral or interlocutory point,
We consider all motions of this sort tо quash executions, as addressed to the sound discretion of the court; and as a summary relief, which the court is not compellable to allow» The party is deprived of no right by the- refusal; and he is at full liberty to redress his grievance by writ of error, or audita querelа; or other remedy known to the common law. The refusal to quash is not, in the sense of the common law, a judgment; much less is it a final judgment. It is a mere interlocutory order. Even at the common law, error only lies from a final judgment;‘and by the express provisions of the judiciаry act of 1786, chap. 20, sec, 22, a writ of error lies to this court only in cases of final judgments.
But. if this objection were not, as we think it is, insuperable, there would be' other decisive objections against the party. In the first place, the very ground of argument to maintain the motion to quash is, that the injunction operated as a supersedeas of the execution, according to the acts of Maryland of 1723, chap. 8, and of 1799, chap. 79, regulating proceedings
The chancery jurisdiction given by the constitution and laws of the United States is the same in all the states of the union, and the rule of decision is the same jn all. ' In the exercise of. that jurisdiction, the courts of the United States are not governed by the state practice; but thе act of congress of 1792, ch. 36, has provided that the modes of proceeding in equity suits shall be according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity, as contradistinguished from •courts of law. And the settled doctrine of this court is, that the, remеdies in equity are to be administered, not according to the state practice, but according to. the practice of courts of equity in the parent country, as contradistinguished from that of courts of law; subject,-of course, to the provisions of thе acts of congress, and to such alterations and rules as in the exercise of the powers delegated by those acts* the courts of the United States may, from time to time, prescribe. Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. R. 212; United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. R. 108. So that, in this view of the matter, the effect' of the injunction granted by the circuit court was to be decided by the general principles of courts of equity, and not by any peculiar statute enactments of the state of Maryland.
•Strictly spealting, at the common law an injunction in equity does not operate as a supersedeas; although it may furnish a proper ground for the court of law,in which the judgment isrendered, to interfere by summary order to quash or stay the proceedings on the execution. If the injunction is disobeyed, a court of еquity has its own mode of administering suitable redress. But a court of law is under no obligations to enforce it as a matter of right or duty. In respect to suits at common law, it is true that the laws of the United States have adopted the forms of writs, executions and other proсess, and the modes of proceeding authorized and used under the state laws, subject, however, to such alterations and additions as may from time to time be made by the courts of the United States. But writs and cxe
But if the injunction could be admitted to operate as a Supersedeas at law, under any circumstances, in the courts of the United States, there would yet remain a decisive objection against its application in the present case. Nothing is bettef settled at the common law than the doctrine that' a supersedeas, in order to stay proceedings on an execution, must come before there is a levy made under the execution; for if it comes afterwards, the sheriff is at liberty to proceed upon a writ of venditioni exponas to sell the goods. There are many cases in the books to this effect; but they are admirably summed up by Lord Chief Justice Willis, in delivering the opinion of the court in Meriton v. Stevens, Willis’s R. 271, 280; to which alone therefore it seems necessary to refer. See Charter v. Pector, Cro. Eliz. 597, Moore’s R. 542; Clark v. Withers, 6 Mod. 290, 293, 298; S. C. 1 Salk. 321; Blanchard v. Myers, 9 John. R. 66; 2 Tidd’s Pr. 1072; Com. Dig. Execution, C. 5, C. 8; Bac. Abridg. Supersedeas, G. See also M’Cullough v. Guetner, 1 Binn. R. 214.
In the present case, the levy on the fieri facias was made more than a week before the injunction was granted; so that, according to the course of the common law, it ought not to operate as a supersedeas to the venditioni exponas.
In every view of this case it is clear that there is no error in the proceedings, which is revisablo by this court. Whatever might have been properly done by the circuit court, upon
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the .same is hereby affirmed, with costs and damages at the rate of six per centum per annum.