Boyett v. WebsterBoyett v. Webster
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Birdsong
Following the grant of a discretionary appeal, Lois W. Boyett appeals the grant of Jesse C. Webster, Jr.’s motion in limine to exclude all evidence regarding Webster’s prior drunk driving incident during the first phase of a bifurсated personal injury and punitive damage trial. Boyett contends the trial court’s refusal to admit evidence of Webster’s previous DUI deprived her of a fair trial and resulted in the jury’s decision not to award рunitive damages. We agree and reverse.
Webster made a left-hand turn with his car and struck Boyett’s car. At the time, Webster was grossly intoxicated; he registered a BAC level of .32 on the Intoximeter 3000 one hour after the accident. Webster pleaded guilty to DUI in connection with this incident.
Boyett’s suit for compensatory and punitive damages alleged that Webster’s actions in driving while grossly intoxicated were wilful, wanton and showed а conscious disregard for the foreseeable consequences of his actions. This allegation, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, would authorize imposition of punitive damages.
1. Because admission of evidence, including ruling on a motion in limine, is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, appellate courts will not disturb the exercise of that
2. In punitive damages cases,
Further, under Georgia law, for punitive damages to be authorized, there must be evidence of wilful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, or oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise thе presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 118 (365 SE2d 827). Negligence alone, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to support a punitive damage award (Associated Health Systems v. Jones, 185 Ga. App. 798, 802 (366 SE2d 147)); something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required. “ ‘ “There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or ‘malice,’ or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or suсh a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton.” ’ ” Cullen v. Novak, 201 Ga. App. 459, 460 (411 SE2d 331), citing Colonial Pipeline, supra at 121. Nevertheless, in suits for negligence generally, evidence of similar acts or omissions on other and different occasions is not admissible. Thompson v. Moore, 174 Ga. App. 331 (329 SE2d 914), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, Moore v. Thompson, 255 Ga. 236 (336 SE2d 749). From these competing interests arises the dilemma inherent in these cases.
In this case, the trial court originally planned to balance thesе interests by severing the issues of liability and damages for the underlying tort from the issues of liability and amount of punitive damages. Upon defense counsel’s objection, however, the trial court bifurcated the trial with only thе amount of punitive damages severed from the other issues. Although Boyett’s counsel consented to the bifurcated procedure, he did so with the opinion that Webster’s prior DUI should be admissible in the first phase оf the trial. Subsequently, the trial court granted Webster’s motion in limine and excluded evidence of his previous DUI in the liability phase because Webster’s prior offense might prejudice the issue of Webster’s liability for the underlying tort.
We find this was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An exception to the general rule regarding excluding evidence of similar acts or omissions allows admission of this evidence when the defendant’s driving under the influence in the incident at issue is an aggravating circumstance which would authorize the trier of fact to impose punitive damages.
Holt v. Grinnell,
212 Ga. App. 520, 521 (441 SE2d 874), citing
Moore v. Thompson,
255 Ga. at 237. In that circumstance, the extent of the defendant’s wilful misconduct, wantonness and entire want of care in driving under the influence cannot be gauged solely by focusing on the single incident in issue and disregarding other incidents of similar conduct. See
Holt,
supra at 522. Consequently, evidence that the dеfendant previously drove under the influence on another occasion is admissible in the liability phase of a bifurcated trial because such evidence is relevant to the issue of whether punitive damаges should be awarded.
Moore v. Thompson,
255 Ga. at 237, 238. Even though the danger of prejudice is a reason to exclude this evidence, in balance, this evidence’s relevance on liability for punitive damages outweighs any prejudice if the jury is fully charged that this evidence goes only to liability for punitive damages and not to the issues of liability or damages in the particular incident on trial.
Holt,
supra at 522, citing
Thompson v. Moore,
174 Ga. App. at 333. Because
Holt
was decided based on the admissibility of the
pleas
of nolo contendere generally under
“In certain circumstances, however, that bifurcated procedure may be inadequate to avoid confusing the jury in its determination of the issues of compensatory damages and punitive damages. That is, evidence appropriately admitted to show the propriety of punitive damages may influence the jury in deciding the issue of liability for compensatory damages.” Gen. Motors Corp., supra at 887 (9). Considering the trial court’s authority to further sever the issues to avoid prejudice, this problem should not be solved solely by excluding from the jury in the liability phase evidencе of other acts of driving under the influence or other similar acts. So doing might assure defendants a fairer trial on liability for the underlying negligence at issue, but doing so in a bifurcated trial virtually assures that plaintiffs are denied fair trials on liability for punitive damages.
In this case, by merely bifurcating the trial and then excluding evidence of Webster’s prior DUI, the jury was precluded from hearing the very information needed to determine whether Wеbster showed wilful misconduct, malice, wantonness, oppression or an entire want of care sufficient to authorize punitive damages. Here, evidence that Webster had previously driven under the influence of alcohol was relevant to his liability for punitive damages that was decided in the first phase of the bifurcated trial, regardless of the potential prejudice on the underlying negligence, and notwithstanding thаt this evidence also may be relevant ultimately on the determination of the amount of damages sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant in light of the circumstances of the case. Seе
Although we recognize there may be situations in which the probative value of the similar acts may be such that severance of these issues is not required, nevertheless, in most cases trial courts should “employ a trifurcated procedure, wherein compensatory damages are litigated in the first phase of the trial; the propriety of punitive dam ages is litigated in the second phase; and the amount оf punitive damages to be awarded is litigated in the third phase of the proceeding.” Gen. Motors Corp., supra at 887 (9). Despite counsel for appellant’s arguments to the contrary, an admission of liability is not required to trifurcаte proceedings. See Hanie v. Barnett, supra. If the trial court had trifurcated these proceedings, the jury would have had the opportunity to determine whether Webster should be assessed punitive damages with the benеfit of all relevant evidence, but without possible prejudice to his liability for the underlying tort. Instead, this jury was deprived of the vital evidence necessary to determine whether Webster should be liable for punitive damages.
Further, we do not find Goss v. Total Chipping, 220 Ga. App. 643, 645 (3) (469 SE2d 855) inconsistent with this result. Although Goss affirmed the judgment in a bifurcated case in which evidence relevant to liаbility for punitive damages was excluded because it might be prejudicial on liability for the underlying tort, it did so because it found that the exclusion of the evidence was likely harmless error. Further, Goss recognized that the bеtter practice is to try liability for the underlying tort separate from liability for punitive damages. 220 Ga. App. at 646.
Accordingly, the part of the trial court’s judgment holding that punitive damages are not awarded must be reversed and thе case remanded for proceedings consistent with
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part with direction.
Beasley, C. J., and Blackburn, J., concur.