86 Ga. 379 | Ga. | 1890
After a previous writ of error in this case was disposed of (Wilson v. Boyd, 84 Ga. 84, 10 S. E. Rep. 499), the case was tried again in the courifbelow and resulted in a nonsuit, to the granting of which Boyd, the plaintiff, excepted.
Ve think what we have held above is correct, but suppose it to be incorrect as a general rule of law, and so it would be perhaps tested by the case of Ronkendorff v. Taylor, 4 Peters, 348, yet under the special facts of this particular case we think neither Parker nor Boyd could complain as against Wilson of any ambiguity in the levy and advertisement. Parker was the tax debtor, and the property was levied upon, advertised and sold as he pointed it out to the levying officer. Boyd was present at the sale and understood that the same undivided fourth of the lot which he had purchased at a previous judicial sale was being again sold. He gave notice of his prior purchase, but made no objection to the terms of the levy or advertisement
There is no error in any of the assignments contained in the bill of exceptions,- nor in the judgment of nonsuit.
Judgment affirmed.
On January 17, 1891, before the above judgment was made the judgment of the superior court, Boyd petitioned for a rehearing in the Supreme Court, on the ground that the first specific assignment of error in his bill of exceptions was not decided by that court, and that the same, together with the facts connected therewith, must have been overlooked, else the exception would have been sustained. This exception was, that the superior court erred in sustaining the levy of the taxfi.fa. when it appeared, both by the levy itself and by the other evidence, that Parker pointed out said property when he was not in possession of it, and 'when it further appeared that there was amply sufficient other property in the possession of Parker to have made the-money due on the tax ji. fa. The petition invoked the application of section 3641 of the code.
Petition for rehearing denied, this court having already decided in the same case that section 891 of the code applies to pointing out property under tax executions. See 84 Ga. p. 36. Section 3641 of the code applies, not to tax executions, but to executions founded on judgments.