The sole issue raised by this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence in an action for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. The defendant, John H. Wenk, asserts that it was error for the judge to deny his motion for a directed verdict, and after the
*593
verdict to deny his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 50,
In reviewing the denial of Wenk’s motion for a directed verdict,
2
we view the evidence most favorable to Boyle. See
Uloth
v.
City Tank Corp.,
Wenk was employed by Consulting Investigators, Inc., to do private investigative work. 3 Wenk was asked to investigate the health and capacity for work of one John Walsh.
Walsh is the plaintiffs brother-in-law; he and his wife live in an apartment upstairs from the Boyles’ home. In the course of his investigation Wenk called the Boyle home and began asking personal questions about Walsh. The plaintiff suggested to Wenk that he call Walsh directly; she also asked Wenk not to call again as she had just been discharged from the hospital. 4
*594 In spite of the plaintiffs request, the next week Wenk called the plaintiffs home at 1 a.m. The plaintiff was alone with her children, 5 and she was disquieted by the late hour of the call. She told Wenk not to call again and hung up. After the call the plaintiff was fearful, upset, and unable to sleep. The next week Wenk appeared at the Walsh apartment; Mrs. Walsh invited Boyle upstairs. When asked, Wenk admitted that he had been calling Boyle. The plaintiff told Wenk that he "had [her] terrified.”
Then Wenk asked Walsh what he did for a living, and Walsh answered that he "robbed banks.” In Boyle’s presence, Wenk retorted that he had been "in prison too for rape.” The police were summoned.
When two police detectives arrived, the police observed that Boyle was crying and agitated. The detectives asked Wenk to identify himself, and Wenk responded, "I’m a police officer.” When challenged, Wenk admitted he was engaged in private investigative work.
Boyle, Wenk, the Walshes, and the detectives went to the police station. Boyle was weeping. At the police station she became weak and sick due to hemorrhaging. Blood was observed on Boyle’s chair after she left the station to seek medical assistance.
Boyle was under a physician’s care for an extended period of time after these events. Boyle also sought the assistance of a psychiatrist. There was ample medical evidence as to Boyle’s injuries, as well as evidence of a causal relationship between Boyle’s emotional condition and the phone calls from Wenk. 6
Wenk asserts that as a matter of law these facts do not evidence the "extreme and outrageous” conduct necessary to support a claim for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. See
George
v.
Jordan Marsh Co.,
However, in our view, Wenk did engage in a pattern of conduct which a jury could find was extreme and outrageous, exceeding mere insult or minor annoyance. Wenk’s conduct may reasonably be viewed as an attempt to intentionally shock and harm a person’s "peace of mind” by invading the person’s mental or emotional tranquility.
The flaw in Wenk’s argument is that he isolates each individual incident and ignores the fact that the jury are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the totality of circumstances. See
Poirier
v.
Plymouth,
*596
Significantly, Wenk’s conduct continued even after Dolores Boyle, in the first call, had told him not to call again.
8
See
George, supra
at 245-246;
Dawson
v.
Associates Fin. Servs. Co. of Kansas, Inc.,
Though there is no evidence that Wenk knew the precise nature of Mrs. Boyle’s physical susceptibility, his knowledge that she had just returned from the hospital put him on notice that she might be more vulnerable to harassment or verbal abuse. See
Dawson
v.
Associates Fin. Servs. Co. of Kansas, Inc.,
We are mindful of the need for limits on recovery for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress: "No pressing social need requires that every abusive outburst be converted into a tort; upon the contrary, it would be unfortunate if the law closed all the safety valves *597 through which irascible tempers might legally blow off steam.” 9 Magruder, supra at 1053. Moreover, the courts must be particularly wary in this area to avoid fictitious claims. Agis, supra at 143. 10 Hochman, "Outrageousness” and Privilege in the Law of Emotional Distress — A Suggestion, 47 Cornell L.Q. 61, 63 (1961).
However, where a person engages in intentional conduct which is designed to, and actually does, result in severe emotional and physical damage, the possibility of trivial or fictitious claims does not justify denial of recovery to the victim.
Agis, supra
at 143-145.
State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n
v.
Siliznoff,
Finally, Wenk argues that the judge mistakenly believed that "it was the sole prerogative of the jury” to determine liability in a case alleging infliction of emotional distress. This contention is not supported by the record.
The judge did express doubts concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and indicated that he might grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the jury found for Dolores Boyle. The judge’s comments indicate that he carefully scrutinized the evidence before ruling on Wenk’s motions. Ultimately the judge concluded
*598
that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to consider whether Wenk’s conduct was in fact extreme and outrageous. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment h (1965);
Womack
v.
Eldridge,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
We transferred Wenk’s appeal to this court from the Appeals Court on our own motion.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company hired Consulting Investigators, Inc., who in turn hired Wenk, to investigate John Walsh’s health and capacity for employment. Boyle listed Liberty Mutual as a defendant in her amended complaint, but subsequently voluntarily dismissed that claim.
Boyle had been discharged from the hospital two days earlier after giving birth to her second child.
Boyle’s husband was working a night shift.
Wenk is not challenging the sufficiency of the medical evidence.
Due to Boyle’s physical injuries, this case is analogous to
George
v.
*595
Jordan Marsh Co.,
We note that the Legislature has labeled unreasonable attempts to collect personal or family debts by communication at an unreasonable hour, or with unreasonable frequency, or by use of offensive language. G. L. c. 93, § 49.
Wenk’s conduct seems to have been more than a spontaneous outburst. His conduct appears to have been a calculated tactic designed to pressure reluctant persons to reveal information useful to his investigation. See Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 63, 72 (1950).
In Agis, we allowed recovery for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, absent resulting physical injury. Where, as with Dolores Boyle, the complained of conduct results in severe physical injury, there may be less likelihood of a fictitious claim. See W. Prosser, Torts at 60 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40, 53 (1956).
Wenk argues that in a case alleging infliction of emotional distress, a two-step process is required — first the judge must determine whether the conduct may reasonably be viewed as extreme and outrageous, and second, that the jury must determine whether the conduct was in fact extreme and outrageous. This is precisely the test outlined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment h (1965). See
Golden
v.
Dungan,